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Abstract 
 
Fair-trade is investigated at three levels. Each level relates to a specific group of actors. 
The first group are the consumers of fair-trade. In this respect fair-trade overlaps with 
altruism. A model is developed which seeks out parameters by which to judge whether 
or not a person will engage into this gesture of altruism, and accordingly measures the 
fair-trade utility of the consumer. On the basis that it is voluntary, fair-trade is deemed 
to be virtuous in that it either uplifts consumer utility, or else the consumer withdraws 
their patronage. Information is hypothesised to play a key role in determining the depth 
of this relationship. 
The second group are neighbouring producers, that is the non fair-trade 
producers who compete in the same market. A situation is modelled in which fair-trade 
is viewed as a switch in demand preference rather than new demand. The model allows 
an evaluation based on the standard tenets of welfare economics: to inform upon which 
movements are value-creating, which are merely transfers, the symmetry of those 
transfers and where Pareto improvements can and cannot be realised. The policymaker 
is afforded a logical overview, but with the implication that many of the relevant 
variables may be lie beyond their direct influence.  
The third group are landless vineyard labours in South Africa who are 
empirically analysised. We observed the strongest performance of fair-trade with 
respect to subjective improvement in wellbeing and the sort of participation that could 
be categorised as empowerment.  
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General Introduction 
 
Apparently trade has little in common with love and war. 
The primary subject matter of this thesis is fairness in trade and in particular what 
Western consumers have come to recognise as being the ‘fair-trade’ movement. 
As will be brought into focus by the identifications of the literature review (Chapter 
I), the primary intention of this discourse is to consider the welfare effects that fair-trade 
has on each of the actors involved. While the majority of studies centre on the 
participating producers, this dissertation attempts a rounded understanding of fair-trade 
by separately partitioning two additional groups of actors. These are the fair-trade 
consumers themselves (voluntary-based benefactors), and the neighbouring non-
participating producers (non fair-trade producers who compete in the same market). 
Following the literature review, each chapter is dedicated to a particular group. 
Adopting an approach from behavioural economics, Chapter II considers those on the 
consumption side of the relationship; it designates fair-trade to be a form of altruism, 
and theoretically investigates why the fair-trade consumer exists. Chapter III assumes 
the stance of a classical welfare approach and, under the consideration that demand is 
limited and extra supply unwarranted, simulates the various reshuffles of welfare that 
can take place between participating and non-participating producers. In essence this 
chapter begs the question, ‘what might fair-trade mean for the incomes of producers 
who are absent from the fold’? Penultimate to rounding off the thesis as a whole, 
Chapter IV returns the feet of this thesis to the grassroots by providing an empirical case 
study of grape pickers (fair-trade wine) in South Africa. 
This dissertation does not comment on the origins of so-called ethical consumption. 
Nor is it the intention of this prologue to acquaint the reader too intimately with the 
legal and bureaucratic specifics of the fair-trade movement. What the opening section of 
this thesis does is to pick up fair-trade from the point at which the movement dropped 
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its hostility to the market (mid to late 1990s). The aim is to deliver a practical outline of 
what fair-trade is, the logistics of the movement, and the generalised standards under 
which it operates. This general introduction will round off with an expression of how 
this thesis opts to comprehend the concept of fairness. This is designed to whet the 
appetites of critics who pose the opinion that the economic mode of enquiry offers little 
time for fairness, and that proponents of market driven allocation have lost their way 
regarding a comprehension of what ‘fairness’ is. At the very least, this general 
introduction should communicate an understanding of the chosen frameworks of 
subsequent chapters.  
It is appropriate to proceed with an ‘in-house’ definition: 
Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that 
seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by 
offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalised producers 
and workers – especially in the South. Fair Trade Organisations (backed by consumers) 
are actively engaged in supporting producers, in awareness raising and in campaigning 
for changes in the rules and practices of conventional international trade. 
FINE1, October 2001.  
While the above text is touted as a definition, it may be argued that the statement 
amounts to more of a guiding principle, a constitution of sorts; as in regard to the 
realities on the ground it undeniably leaves much to the reader’s imagination. The 
specifics of various fair-trade agreements are often generalised to be inclusive of such 
definitional conditions as: a minimum price that is inclusive of a ‘social premium2’ the 
level of which guaranteed to be above the market price, partial payment in advance if 
                                                 
1 FLO IFAT NEWS……FINE is an acronym for main certifiers (regulators) of the movement.  
2 A social premium is a set amount of money that the cooperative appropriates and is supposed to put to 
use for investments from which all member may benefit, e.g. a health clinic. 
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requested, and the signing of contracts sufficient in length to afford the producers a 
predictable horizon of income. 
There is nothing overly misleading about the above definitional inventory, it states 
the rules of the game in what may be described as an ‘accurate enough’ package. 
However it’s necessary to be aware that there are occasional pragmatic departures from 
what one may typically regard as the usual suspects of fair-trade, for example, “Where 
minimum prices are not defined these must be based on covering production costs as 
defined by the producer” (OPM 2000, p.6). The fact that some products lack minimum 
prices provides an illustration of one such twist of convention. Hence emerges the 
reasoning as to why the fair-trade movement is forced to employ so broad a definition 
as its principal charter. In response to ambiguities that manifest themselves at the 
operational level, the general and practical definition of fair-trade that this discourse 
will adopt may be termed simply as: Fair-trade is a privileged trade agreement 
whereby producers and or labourers receive a degree of insulation from market forces 
and alleged market failures.  
Strictly speaking, one might reserve ‘fairtrade’ (as a single term) for discussions that 
relate to ‘the FLO3 certified movement’. Indeed, as far as the eye of the consumer is 
concerned, FLO umbrella certification likely constitutes nine tenths of the concept. 
Nevertheless, there do exist various other uncertified initiatives that are capable of 
posing a similar moral boast. Therefore, the more candid definition that this discourse is 
employing serves not only to iron out the creases from the FINE definition, but also to 
actively accommodate a number of quieter and less visible endeavours of a similar 
flavour. For the sake of consistency and inclusiveness, this discussion will stick with 
‘fair-trade’ (as a hyphenated term) throughout. More refined detail will be offered in 
appropriate sequence, for now it is enough to merely be aware that the generic standards 
                                                 
3 FLO has recently changed its name to ‘fairtrade International” for this thesis we are sticking with FLO 
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are not quite as watertight as one might expect, and that the concept as a whole is at 
times present in commodities which are not certified (see Berlan 2006, and Mohan 
2010).  
Prior to further elaborating on the problems of a definition, it is worthwhile taking a 
step back in order to consider the geography, commodities, size and growth of the 
movement. Appendices 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 offer a picturesque outline of the countries and 
commodities with which FLO-certified fair-trade is predominantly associated. In terms 
of volume and visibility, coffee has traditionally been the poster child of the fair-trade 
movement, but in regards of retail value bananas have now in some markets knocked it 
from its top spot, and other commodities continue to rise. As a whole, fair-trade is 
estimated to account for only 0.01% of global agricultural trade (Riedel, et al. 2005). 
Needless to say the markets for final consumption are those with affluent enough 
incomes to be able to support it. The Fair Trade Federation (2010) estimates that total 
global sales of fair-trade products in 2009 amounted to €3.4bn, a 15% overall increase 
on the previous year. In 2009 North American sales amounted to €1.053bn, a 20% 
increase on the year before. Sales in 2009 to Pacific Rim countries amounted to €29m, a 
55% increase compared to 2008. Europe stands out as being particularly receptive to the 
message of the movement. Appendix 0.4 depicts the market share of coffee across 
selected countries, and Appendix 0.5 displays more recent retail volumes and year on 
year growth in global sales. Whilst there is always a lag, the length of which we do not 
yet know, it is interesting to observe that the financial crisis did not appear to coincide 
with a dent in the value of the fair-trade market. 2008-2009 did however reside over a 
fall in the rate of growth, albeit still an impressive one, down from 43% in the previous 
period to 15%. Appendices 0.6 and 0.7 trace the growth of fair-trade in the UK market, 
in which total sales in 2009 are estimated to have been between £799m to 836m, and to 
have thereafter breached the billion pound mark in 2010. As estimates sometimes have 
 16
to be revised, the researcher may find slight discrepancies between various FLO annual 
reports, which are the sources of the numbers being reported here. 
In a further engagement of the FINE definition, one could assert that it is a touch 
myopic to view this problem of fairness in trade as being a North–South issue as 
opposed to it being a more deeply entrenched rural–urban phenomenon. Indeed, as a 
prelude to the developmental writings that shall later be brought into focus, one is well 
equipped to argue that relative agricultural ache is more a sign of progress than illness. 
Admittedly, that must surely be of little comfort to those who are forced to bear the 
burden of structural disruption and/or structural entrenchment. The inter-temporal, or to 
be more precise, the intergenerational trade-offs that fair-trade may potentially give rise 
to makes for an absorbing avenue of discussion. While one must maintain respect for 
paths well worn and lessons that seem largely inevitable, at the same time one must not 
be too eager to be taken hostage by the view that not even the edges can be smoothed to 
assist those whom development might otherwise devour. Relevant as it is, the potential 
for a ‘developmental critique’ of fair-trade shall only occasionally be touched upon in 
this thesis, thus it will not be featuring as a central element.  
Continuing to take issue with the FINE definition, one may raise an eyebrow in 
respect to the claims of transparency and sustainable development. From the view of the 
consumer who is likely to have only the packaging in front of them, there is no explicit 
reason to consider that fair-trade is any more or less transparent than a conventionally 
traded good. What is made public outside of the packaging may well surpass that of 
many conventional equivalents; however, given the search costs involved, transparency 
in itself can be a trait that is difficult to qualify. In one sense something can be declared 
to be transparent if everything that relates to it is freely available. But in another sense, 
if that which constitutes ‘everything’ amounts to an unassailable amount of testament, 
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then the claim to transparency shrinks in practical meaning. The ‘Fair Tracing project’4 
potentially offers an impressive and innovative solution to this part of this quandary. 
What it does not completely solve is the wider issue of consumer faith in the 
enforcement of standards mechanism. Given that the number of inspectors is listed to be 
120 (FLO-CERT), one may be forgiven for harbouring a touch of scepticism regarding 
the ability of labelling organisations to effectively monitor conditions on the ground; the 
relationship with the consumer does in effect end up defaulting to be one of ‘trust’. 
Brittle as trust characteristically is, in devising a solution to the problem of bolstering it, 
those responsible would be well advised to show ample sensitivity to the truth that it is 
far easier to regulate something to death than it is to regulate it efficiently and 
effectively. Indeed, given that ‘inspection’ and ‘final price’ are likely to be positively 
related, one must express sympathy with the difficulty of the task at hand. 
In respect to the FINE statement of sustainability, one may legitimately ask, 
sustainable relative to what? In addition, some may argue that FLO’s hostility to GM 
crops starkly contradicts its stated aim of sustainability (Haight and Henderson 2010). 
More troublesome still becomes the claim of sustainability when coupled with the oft 
touted accusation of oversupply. As yet, oversupply should neither be taken for granted 
nor lifelessly dismissed; the prospect of, and related issues thereabout, shall respectively 
be addressed in Chapters I and III.  
A parallel matter of suitability relates to the encouragement that the movement 
extends to farmers in having them embrace organic methods of production. Attempting 
to pair fair-trade with organic production plays well to the likely privilege of the final 
consumer, and in addition ‘organic’ adds weight to what might be deemed to be real 
economic value to the product. It is however, as yet, an unsettled debate as to whether 
                                                 
4 http://web4.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/C.Wallenta/fairtracingblog/ A program being developed by which a 
consumer will be able to input a barcode and trace the organs of their purchases by way of website and 
mobile phone.  
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organic production is any more sustainable than non-organic methods. Synthesised 
chemicals are of course absent by definition, but the negative trade-off is said to be felt 
in a reduction in yields per hectare; by which note, serious questions of suitability may 
legitimately be raised (Economist 2006). Possibly the best counter to the questioning of 
sustainability relates to the social premium being employed in a manner that teaches 
sustainable methods of production to farmers – this does indeed at times take place. Yet, 
whatever techniques may be taught, theory and practice appear to suggest that ‘secure 
property rights’ in themselves are the greatest foe that the tragedy of the commons has 
ever faced, and as such represent the one of the finest friends that ‘sustainability’ could 
ever wish for. 
Important to how this general introduction is to be rounded off, Moore (2004) makes 
us privy to the fact that movement insiders readily acknowledge the definitional 
problem that surrounds ‘fairness’. Strange as it may sound, this admission of Moore’s 
carries an air of comfort for the welfare economist; for had the claim been otherwise, 
the credibility of the movement would be philosophically and analytically damaged. 
Testament to its cornerstones being a number of ‘impossibility theorems’ and its 
strongest micro judgement, that of Pareto, being essentially value judgment, it is a well 
established fact that welfare economics is an analytically incomplete charter (see Ng 
2004). Philosophically, the door is more ajar. 
When addressing fairness, it is effortless to get caught up in the romance of elegant 
and enchanting mantras such as, “from each according to his ability, to each according 
to his need(s)”. Indeed, if a person is never once in their lifetime inspired by optimistic 
undertones such as those, then it is to the coroner they should arguably have been sent. 
Yet history beckons the old Chinese proverb to mind, ‘be careful what you wish for…’ 
and few laws boast the potency of the ‘law of unintended consequences’. For the reason 
that judgements are always ongoing, one may never speak with precise accuracy of the 
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legacy of historical action. It’s not over until it’s over, and so judgment is a largely a 
continuous process. And if the road to hell can be paved with the finest of intentions, 
than so too feasibly can the road to heaven be paved with the worst of intentions. 
Speaking to date, there is an unfortunate irony in recognising that extreme egalitarian 
adventures appear to have damaged the very people that they were designated to be 
vanguard of. And, while it is wholly true to say that he who cannot envision something 
better for the world is a person of meagre mind or crippled heart, it is equally factual to 
assert that she who seeks to navigate the seas of human incentives will make precious 
little headway if she chooses to deny the existence of the selfish tides and egotistical 
winds. Of precious little use are the finest silk sails if no wind is permitted to fill them.  
There will always be the tendency to look back with the feeling that we can learn 
from past mistakes and craft something better for the future. This is a sentiment both 
noble and essential to the evolution of our species, yet in respect to doctrines of extreme 
fairness, it is not so much the past but rather ‘the self’ into which one must peer. At the 
microeconomic level, fairness from the perspective of the individual is a social 
judgement that embodies the beliefs, preferences and values of a particular population at 
a particular period in time. The problem of defining what is essentially a ‘social 
judgement/perception’ runs aground when confronted with the fact that, if these 
perceptions and judgements change, then so may that which gets designated fair or 
unfair. We are potentially faced with trying to define an inconsistent entity. A view such 
as this receives strong empirical support from Kahneman et al. (1986a, 1986b), the 
results of which clearly indicate that people harbour deep inconsistencies in their 
declarations as to what they perceive constitutes fairness. Similarly, Thaler (1985) 
clearly demonstrates that the same individual will routinely employ different ‘fair’ 
prices for an identical good. 
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When it comes to resolving the tensions which reside between micro behaviour and 
macro application, and therein attempting to soothe the precarious rift between ‘equity 
and efficiency’, few harbour the intellectual craftsmanship of the late John Rawls. 
Through his veil of ignorance exercise, Rawls crafts a definition of fairness in which, 
quite simply, one is only permitted to designate a particular outcome to be fair, only if 
one is willing to accept it for oneself (1971 p118). Described more intimately by Rawls, 
the beauty of his idea is to be found in its simplicity; it’s almost humorous to have 
inaugurated a complex search for something so apparent. Blushes are however spared 
by the truth that philosophical brilliance and tractability seldom converge. The proposal 
suffers from the issues relating to imperfect information, something I think can 
agreeably be referred to as a failing of a ‘no Marie Antoinettes’ assumption. In addition, 
non-universal tendencies of risk also pollute the idea. Yet, irrespective of flaws in 
practical application, it is imperative to have something to gravitate towards, and Rawls 
provides just that. To capture it simply, eradication of the sort of lifestyles and 
livelihoods that one would deem unacceptable for oneself is a truly dignified way to 
assign both definition and purpose in the tying together of justice and development. 
From this he of course crafts the famous Rawlsian base, above which inequalities are 
tolerated in the name of liberty and efficiency, but below which nobody should be 
permitted to fall. As we will see in the literature review, fair-trade may not necessarily 
be targeting the most severe levels of poverty, but in attempting to use market forces to 
fortify a progressive base for a sufficiently disadvantaged group, it can be seen as being 
harmonious with a Rawlsian distinction of fairness. It is for its compatibility with 
‘Rawlsian fairness’ that this thesis in principle believes fair-trade has the potential to be 
deserving of its prefix. For its own part this thesis believes the concept of fairness can 
be seen to reside within a paradox: one may not be able put a price on justice (at least it 
is outwardly honourable to think so), yet at the same time it is entirely wrong to suggest 
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that one cannot equate a cost to justice. It is somewhere within that paradox that the 
obscure concept of fairness hides, and it is the solution to that inconsistency which 
punctuates the approach that this thesis adopts in its efforts to evaluate fair-trade. This 
thesis will not lay claim to answering in all purity the question as to whether or not fair-
trade is actually fair. Rather, the objective is to progress the debate so as to facilitate a 
better understanding of whether or not, and by what magnitude, a situation of fair-trade 
may or may not be preferable to a more conventional state of affairs. The retort by 
which we shall subsequently attempt to tame the paradox above can be stated as simply 
as so: if the costs of justice are inaptly high in terms of welfare, then that alone will be 
sufficient to facilitate the conclusion that justice is unbecoming of its name. Quite 
simply, fairness is what fairness does. 
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Chapter I: Literature Review 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature that directly confronts fair-trade can be divided up into the following five 
classifications: informative, sociological, statistical case studies, econometric 
evaluations and theoretical economics. This literature review places them under three 
headings. The first three classes are grouped together and discussed under the heading 
‘Case studies I’. Subsequently, in accordance with the importance we attributed to 
ceteris paribus and statistical significance, the few econometric analyses that have 
surfaced are reviewed separately under the heading ‘Case studies II’. Before rounding 
up with some conclusive remarks, cordoned under their own heading, the theoretical 
economic perspectives constitute the penultimate section of this chapter. The theoretical 
economic literature is somewhat different from the other entries in that it opens the door 
to a much broader base of literature – agricultural economics, welfare economics, trade 
economics, development economics – the pool of which potentially widens to become 
an ocean of interrelated paradigms, and so there is a  need to be selective. I will look at 
‘the frameworks’ which certain economists have chosen to apply directly to the context 
of fair-trade. 
In terms of who argues for what, two avenues of engagement may respectively be 
sighted. The first is a position of contentment at corrective intervention, and the call that 
fair-trade is legitimised by the presence of market failures and other interferences. 
Secondly, and alternatively, there is the perspective of dissatisfaction at the addition of 
‘yet another’ inefficient market distortion. It is generally those who favour the vantage 
point of the former who choose to offer fair-trade the energies of their thoughts and 
writings. But let this not skew the overall picture because, if one wishes to seek out 
economic literature that sings from the hymn sheet of minimised intervention, then 
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obviously the writings that are available are more than plentiful. The philosophical 
gravitas of which, one may perceive, emanates from the liberal tradition that was set 
forth by ‘the wealth of nations’ – the formal offshoot being the eminently named ‘first 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics’. Hence, some may feel that if fair-trade is 
viewed as an intervention, modern economics is somehow principle-bound to disown it. 
Such a view is simplistic as it is erroneous to cite that if a person offers support to fair-
trade, they by default disown an allegiance to free trade. Only if all other impediments 
to free-trade were lifted, could one begin to see the debate in that bilateral light. 
Wishing to accommodate a sufficiently generous interpretation of what constitutes 
impact, this chapter has made an effort to be as inclusive as possible. While my 
preference is for hardened empirics, multidisciplinary respect is woven within and so 
various papers that dwell on sociological sentiments of empowerment have been 
included. The conclusive remarks that herald the end of this chapter clarify the gaps in 
the literature, and in doing so enforce the logic and sequence of the remainder of this 
thesis. 
 
 
1.2 CASE STUDIES I 
 
Taking coffee as its subject matter, Lindsey (2004: 9) accuses the fair-trade movement 
of “economic illiteracy”, an assault very much orientated towards dissatisfaction at the 
addition of another price distortion on trade. Despite being critical of agricultural tariffs 
and subsidies on the Western side, Lindsey does not appear to have considered the role 
of fair-trade as a partial counter balance to such actions – only that both of those 
interventions are unwelcome. A valid point is put across in relation to the differing 
technical capabilities that exist between countries; an example of such being, “In some 
areas of Guatemala, it could take over 1,000 people working one day each to fill the 
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equivalent of one container of 275 bags.....whereas......in the Brazilian Cerrado, you 
need five people and a mechanical harvester for two or three days to fill a container” 
(Lindsey 2004: 4). Moreover, in terms of aggregate welfare, it is noted that jobs that 
have been lost in some parts of Central America have apparently been matched by job 
creation within the Vietnamese coffee industry. As well, while much of the literature 
seems to take for granted the demand side, Lindsey communicates the germane 
information that US per capita consumption of coffee has fallen from 36 gallons a year 
to 17 gallons between 1970 and 2000. Furthermore, it is imperative to recognise not just 
that prices have fallen, but equally the reasoning behind why price contractions have not 
been transmitted to Western markets. This is because the price of the bean itself 
constitutes a paltry 5-7% of the price of the product. The article culminates in two 
crudely categorical prescriptions: cut back supply, or boost demand.  
In a similar vein, Sidwell (2008) takes gripe with the fair-trade movement over a 
number of related issues. His criticisms centre on certain ‘value chain facts’ and 
monitoring problems. The undercurrent of the argument is that of the superiority of free 
trade. The calls for free trade are endearing to most economists, however, touting the 
benefits of free trade is one thing, but having the WTO sail out of the democratic 
doldrums of agricultural stubbornness is another matter altogether. If one plays devil’s 
advocate, great care must be taken before making a blandly theoretical assault on 
protectionism. Firstly there is the practical failure of analytical  assumptions to consider, 
and while economic theory tends to praise universal abandonment, economic history – 
arguably a better host of the various dimensions of protectionism – informs us that 
certain taints of protectionism have indeed decorated the well trodden paths of many a 
now wealthy nation (Chang 2002). The message being touted here is by no means one 
of general support for protectionism, merely that protectionism comes in many shapes 
and sizes, and that the reader need consider both history and theory.  
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Of more immediate concern for the fair-trade movement should be the claim that a 
mere 10% of the premium ends up in the hands of the producers (Sidwell 2008: 28.). 
Even advocates state the percentage as at times being only 25% (Nicholls and Opal 
2005). Of much less concern should be the allegations that four fifths of certified fair-
trade produce ends up being sold in conventional markets, and that by being so 
concentrated in middle income countries, fair-trade fails to help the poorest of the poor. 
Given that Sidwell (2008) suggests that the gains of fair-trade farmers are generated at 
the direct expense of non-participating farmers, having four-fifths sold conventionally 
may be more of a virtue than a vice. The reasoning is two-fold. Firstly, if producers 
receive orders for relatively small proportions, and the role of the conventional markets 
permits a vent for surplus, then the spread of orders could feasibly be wider and in turn 
limit the damage to those who miss out. Chapter III of this discourse will formally show 
how this is possible.  
Secondly the argument that producers become dependent on the charitable whims of 
Western consumers is also diluted if orders are relatively small in proportion to overall 
production. As for the criticism that fair-trade fails to help the poorest of the poor, by 
the same means one could criticise any charitable cause that helps ‘anybody’ other than 
the world’s worst off. How about the charity ‘Cancer Research’ should its patrons 
disown it because wealthy people are perhaps more likely to be beneficiaries? Of course 
not, it need simply be accepted that different causes give assistance to dissimilar groups 
of people. As such, it is surely overly harsh to criticise fair-trade for the reasons that it 
aids the second or third worst off as opposed to the most worst off.  
A fine point is made by the proclamation that, “No country has ever become rich 
while remaining agrarian” (Sidwell 2008: 14). In defence of that statement, economic 
history speaks with clarity. Two cornerstones of development economics which 
subscribe to the view that agriculture shall always play second fiddle to industry, are the 
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Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (1950) (PSH hereafter) and the Lewis model (1954). The 
PSH is the statement of the developmental trend by which we may expect to observe 
declining terms of trade for primary commodities. In the context of this dissertation as a 
whole, there is more to tap from the PSH than there is from Lewis. Hence, proper 
discussion of its influence shall be reserved for Chapter III, so as to present it in a more 
appropriate setting. What must however be said as a prelude to what will be addressed 
in chapter III, is that the discussion intends to go further than citing various elasticities 
as the cause of the declining terms of trade, and so heavily dispute the suggestion that 
these declining terms of trade are indicative of a North–South divide. 
The Lewis model (1954), which can be pitched alongside the PSH, preaches the 
virtues of a free lunch of labour on which an industrialising city may feast to grow. 
Labour displaced by productivity gains, migrates and thus facilitates a more competitive 
manufacturing wage, the national reward for which is industrial development, and 
labour’s share comes by the way of a relatively higher real marginal product. This path 
of migration appears to have stood the test of time. However, what is on offer has 
tended to be a debate over speed rather than sequence – at times a bitter debate. The 
existing literature furnishes nothing to the resemblance of a concrete conclusion.  
There is a danger that if fair-trade were sufficiently strong it might retard the process 
of urbanisation that the Lewis model describes. It terms of efficiency and an implicitly 
proposed ‘race to growth’ one may possibly look upon fair-trade as potentially 
disastrous. This is the view that Collier (2008: 163) hints at. Alternatively, if fair-trade 
is not potent enough to pervert the call of the industrial wage, which given the 
connection between the price of food and the industrial wage it may never be, fair-trade 
might harmlessly afford a more pleasant existence for an unfortunate generation of 
producers. Or perhaps, if capabilities are strengthened prior to migration, such might at 
a later stage hasten a national ascent up the industrial value chain, or even stake a claim 
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in the lucrative and footloose service sector, as India appears to be in the process of 
doing.  
What is being peddled here is not certainty per se, but merely the suggestion that it 
may be overly crude to consider this as just a matter of spiking the flow of labour so as 
to have it rush elsewhere. It is also a question of the ability of a sector and city to absorb 
and make productive use of the labour that migrates. While a squeeze must likely be 
tolerated, if things go well history suggests it shall be the descendants of those who 
abide that squeeze who end up endowed with the luxury of later distancing themselves 
from having the stomach to endure the same discomfort that the builders of their nation 
endured for them. The question of how the generational burden of development should 
be shared is an incredibly complex one that straddles an overlap between a number of 
economic sub-disciplines and moral philosophy. Writing from the perspective of a 
Western person in this day and age, I, by default, write from the vantage point of a 
person who has already had somebody else carry the burden of industrialisation of 
which I am a beneficiary. Would I – would you the reader – be willing to make the 
same historical sacrifice? A bedtime reading of Dickens is enough to convince me of 
my own reluctance. The required authority of anyone to demand generational sacrifices 
from anyone else is morally amiss.  
When it comes to development economics, the most difficult issue with which to 
grapple is the alteration of landscape that is generated by the arrival of structural change 
and industrial newcomers: global growth, shifts in relative wealth, fresh challenges, 
different opportunities, and new lessons to be heeded. The world as a whole becomes 
essentially different from what it was. Therefore, ultimately, the desire to quote 
something with the clarity of a ‘road map’ is a yearning that will remain largely 
unsatisfied. Simply, you can’t have a road map for roads which are yet be built; and so 
pragmatism on the part of interpreter and the policy maker will forever be requisites of 
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good judgement. Taking for example Amsdens’s (1989) tri-classification of industrial 
revolution, “invention, innovation and imitation”, here resides the implicit suggestion 
that we can, from our comprehension of past progress, trust in isolation neither the 
econometrician nor the economic historian. Each is needed so as to make up for 
shortcomings of the other. Moreover, an apparent progression to ‘servicisation’ adds 
further to the uncertainty of the waters in which we wade. Ultimately, this ‘destiny of 
agriculture’ perspective is one that taps into a wider and more cryptic developmental 
debate – “the owl of Minerva takes flight  only at dusk” (Hegel 1900).  
While the suggestive relationship between fair-trade and development is something 
that this discourse could not rightly let pass without comment, no bold attempt shall be 
undertaken to settle it. Simply, it is hoped that the reader will actively appreciate the 
abundance of possibilities that exists, and therein be mindful of false prophets who 
claim to see such great distances ahead.  
To summarise, there is no doubt that a national fixation on agriculture at the expense 
of industry marks squarely the boundaries of a garden of serfdom – the road to which 
may indeed be paved with the best of intentions. In the absence of reliable time series 
data, we are largely reduced to guided conjecture. The conjecture of this discourse is 
that, while fair-trade does have the potential to adversely affect incentives to the 
detriment of industry, a meaningful distortion is unlikely to occur at its current market 
share. However if the movement continues to gather pace, it may begin to approach a 
level at which it’s time to revalue that intuition. 
Returning our focus to more immediate matters of impact, the Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisation (FLO) and its associated national initiatives have produced a number of 
their own impact studies, and their own review of other people’s studies (See Nelson 
and Pound 2010). Unfortunately those papers are often characterised by a distinct lack 
of robust counterfactual comparisons. This is understandable from the point of view of 
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resource allocation. What these reports do tend to be good at providing is information 
regarding commodity dependency, actual projects that fair-trade monies have been 
channelled to finance, and a rich source of facts regarding the political barriers to trade. 
A similar statement is applicable to a number of studies that have been undertaken by 
the Natural Resources Institute in association with the University of Greenwich.  
Blowfield and Gallet (2001) for example detail well the practicalities of how fair-
trade works at the level of the plantation rather than that of the small producer. 
Interestingly, it was observed that the social premium gets predominantly absorbed by 
the purchase of European export licences (prepayment required per quarter). It is also 
remarked that the plantation appears to be run in a more socially progressive manner 
than what the authors referred to as the “Ghanaian norm”. However, possibly damaging 
assertions of efficiency, suspicions are raised about how commercially viable the whole 
operation would be in the absence of fair-trade. Relevant from the perspective of caring 
for material impact, actual wages of plantation workers are observed to be no different 
from those of standard casual day rates (both above the minimum wage). However the 
workers of the fair-trade related operation did enjoy the status and security of being 
permanently employed.  
Within a study of farmers from the Mexican state of Oaxaca, Aranda and Morales 
(2002) imply that the co-operative alone is still far and away the most essential 
institution for keeping farmers out of poverty. The authors appear to value fair-trade 
predominantly for its ability to help the co-operative maintain membership number 
during periods of low prices.  
By comparing the respective value-added elements in the supply chains of 
conventional and fair-trade operations, Mendoza and Bastianesen (2003) paint a 
somewhat uncomplimentary picture regarding the relative inefficacy of fair-trade 
(Appendix 1.1). While acknowledging that fair-trade producers do receive a superior 
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proportion of the value chain, the authors assert that scale is the crux of the problem. A 
‘self-aggravating loop problem’ emerges in which reduced scale and inefficiency force 
prices to be higher than conventionally traded goods, which in turn cements demand at 
such levels to hinder it from reaching a height that would enable improvements in scale 
and efficiency. Suggested fixes include: dilute the fair-trade criteria so as to increase the 
incentives for more mainstream firms to get involved, allow existing fair-trade 
intermediaries to pay the fair-trade rate to non-certified producers, try to more directly 
channel the fair-trade surplus into technological and organisational enhancements, and 
become radically more demanding in terms of quality. While the suggestions are 
interesting, not all of them are straightforwardly feasible; certain legal issues may arise, 
and it must be mentioned that FLO does to a degree already make efforts to implement a 
number of these suggestions.  
Zehner (2002) points out how it can be overly simplistic to routinely assume that a 
reduction in middlemen will automatically generate a scenario in which producers can 
be made better off. It is asserted that green coffee procurement is precisely the type of 
product which requires middlemen e.g. the quality is difficult to observe and the product 
is acquired from a highly fragmented supply base. It is thus argued that within the 
market for green coffee, effective competitive middlemen play the vital role of reducing 
buyers’ search costs and in turn stave off the likelihood of an adverse selection problem. 
Adverse selection in this instance is said to occur if buyers are uncertain of the 
product’s quality and react by only ever being willing to pay the average price. Hence, 
the below average quality producers would be the recipients of a free ride, while the 
above average quality producers would question negatively the incentives they face. 
One may speculate that the Nash equilibrium of such would likely be that producers 
withdraw from trying to improve the quality of their crop. Zehner (2002) concludes that 
the root cause of the problem is an absence of competitive markets for intermediaries, 
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and formulates the opinion that fair-trade alone cannot provide a meaningful solution to 
this problem. 
Incorporated within two case studies of Tanzanian coffee and Ghanaian cocoa, OPM 
(2000) provide a thorough overview of the general workings of fair-trade. While the 
case studies on offer present a rich insight into the commodities in question and the 
importance of those commodities to their respective communities of origin, the 
discussion of impact is predominantly limited to the cooperative as a whole rather than 
the individual producer. In this respect, although declared to be mildly helpful, the 
assistance of fair-trade is proclaimed to be fettered by the low proportion of sales it 
represents. In addition, the disclosure of how other forms of financial assistance have 
accompanied fair-trade leads to considerable uncertainty regarding its ceteris paribus 
contribution. The report is unique in pointing out that the existence of fair-trade can lead 
to overly generalised and exaggerated criticism of other intermediaries.  
Prior to any further engagement of fair-trade specific case studies, a brief discussion 
of coffee sets the scene for much of the literature that is to follow. This is justified by 
the pride of place this commodity occupies in the ranks of fair-trade. An inspection of 
the state of the coffee market is a requisite of understanding the principles which 
underpin the existence of fair-trade.  
Structural imbalances and oversupply characterise the global coffee market. Ponte 
(2001) summarises the consequences of the ending of the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA) as leading to lower and more volatile prices, with a higher proportion 
of income being retained by importing countries (traders, retailers, but mostly roasters). 
A figure from Talbot (1997) illustrates well the temporal adjustments in the value chain 
(Appendix 1.2), the most striking alteration of which being the rise and dominance of 
‘value-added’ that is equated to consumption countries. A broad review of the coffee 
literature shows that scholars appear near unanimous in recognising the roaster to be by 
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far the most dominant player in the chain. Indeed, Ponte (2001) informs us that two 
groups together command almost half of the global roasting market; Philip Morris with 
25% and Nestlé with 24%. Furthermore, the latter boasts a 56% share of the soluble 
market. The former, Phillip Morris is associated with the ownership of eleven different 
affiliates and brands. With respect to these concentrated holdings, the competition that 
supermarket shelves appear to exhibit can be said to be little more than a mirage. It is 
further claimed by Ponte (2001) that, via strategic choices taken throughout the 1990s, 
barriers to entry have increased for both roasting and trading.  
While this apparent lack of competition makes for a problem at the level of the 
producer, it must be borne in mind that supply chain competition has to be checked at 
many different levels. One place in particular in which there does appear to be healthy 
competition is the national exporter level. Reinforcing this view, Karp and Perloff 
(1993) construct a theoretical and empirical model that affords a conclusion in which 
the two globally dominant producers (Brazil and ‘Colombia at the time5’) behave 
significantly more like price takers as opposed to price makers.  
Ultimately what the coffee literature as a whole leans towards is a description of 
precisely the sort of market failures that are required to give credence to intervention 
both at the practical and theoretical levels. In relation to this, it’s also worth reminding 
oneself of the closeness of resemblance between agricultural markets and markets of 
textbook competitiveness. As will be dwelt upon in Chapter III, this more than anything 
else informs us why the marginal products of industrial and service labour will nearly 
always surpass those of agriculture. As is often the case with many suggestions of 
market failure, one should think not of ‘the’ market; but rather consider that failure is 
sometimes made socially reconcilable via the consequences of exchanging different 
returns to labour ‘between’ different markets.  
                                                 
5 Vietnam have since surpassed Colombia for the No.2 spot. 
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Imhof and Lee (2007) provide a well-built case study of coffee production in the 
relatively impoverished Bolivian province of Caranavi. They endeavour to investigate 
the impact of fair-trade as regards poverty, income inequality, conflict prevention and 
what effect fair-trade might have on neighbouring producers who do not participate. 
While no econometric model is specified, the depths of data collection are such that this 
paper more than holds its own against most other case studies. 
Maintaining the flow of discussion with respect to impact, four entities are 
observed: two fair-trade cooperatives (Coaine and Mejillones), one intermediary that is 
not certified but that does in practice subscribe to the general ethos of fair-trade 
(Antitrade), and one ‘normal’ profit maximising intermediary (Copacabana). A data 
table of summarised observations is included in Appendix 1.3. The descriptive statistics 
tell a story in which the net income of fair-trade producers is on average greater than 
that of conventional peers. Measurement of material welfare, as taken by indicators of 
consumption and standards of living also bode well for fair-trade. Noteworthy aspects 
include better access to potable water, greater availability of electricity, and the 
decreased likelihood of having to engage in alternative forms of income generation.  
Findings on income inequality and conflict prevention are somewhat inconclusive. 
For example, on balance fair-trade is considered to fill the uncompetitive void and force 
all intermediaries to bid up prices – thus indirectly supporting conventional producers in 
the process. But if on the other hand world prices were to fall, fair-trade producers 
receive the protection of a price floor, whereas the exposed incomes of their 
contemporaries tumble, hence aggravating local income inequalities.  
One of the most significant impediments to investigating the impact of fair-trade is 
the absence of time series observations. However a glance at the differing educational 
attainment between parents and their children can provide a compensatory proxy of 
sorts. Indeed, it is highly interesting to note that while producers selling to Copacabana 
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exhibit relatively better educational statistics, a generation or so later, the children of the 
other producers have largely caught up with or surpassed the offspring of Copacabana 
producers. For example, 41% of Copacabana producers received no education and that 
figure appears to have remained constant for the children of those producers. The 
comparable figures for the two fair-trade co-operatives show falls in the occurrence of 
no education from 75% to 27.7% and 52.5% to 26% respectively for Mejillones and 
Coaine. This seemingly clear failure to uplift a consecutive generation is, in terms of 
raw data, arguably the most telling observation within the paper. The authors appear 
very much convinced that the long term value of fair-trade is to be found in capacity 
building, for which they argue the social premium plays a more compelling role than 
higher prices per se. Partial justification for that stance appears to be derived from the 
absence of a social premium for Antitrade producers. However, in response to this, it 
could be argued that they may have let the element of ‘low income variance’ pass by 
unappreciated. Both of the fair-trade co-operatives in this study used their social 
premiums for improving production facilities and paying off co-operative debts. The 
report also contains a section dedicated to the impact of fair-trade on landless labourers. 
It is stated within the conditions of FLO that labourers must not receive below the 
regional average or the national minimum wage. It was found that daily labourers in 
fair-trade fields were paid the same nominal wages as their conventional counterparts. 
However, after adjusting for the subsistence and shelter that the non-fair-trade labourers 
were not necessarily the recipients of, assuming a 6-day working week the extra value 
to fair-trade labourers was calculated to be 44% above that of conventional labourers. 
Ultimately, Imhof and Lee (2007) provide a rich array of stats and in depth 
discussion that offer compelling evidence in support of fair-trade; there does however 
remain some scope for trying to disentangle correlation and causality – as the authors 
themselves rightly acknowledge. 
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Reynolds (2002) gives an outline of the organisational structure and logistics of the 
fair-trade movement, taking a sociological perspective that is very much concerned with 
empowerment. She asserts that the effectiveness of income gains being translated into 
intrinsic welfare should be taken as neither universal nor constant. In trying to 
appreciate how that transformation can be optimised, she directs our attention to the 
organisational characteristics of different producer groups, the capabilities and 
ideological orientation of internal decision makers, and other factors of influence that 
stem from the wider economic and political spheres. Information and market 
transparency are also highlighted as key elements in realising the long term aim of 
producer empowerment. 
An index of empowerment would indeed be a fine addition to any study of fair-
trade. However, notions such as ‘empowerment’ can be softly subjective and 
notoriously tricky to quantify; it is for that reason some economists may prefer to slip 
past them with less notice, or at least default to taking refuge in the utilitarian 
underpinnings of their own discipline. Yet, there are bridges to be built and Rawls’s 
consideration that ‘self-respect’ be regarded as “perhaps the most important primary 
good” (1971 pp.440 – 6) provides the intellectual impetus for economists to go in 
search of bricks and mortar to recognise that end. 
This is a request that some have paid partial heed to, because while it is true that 
utilitarian traditionalists are (at times for good reasons) less than keen to shift the focus 
away from income (personal choice), this is not the case for economic literature as a 
whole. In particular a number of avenues of development economics, epitomised by Sen 
(1999), show considerable preference for moving the debate towards non-instrumental 
aspects of wellbeing. Directly relating to fair-trade, further support for the capabilities 
and empowerment perspective is put forth in Reynolds et al. (2004), in which the 
authors examine a number of coffee co-operatives in Mexico, Guatemala and El 
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Salvador. A conclusion is built around the identification of the greatest need being an 
expansion of capabilities and anecdotal evidence that fair-trade monies are indeed being 
channelled in this direction.  
In addition to providing a sound insight into the specifics of coffee production in 
general, Milford (2004) offers three categories of coverage: a theoretical engagement of 
the issue, a defence of agricultural cooperatives in general, and case study. The first two 
of these are very much entangled and shall be discussed in the later stages of this 
chapter. Her case study, which centres on the production of organic coffee in Chiapas, 
Mexico, shall however be discussed within this section. With the aid of interviews, 
observations and questionnaires, her findings support the idea of a strong co-operative 
being a positive force favouring the welfare of both members and non-members. Her 
paper also highlights the benefits of fair-trade which are not directly linked to the size of 
the premium, chief of which appears to be the option to receive 60% of payment 
upfront. However, in practice it would seem that not all of the fair-trade intermediaries 
comply with this apparent obligation. Milford’s research points to the necessity for a co-
operative to be able to match the efficiency of private investor-owned firms (IOFs) and 
the likely requirement for a subsidy to achieve this. She insists it is the per unit 
approach to pricing coupled with the competitive threat of losing a contract that 
differentiates fair-trade from a standard government subsidy, and for the co-operatives 
which she visited, claims to have found no evidence of ‘lazy grazing’ on fair-trade 
subsidies. While conceding that fair-trade alone cannot solve the global problems that 
producers in developing nations face, her case study concludes strongly in favour of 
fair-trade. 
Ronchi (2002) undertakes a qualitative case study of Costa Rican coffee co-
operatives that have been involved with fair-trade for the duration of the 1990s. In her 
analysis, she makes a clear distinction between direct and indirect impacts (indirect 
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being the strengthening of the cooperative). Capacity enhancement stands out as being 
the major contribution of fair-trade. Captured within the same paper is said to be an 
improved sense of confidence that comes in part from a better understanding of export 
channels and the fostering of the sort of professionalism (capabilities) that gives rise to 
more effective utilisation of those channels. All of this receives a virtuous underpinning 
from the deliverance of relative price (income) predictability. The value of this stability 
is that it serves to counter some of the risk averseness one might typically associate with 
low income self-employment.  
Staying with Costa Rica, Ronchi complements her 2002 paper with a related 
discourse in 2006. Within those reports the regulatory framework surfaces as another 
central factor of influence. In particular, presided over by the research and regulatory 
body ‘Instituto de Cafe de Costa Rica’ (ICAFE), ‘Law 2762’ offers coffee farmers 
explicit protection from exploitative forces. It is a requirement of the law that all 
producers sell their coffee cherries to an ICAFE registered mill (as opposed to 
middlemen) within a day of them being harvested. By monitoring post-processing 
export prices, ICAFE aims to ensure an input price for farmers in correspondence to 
their competitive marginal product. If ICAFE is accurate, this in turn restricts the mills’ 
earnings to that of normal economic profit.  
It can thus be argued that in the case of Costa Rican coffee, organisational 
competency and a corrective institutional setting resolve to be the critical and 
complementary factors in amplifying the benefits of fair-trade. In an example that 
relates to the former, a number of the co-operatives in this study earmarked 30% of their 
fair-trade gains to be put towards a ‘social capital fund’ and Ronchi appears convinced 
that other fair-trade cooperatives would be well advised to adopt similar arrangements. 
In line with such is the implication that any attempt to evaluate the wider impact of fair-
 38
trade, say on a regional or international basis, must if possible take into account the 
organisational quality of the co-operative itself.  
One such example of what appeared to be a poorly organised cooperative 
partnership is discussed in Tallontire (2000). Within this, warning signs emerge that 
some cooperatives may be prone to view fair-trade as a resource be tapped as opposed 
to a developmental opportunity to be grasped. Finally it is worth mentioning that one of 
the interesting observations to emerge from the interviews was that, “Very few 
producers could recognise Fair-trade as the source of the improvements they 
acknowledged,” (Ronchi 2002, p.11). In addition to what was already invoked by 
Ronchi (2006), her theoretical and econometric follow-up is addressed when this review 
moves to accommodate specifically that category of literature.  
Nelson and Galvez (2000) look into to the effects of fair-trade on cocoa producers in 
Ecuador. The report, like many of the others, may be criticised for offering no 
numerical comparison to any control group of any kind. Nonetheless, some interesting 
points were put across.  
The establishment of a ‘cocoa school’ is said to represent a tangible sign of 
capability investment. However, relating to the broader issues at hand, the fact that 
access to adequate infrastructure was cited as being the most binding constraint on 
economic development begs for attention to be given to the role the state must play in 
the provision of public goods – fair-trade cannot be substitute for those. Indeed, some 
would argue that addressing structural issues would be far more effective than fair-trade 
in terms of dismantling the sort of conditions that foster heavily unequal bargaining 
positions. 
It is of further interest to note that during recent times the ‘conventional’ price on 
offer was noted to have almost (at brief times fully) converged on the fair-trade price. 
While producers with short memories will surely be tempted to question how a ‘fair’ 
 39
price can be so close to a ‘conventional’ price, the authors choose to see this as a mark 
of success for fair-trade – a positive spill-over or the consequence of ‘demonstration 
effect’ if you will. At a later stage in this chapter we will engage a theoretical 
perspective behind why this may indeed be locally possible. However, from the paper at 
hand (Nelson and Galvez 2000), in the absence of any systematic empirics, the 
suggestion that fair-trade is responsible for the convergence remains unsubstantiated. 
The overall conclusion of the report is that fair-trade successfully managed to break the 
pre-existing near-monopoly condition (oligopsony to be precise).  
Poe and Kyle (2006) examine the impact of fair-trade on female basket weavers in 
Bangladesh. The conclusion is not particularly favourable to fair-trade. It is found that 
fair-trade wages are no different from the subsistence wages received by agricultural 
day labourers. There is however a partial reprieve to be found in the fact that without 
the fair-trade baskets these women would be unemployed. The example of this paper 
has been referenced so as to allow the reader a more complete view of the range of 
activities that fair-trade encompasses. Yet endeavours such as these, however well-
meaning, shall not feature as a central part of this study. Focus shall instead be placed 
firmly on agriculture for the reason that it offers a far more fundamental foundation 
from which to build upon. The economic credibility of the movement is better preserved 
by relying on demand which is less frivolous and quasi-artificial.  
 
 
1.3 CASE STUDIES II: ECONOMETRIC EVALUATIONS  
 
Bacon (2005) offers a localised study of coffee farmers in northern Nicaragua and 
provides one of the few papers that examines statistical significance. Employing a two-
way ANOVA approach it concluded with 99% confidence that fair-trade and/or organic 
certification leads to significantly higher prices for farmers. In addition, interviews with 
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both farmers and elected cooperative leaders led to a number of other interesting 
observations. In terms of the average price received, and average time taken to acquire 
payment, only the handful of farmers who were able to sell direct to roasters were the 
recipients of a better deal (US$1.09/lb, 33 days). Fair-trade outperformed all other 
options of sale in this respect (US$.0.84/lb, 41 days). The most common situation 
appeared to be that of co-operatives selling to conventional markets (US$0.41/lb 46 
days). It was the farmers who made use of local middlemen that came off worst 
(US$0.37/lb 9 days). Apparent by the low number of days they are required to wait, the 
middleman trade-off is one which allows producers to satisfy their immediate economic 
needs in exchange for forgoing higher future returns. Finally it was reported that 
farmers who were connected only to conventional markets were four times more likely 
to anticipate the loss of their land title as a result of low coffee prices.  
Becchetti and Costantino (2008, 2006) provide a thorough and detailed econometric 
analysis with the integral details of the methodology that was employed. The study 
takes place in Kenya and covers 18 products in all. Within the population four distinct 
groups are identified: ‘Bio’ farmers (long term affiliation to fair-trade, over 13 years on 
average), ‘Conversion’ farmers (short term affiliation to fair-trade), ‘Onlyfruit’ farmers 
(short term and partial affiliation to fair-trade) and ‘Control’ farmers (no affiliation to 
fair-trade). The relationship to fair-trade with respect to the relevant producers passes 
through an organisational group known as Meru Herbs who provide a link to an Italian 
fair-trade importer.  
In 1991 Meru Herbs acquired the mandate of seeking to generate the sort of farming 
income that would justify expenditure on a large irrigation project of which the first 
phase was completed in that same year. As the area is classified as semi-arid, the project 
was envisioned to greatly enhance the prospects of the communities it was designed to 
touch. All the farmers in the sample are equal beneficiaries of the irrigation scheme. 
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With data gathered from an extensive questionnaire (100 questions), several regressions 
were run. The dependent variables were various indices of price satisfaction, food 
consumption and dietary quality, living satisfaction, technical assistance, infant 
mortality, education and child labour. The standard control variables include land size, 
number of dwellers, number of seasonal employees, age, sex, ethnic affiliation, religion, 
schooling years, marital status and the presence of additional income sources. 
In terms of ‘price satisfaction’, both the conversion group and bio group came out as 
having a positive and highly significant state of affairs. The control group produced a 
small and negative coefficient of a similar inverse magnitude. Interestingly, in their 
working paper, the ‘onlyfruit’ group coefficient came out negative and only weakly 
(90%) significant. It is not too difficult to rationalise why the conversion group would 
have a tendency to exhibit more subjective satisfaction than the bio group. It possibly 
boils down to the tendency of people to exhibit more appreciation in the early stages of 
positive change. In other words, after 13 years of affiliation it is quite conceivable that 
bio farmers do, to a degree, take their fair-trade position somewhat for granted. Overall 
the price satisfaction results add some broad empirical support to the intuitively 
straightforward suggestion that access to fair-trade channels are beneficial by virtue of 
both higher net returns and reduced price (income) volatility. 
The results for food consumption and dietary quality bode equally well for fair-trade 
affiliated producers. In each case membership of the control group is shown to have a 
negative association. The results are 95% significant for food expenditure, the interval 
falling to 90% in the dietary quality regression.  
Further models that were run to look for a relationship with living satisfaction, and 
technical assistance all offered up a picture of fair-trade that is broadly favourable. Yet 
other explanatory variables did begin to become relatively more important than in 
previously mentioned models. Notably, for living standard satisfaction, ‘other sources 
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of income’ is as significant as fair-trade, with a much larger coefficient. Interestingly, 
the significance of ‘other sources of income’ remains but turns negative when regressed 
against infant mortality. In addition, the analysis suggested that fair-trade was of no 
consequence to a suppression of infant mortality. Rather, an improvement in the score 
of that variable was more explicable as a general association to Meru Herbs irrespective 
of any relationship with fair-trade. As for technical assistance, while the ‘years of 
schooling’ coefficient is of a lesser magnitude than fair-trade, the significance it exhibits 
is the same as fair-trade.  
Finally, regressions were run to investigate the impact of fair-trade on child labour 
(defined as the number of children between 6 and 15 not attending school) and human 
capital investment (defined as the number of children between 6 and 18 who are 
attending school). Regarding descriptive statistics, something of a surprise was made 
evident by the conversion group being on average the best performer in both of those 
categories. Perhaps even more of an eye-opener was that the control group 
outperformed both the ‘bio’ and ‘onlyfruit’ groups with respect to infant mortality. 
Estimates did indeed pick up on this and declare a positive and highly significant 
coefficient for the control group, and a weakly significant (90%) and negative 
coefficient for the bio group.  
The situation for child labour and human capital was less flattering to fair-trade. The 
bio group came out insignificant in both cases, with a negative coefficient in regards 
human capital. The conversion group offered some respite for fair-trade in that the 
direction of its coefficients reflected positive social outcomes, yet theses results passed 
only the 90% confidence interval.  The poor performance of the ‘bio’ group poses some 
issues.  
The implicit suggestion of increased returns to employment raising the opportunity 
cost of schooling is unlikely to be one that nestles comfortably with the fair-trade 
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movement. That is of course by no means the only possible reasoning behind these 
results, it is just the most immediate which comes to mind. Speculation aside, this 
lacklustre performance of human capital investment does surely warrant further 
investigation6.  
Ultimately, with the exception of the rather lacklustre findings regarding human 
capital and child labour, the paper concludes that access to fair-trade channels has 
bestowed a broadly positive impact upon the region of inspection. Moreover Becchetti 
and Costantino (2008) have contributed a strong analytical set-up that can potentially be 
taken and transplanted to the study of other regions. It is however a confession of the 
authors that more could possibly be done to further control for the (apparently positive) 
spill-over effects of fair-trade on proximate producers. In line with that admission, there 
is the possibility that their results may underestimate the impact of fair-trade. 
Becchetti and Castriota (2008) offer a concise study of a Chilean honey co-
operative. Applying standard regression analysis and propensity score matching (PSM) 
techniques to a cross-sectional dataset of around 200 producers, the authors conclude 
strongly in favour of fair-trade. Interestingly, the cooperative in question pays a slightly 
lower price for its members’ honey, but at the same time provides an impressive array 
of assistance: free transport for honey, zero interest advance payments, product lab tests, 
training courses, and a stable agreement in respect of the quantity to be purchased. Their 
conclusion relates in particular to productivity and associated net income. Affiliation to 
fair-trade is shown to be associated with a cumulative productivity differential of 83,186 
pesos (US$ 166) per hour of honey-based income, as opposed to 141,302 pesos (US$ 
283) – a remarkable lift of around 70%. A percentage increase in fair-trade sales was 
estimated to be worth a per hourly income increment of 707 pesos (US$ 1.4). Training 
                                                 
6 Becchetti et al. (2008 p.3) in a follow up note the authors claim that as a response to their paper the co-
operative has began to take practical steps to address this human capital issue.  
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courses in particular were accredited with facilitating these gains in productivity, and 
internal to the relationship the authors found a positive and significant relationship 
between fair-trade and training activities. The paper places emphasis on these 
improvements coming about in the presence of a lower wholesale price – this they call 
“the fair price myth” (p.24). This is indeed a noteworthy finding, and one that opens the 
door to a view of the mechanics of how fair-trade achieves its impact. It must however 
be noted that while we are informed that the wholesale price is less than what peer 
wholesale buyers pay, we are not given any information regarding the retail end of this 
supply chain. Therefore, it may be tenuous to relegate the ‘fair-price contingent’ to the 
realms of mythology. In order to corroborate the claim that is being made, we would 
need to know where the monies that finance the ‘additional services’ that the co-
operative provide come from, because if a fair-trade based mark-up at the (retail) end of 
supply chain was contributing to the provisions of those services, then the stated myth 
would be not be a myth. Nonetheless, the overall findings strongly favour fair-trade, and 
the fact that it is productivity based findings, aligns nicely the often abrasive 
relationship between equity and efficiency.  
Providing some respite to the often touted criticism of fair-trade not dealing with the 
lower depths of the poverty bracket, Becchetti et al, (2008) econometrically examine the 
livelihoods of 240 Peruvian artisans. Unlike previous papers by one or more of these 
authors, the price element of fair-trade appears to be granted a more prominent role. 
Indeed the typical differential between fair-trade and conventional intermediaries is 
stated as being a remarkable 4.7 times higher. In addition, the encouragement of socially 
responsible tourism, an endeavour with which fair-trade organisers are said to actively 
participate, there is in addition a 50% mark-up on top of the fair-trade price. The 
findings may be summarised as a clear estimated nonlinear (concave) relationship 
between years of affiliation with fair-trade and material elements of welfare. An 
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additional linear relationship emerges between the opening of consecutive trade 
channel, of which fair-trade is one of a number of outlets. Although an indirect 
relationship is considered, strong and significant associations are found to be present 
regarding fair-trade exhibiting a positive effect on subjective levels of happiness and 
self-esteem. The data itself is cross-sectional, but by taking a back-cast panel approach 
the authors are able to mould some dynamics into their inference and observe fair-trade 
to be significantly associated with the willingness and/or ability of parents to have their 
children schooled. Most of the results bode well for fair-trade, however there is some 
mixed evidence in terms of externalities. Firstly, there is evidence to support that fair-
trade increases the bargaining power of all producers, but in one of the two cases the 
authors cite that they cannot reject the LeClair (2002) hypothesis of fair-trade 
potentially depressing prices for non-participating producers.  
Ronchi (2006) in an analysis to justify both the existence of fair-trade and co-
operatives in general, draws upon a perspective which has come to be known as the 
New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature, and attempts to 
econometrically verify the existence of market power. Within this approach, market 
power is defined simply as being “deviations from marginal cost pricing” (p.14). The 
sought-after metric is one that conveys how distant the situation is from a perfectly 
competitive market, and thus the identification of a benchmark at which one can 
legitimately declare that oligopolistic conditions are permitting market power to be 
exploitatively exercised.  
From the outset it is conceded that there can be difficulty in trying to empirically 
distinguish between market power and efficiency (see Bresnahan 1982). Explained 
simplistically, the dependent variable is what is referred to as the mark-down measure, 
(P* – Pr) where P* is the green coffee output price (world price) and Pr is the output 
price that the mill reports. Where P* – Pr = 0, the mill has reported the true price and 
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by the extent to which P* – Pr > 0, this measures the margin that a mill/exporter has 
earned in excess of its long run average processing costs. In line with assumptions that 
are about to be disclosed, the presence of any mark-down measures greater that those of 
co-operatives are taken to be evidence to support the existence of market power being 
exerted. The first assumption is that this is only a measure of market power if the mill is 
operating at constant returns to scale (CRS); in the absence of CRS it may just as 
evidently be a measure of efficiency. Under this CRS assumption, the regulatory body 
(ICAFE) can be sure that subtracting the minimum long run average processing costs 
(APC) results in producers receiving at least the value of their marginal product (VMP).  
P* = MPC + VMP  
 => P* – MPC = VMP 
CRS => MPC = APC 
ICAFE apparently calculates and allows for the mill-specific subtraction of APCicafe 
from the output price. It follows, that by legislatively setting the minimum price that the 
producer is to be paid (Pp), ICAFE will strive to ensure that prices are at a level where 
P* – APCicafe = VMP and so it follows that if P* – APCicafe ≡ Pp then Pp = VMP. 
In order to navigate around the unrealistic CRS assumption, Ronachi calls upon 
what she refers to as ‘the institutional reality of Costa Rica’. Two elements get factored 
in, the first being that co-operative mills are less (scale) efficient than other mills (lower 
demand curve); this is backed up via a discussion of the additional services that a co-
operative mill is expected to provide for its members. The second is that there is no 
principal-agent problem in relation to the export dealings of the mills’ agents. In other 
words, even if they possess the ability to do so, co-operatives (apparently by definition 
of ownership) do not exercise market power – that would be self-damaging corruption. 
While the latter assumption is reinforced with a rich discussion of Costa Rica’s 
institutional norms, still there is no shortage of scholars who would pour scorn on the 
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assumption of a perpetually well-behaved agent. Indeed, evidence in favour of the 
sceptic can be found in Mendoza and Bastiaensen (2003, p.43), in which serious doubts 
were raised regarding the transparency and democratic qualities of the co-operative in 
question. Another more explicit example of administrative dishonesty is on show in 
OPM (2000, p.3-22) where it is cited that in 1997 several members of Tanzanian co-
operatives were arrested and charged with corruption. Further examples of problems 
that relate to co-operatives can be seen in Booth (2008), Hawley (2006), and Weitzman 
(2006). 
A large quantity of unbalanced firm-level panel data (v = 21, n = 157, t = 26 years) 
was mobilised in order to construct mill-specific P* – Pr estimates. A fixed effect 
formulation is deemed more appropriate than a random effects model, and it is openly 
conceded that any dealings with the so-called “world price” tend to lack universality 
due to various transaction costs that are associated with different final destinations.  
The results indicate that foreign owned mills, fair-trade mills and co-operative mills 
all offer the effect of reducing the mark-down measure in relation to the performance of 
domestically owned non-co-operative mills. The strongest performers of these are the 
foreign owned mills, as they on average record mark-down measures of almost £0.20/kg 
lower than domestically owned conventional mills. This would suggest that foreign 
owned mills are either more efficient or that they exercise market power. Ronchi leans 
towards an opinion that it is a combination of both. Yet, without being able to observe 
an estimated input demand curve for foreign owned mills, it is impossible to know 
precisely how much of the differential to attribute to efficiency and how much of it to 
blame on market power. This, it must be said, deposits a few creases in the analysis. 
However, at the very least, it cannot be concluded that market power is entirely absent 
from the farm gate – especially as it emerged from interviews that the monitoring ability 
of ICAFE can at times be somewhat stretched. Incidentally, if one were to adopt an 
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optimistic angle of ‘predominate efficiency’, this would equate a compliment of 
efficiency in regards foreign ownership and the vertical integration that often 
accompanies it. Hence, from that perspective, it is interesting to note that these 
observations appear to contradict the often touted suggestion that multinational 
involvement is associated with producers receiving a lower share of the value chain. 
From that vantage point, the analysis is at least as complimentary to foreign ownership 
as it is to fair-trade and co-operatives in general. 
A more refined check of market power comes by making a comparison between 
cooperative mills (many of which are fair-trade associated) and the domestically owned 
non-co-operative mills. The contrast displays a statistically significant lower mark-down 
measure in favour of the former; ‘in favour’ because, holding firm to the ‘co-operatives 
never exercise market power’ assumption, this would appear to suggest that in spite of 
stern legislative efforts, market power is still exercised at the farm gate of Costa Rica’s 
coffee. In terms of further isolating a specific fair-trade effect, Ronchi finds that fair-
trade mills on average record a mark-down measure £0.06/kg lower than that of 
conventional co-operatives and domestically owned single plant mills (significant to 
90%). Again clinging to the assumption of co-operatives being entirely honest with their 
members, this may be interpreted as fair-trade bestowing an additional benefit of 
efficiency. Therefore, overall, if they are to be seen as responses to the market failure of 
market power, fair-trade and ‘co-operatives in general’ receive from Ronchi (2006) 
some quantitative credence to support the legitimacy of their existence. Furthermore, if 
market power manages to surface in the presence of institutions as strong as those in 
Costa Rica, it implies that there is amplified scope for similarities to occur in regions in 
with institutional support is weaker. 
 
 
 49
1.4 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
 
LeClair (2002) offers a simple model that moves to depict the unequal deficits of 
efficiency between a fair-trade subsidy and a direct payment. It is shown that the cost to 
the consumer (in the rich country) is greater than the subsidy received by the producer. 
The message is that it would seem that the ‘warm moral glow’ consumers receive from 
purchasing fair-trade goods could, at no extra monetary outlay, increase with a direct 
payment. The Pareto improvement that LeClair hints at hinges on an implicit 
assumption that the relationship between a given quantity of utility and given amount of 
money is constant – and that the mechanism of transfer does not influence those 
respective utilities. The obvious counter against this is that the utility of producers might 
well be affected by how dignified they view the transfer mechanism to be. Chapter II 
picks up on this ‘aid for utility’ for perspective. 
In the model, fair-trade handicrafts are employed to illustrate the loss of efficiency. 
It can however be shown that to follow the theory and replace handicrafts with 
agricultural goods leads us to a distinctly dissimilar conclusion. 
 
PH = price of handicraft 
QH = quantity of output 
RH = cost of raw material requirements per unit of output 
 
Leclair states the net income of the artisan, essentially total revenue minus total costs. 
This holds for agriculture, with the exception that a fixed cost element would likely be 
involved. However as fixed costs are assumed to be constant leaving them out makes no 
major difference to what is being depicted here. 
 
(L1) PHQH – RHQH 
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The alternative trade organisation (ATO) provides a link to an affluent market, 
promotes the fair-trade products and thus stimulates demand. It is at this point things 
begin to differ for agricultural goods. The ATO provides new demand for handicrafts, 
but in the case of agriculture no new demand is being created. It is simply that there is a 
transfer in demand from conventional goods to fair-trade goods. The implication of this 
is that a supply response may be neither necessary nor forthcoming. As will be seen, 
factoring this into the theoretical conclusion culminates in a starkly different message. 
 
(L2) PH(1+ a)QH(1+ b) – RHQH(1+ b), 
 
where a and b > 0. (1+ a) represents the multiple that will be added to the price by way 
of a fair-trade premium. (1+ b) represents the multiple by which supply will be required 
to increase as a response to new demand. Thus the difference between L1 and L2 
appears as so: 
 
(L3) (a+b+ab)PHQH – bRHQH 
 
Therefore, the cost of QH units to the fair-trade consumer in the developed country can 
be written as PH(1+ a)QH(1+ b), which is greater than the direct subsidy by bRHQH. It 
can thus be seen that ‘b’ is the component that determines the extent to which fair-trade 
is less efficient than a direct transfer. The smaller the value of ‘b’ the closer the 
convergence on efficiency.  
LeClair (2002) correctly speculates that handicrafts are likely to be highly supply 
elastic. Therefore the argument he formulates of fair-trade being less efficient than a 
direct transfer largely holds. However the situation in agriculture could not be more 
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different. The short run aggregate supply (SRAS) curve in agriculture will be perfectly 
inelastic (b=0). Hence, if one accepts that value, in the short run there would be a 
situation of neutrality between the efficiency of fair-trade and a direct transfer. In the 
long run, supply theory suggests that ‘b’ would be likely to increase, yet in relation to 
agriculture in general (barring extreme circumstances), the numbers exist to suggest one 
is accurate enough in expecting a subtle response of supply. For example, in relation to 
coffee, Lewin et al, (2004) estimate the elasticity of Latin American supply to be 0.15. 
So, while LeClair’s theoretical approach still stands well overall, its application to 
agriculture rather than handicrafts facilitates a starkly dissimilar conclusion, so much so 
that it may even be morphed into an argument supportive of fair-trade in agriculture. 
This remark is made not just in the context of the AS curve tending to be highly 
inelastic, but also because it is pointed out that fair-trade mobilises funds that would 
otherwise not come into existence – itself a boost of justification that partially counters 
the claims of inefficiency. As was mentioned in the previous section, the empirical 
evidence on offer in Becchetti et al. (2008) suggests that we can at this stage can neither 
accept nor reject LeClair’s hypothesis of a possible negative externality. 
Maseland and De Vaal (2002) offer a theoretical analysis based on an impressively 
practical definition of fairness. Fairness in this paper is based on the relative 
performances of free trade, fair-trade, and protectionism. Two analytical angles are 
employed. The first is a Heckscher-Ohlin trade framework (see Appleyard et al. 2006). 
The insightfulness of this apparatus is to be found in its ability to provide criteria for 
judgement outside of the standard Paretian criteria. 
In accordance to what appears to be a very Rawlsian distinction of fairness, 
Maseland and De Vaal make their statements dependent on how well the distributional 
effects of fair-trade bode for the group that are the least well off. Their declaration as to 
whether fair-trade is preferred hinges exclusively on satisfaction of that criterion. The 
 52
model assumes a two country, two goods, and two factors approach. One country is 
rich, the other is poor, and it is further assumed that the consumption of all people in the 
rich country adheres to the principles of fair-trade. The conclusion generated is that fair-
trade is always superior to protectionism, and sometimes superior to free trade. Its 
(distributional) superiority over free trade is depended on the price elasticity of demand 
for the good in question. The elasticity must be sufficiently low for the abundant factor 
in the poor country to benefit. Where this is not the case, free trade is preferred to fair-
trade.  
As a consecutive approach within the same paper, the authors also employ a static 
version of the economic geography model that owes its existence to Fujita et al. (1999). 
The performance of fair-trade in this model comes out as highly case-dependent. In 
particular, transportation costs emerged as a highly influential variable. Yet, as an 
essential point of reference, ‘transportation costs’ in this model are to be thought of as 
more than what the name suggests. Rather, the term embodies all the elements that one 
typically associates with trade barriers – both natural and artificial. Relative to 
conventional trade, fair-trade offered increasing returns to agricultural producers only as 
transportation costs fell. This would seem to theoretically suggest that fair-trade would 
work best as an accompaniment to free trade because in the presence of prohibitive 
transaction costs (i.e. protectionism) fair-trade made little difference.  
The remaining theoretical approaches that are to be discussed all draw their 
validation from alleged anti-competitive conditions at the farm gate. In many of the 
papers to follow the uncompetitive conditions are largely pre-assumed. It is hoped that 
previous entries in this literature review (particularly those on coffee) serve as an alibi 
to the acceptance of some of those conditions. 
Milford (2004) draws her approach from various co-operative orientated papers, in 
particular Furubotn (1976), Porter and Skully (1978), Helmberger (1964), Taylor 
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(1971), Le Vay (1983), Sexton (1990), and Deininger (1995). The general idea behind 
the promotion of co-operatives is that they serve as a counterbalance to a monopolist 
buyer (purchasing cartel in reality). Milford’s thesis holds firm to the idea of a co-
operative acting as a “competitive yard stick” by providing a visible measure of what 
Helmberger (1964) refers to as a “barometer of exploitation.” In essence, a sort of 
demonstration effect is being proposed. That is to say, the visible presence of a price 
differential is said to make non-members acutely aware of their own state of relative 
misfortune. In full view of this, the purchasing competitors to the co-operative, IOFs, 
will seek to appear less exploitative by way of not maximising the returns that they as 
oligopolists could exploitatively acquire. Indeed, in their paper on Bolivian coffee, 
Imhof and Lee note that, “Private sector companies were increasingly entering the local 
coffee market and offering prices similar or higher to fair-trade.” (2007, p.73). Also, 
post fair-trade, Starbucks did put forth an initiative for its own in-house genre of 
ethically sourced coffee, and the premium paid was perceived to be quite generous 
(Tallontire and Vorley 2005). Essentially the co-operative is being regarded as a formal 
institution that alters the incentive structure of the economy. The framework employed 
to explain this is that of a standard monopsonist. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 offer graphical 
representations of the situation. 
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Figure 1.1 The depression of the producers wage by a purchasing cartel 
 
 
 
The supply curve = W(q) = Price * Quantity = Producers Gross Income (Y). In a 
competitive situation, the producer’s wage (price) is market determined and occurs at 
point ‘B’ where the Marginal Revenue Product (MRP) intersects the supply curve (W(q) 
= MRP). At this point, producers supply Qb in exchange for wage Wb. This, under the 
standard assumptions of a Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis, is said to constitute 
the competitive outcome. The presence of a monopsonist invalidates a number of the 
assumptions and so pushes the outcome away from point ‘B’. 
It is, by definition, taken that cartel members have the awareness that the quantities 
they purchase will affect the price of all units purchased and in turn affect their profits. 
Accordingly, the marginal cost (MC) curve of the cartel is steeper than the producers’ 
supply curve (if it was a pure monopsonist it would be steeper still). Acting in its own 
interests, the purchasing cartel maximises its profits, at point ‘M’, where MC = MR. As 
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it only desires Qa, it pays the wage Wa, and thus the situation is such that the returns to 
the producer are depressed (Wa*Qa < Wb*Qb).  
As the assumption of decreasing returns to scale is being made, capacity constraints 
dictate that no single firm possess the ability to capture the entire market by way of 
tabling a single high price offer. Indeed, if increasing returns were to be the case then, 
as Milford (2004) points out, the problem would solve itself by virtue of an upward 
bidding process that would result in a competitive outcome (Bertrand competition) – 
formally true even in the case of just two buyers (the so-called Bertrand paradox).  
In order to provide a counterbalance to the cartel, suppose producers form a co-
operative. It shall be the aim of the co-operative to try to push the outcome away from 
point A towards point B. In order for this to take place, two potentially traitorous 
conditions must be satisfied. Firstly the efficiency of the co-operative must be 
comparable to that of the IOF, and secondly the co-operative must operate a policy of 
openness to new members. If the co-operative is just as efficient as the IOF (identical 
MRP curves) and operates a policy of complete openness to new members, then it 
stands to reason that all producers would flock to receive the co-operative’s higher 
price. In this case point B proves unsustainable in the long run as the quantity produced 
will continue to rise until supply equals the average revenue product (ARP), at which 
point, the marginal costs of production will be in excess of the marginal revenue (Figure 
1.2 below). At this coordinate, represented by point D, the marginal costs of production 
correspond to the producer’s wage, thus there are no excess profits being made. The net 
income of the co-operative members is lower than what it would be at point B. 
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Figure 1.2 Co-operative with open membership 
 
 
 
 
 
If on the other hand, the co-operative restricts membership such that point B will be 
sustained for its members, that would be fine except that it might substantially worsen 
the situation of the non-members. In the knowledge that those locked out have nowhere 
else to turn, the barometer of exploitation, while visibly present, would be practically 
worthless in terms of any ‘threat of action’ – there would be no meaningful incentive for 
the IOF to appear less exploitative. The solution is for the co-operative to set the cost of 
membership at such a rate as to effectively balance membership at a level which will 
bind production to the optimal position (Qb). By doing so the demonstration effect 
retains its relevance. If the IOF now squeezes non-members, it brings into play the 
incentive for them to pay to join the co-operative – the membership fee remains 
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unchanged but the net gain of membership increases. It is the threat of non-members 
having the option to join that gives the barometer of exploitation its practical worth.  
Confronting the condition which requires the co-operative to be comparably 
efficient to the IOF leads to a more direct engagement with the role of fair-trade in 
strengthening the hand of the producer. Suppose that in Figure 1.2 the barometer of 
exploitation was represented by the distance from A to B. In this case, assuming that 
membership is not strictly restricted, the IOF has an active incentive to have its 
purchase point tend towards B. It may never reach B, but the presence of the co-
operative is still working to partially restore competitive balance and in turn uplifting 
the welfare of all local producers. However, suppose, as Milford does, that the costs 
associated with cooperative membership result in the co-operative being less efficient 
than the IOF. The outcome of this is depicted by a relatively lower MRP curve (MRP 
co-op in Figure 1.3). 
Figure 1.3 Shifts in the co-operative’s MRP 
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The relative inefficiency has reduced the measure of exploitation by the distance B to E. 
The visible yardstick now stands at A to E. Milford theorises that the application of a 
subsidy (S) – such as a fair-trade premium – will serve to increase the efficiency of the 
co-operative and thus restore balance, ideally ‘MRP co-op’ would converge on ‘MRP 
IOF’. However she does justly note the possibility that the subsidy might push the 
‘MRP co-op’ beyond the ‘MRP IOF’ and thus create an unwanted market distortion 
(MRP co-cop + S).  
While there are background assumptions that beg of us to beware, still this 
‘strengthening of the co-operative approach’ affords a theoretical argument of justifiable 
intervention. However along with that stance also come a number of hurdles for related 
empirical evaluations to be duly mindful of. In particular, if it were to be assumed that 
the IOF does react to the co-operative and fair-trade by shortening the distance between 
points A and B, then there is at least one theoretical suggestion encapsulated within that 
i.e. that, if a localised wage differential were taken to be a dependent variable, the 
estimations would serve to underestimate the effect of a co-operative and/or fair-trade. 
On that note, the extent to which an IOF reacts is the fundamental variable that is 
required to correct for that underestimation. Where that is the case, any statement of 
inference would potentially need to take into account the policy structure of the local 
co-operative. The reason being that, if the co-operative is operating optimal pricing and 
membership management, then there may be cause to accredit a proportion of non-
members’ income to the presence of the co-operative. In essence, one has to not just 
estimate the IOF reaction, but also disentangle from it what proportion of that reaction 
is due to the different managerial capabilities of different co-operatives. Specifically in 
the case of fair-trade, one may care to establish if membership costs have increased with 
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the winning of a fair-trade contract. Needless to say, these are hefty demands to place 
upon a dataset, especially as a well matched time series is unlikely to be available. 
Having established an overview of this theoretical perspective, let us now inspect it 
more critically. Firstly, it’s perceivable that this barometer of exploitation has less to 
offer in the more open economies of today than it did when the idea originally surfaced. 
Furthermore, the implicit assumption that the demand for membership is a decreasing 
function of cost may be a nominal rather than a real consideration, and as such, 
attempting to use the joining fee as a membership regulator raises some awkward issues. 
That is because, if a co-operative is sophisticated enough to adjust its membership fee in 
sync with membership demand and IOF pricing behaviour, then presumably the extra 
revenue from the addition to the fee is not destined to be wasted. An example of ‘waste’ 
in this context would be something such as an increase in real wages of administrative 
workers in the absence of there being any genuine economic reason or market pressure 
to do so. Therefore, assuming that explicit waste would not be a preference of policy, 
the extra revenue that is generated from an increase in the cost of membership cannot 
just vanish into thin air; feasibly those revenues should at some time surface as a form 
of return to members.  
Alternatively, it may be the case that imperfect information distorts the perception 
of non-members such that they do base their decisions to join entirely on nominal costs 
and present period gains. However, even if that is the case, to leave behind those who 
feel they cannot afford to participate hardly encapsulates the spirit of what a co-
operative and fair-trade are supposed to be all about. Moreover, consider that one of the 
strictest criteria of fair-trade certification is the ‘free association of membership’. While 
this condition is tailored more to the avoidance of prejudice by factors such as gender, 
ethnicity and union membership, nonetheless there is still the potential for legal clashes 
relating to attempts to restrict membership. The overall suggestion being made is not 
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that attempting to regulate membership with altering fees is destined to fail, merely that 
it is not necessarily as straightforward a manoeuvre as it may appear on paper. 
An issue that many will consider of greater consequence altogether, it may be 
argued that a one-dimensional exchange oversimplifies the problem. The framework 
from which Milford draws her analysis fails to adequately take into account that the 
quantity produced must be subordinate to the quantity that is demanded, and that the 
dominant market in that relationship is the export market. Along those lines, one may 
legitimately seek to enquire what the implications are of the export market being asked 
to accommodate this extra quantity (Qb). While at first blush the answer may seem 
painfully obvious, there are actually a number of supplementary factors to consider, not 
least that the profit motive of fair-trade intermediaries is apparently permitted to play its 
natural role. Hence, for the moment let us draw breath rather than conclusion. Milford’s 
discourse is by no means unique in struggling with the thorny issue of oversupply; the 
final major entry of this section raises some of the same issues. For the sake of 
structural coherence, a more direct discussion of oversupply is postponed until Chapter 
III. Conducive to the flow of the discussion at hand we press on with a parallel 
perspective to Milford’s.  
Two overlapping papers, Hayes and Moore (2005) and Hayes (2006) portray the 
economic dimensions of fair-trade in a framework based on the Keynesian notion of 
‘aggregate involuntary unemployment’. The inclusion of the concept makes a valuable 
contribution to the literature in that it provides a truer representation of the rural 
predicament typically faced. Indeed, Hayes’s preference for a Marshallian partial 
equilibrium model over a general equilibrium analysis (GEA) is derived from GEA’s 
almost unbroken tendency to tacitly assume full employment. Rather, the situation at 
hand is one in which labour remains unemployed in spite of the market wage being in 
excess of the marginal utility of leisure. In other words, sacrifice of leisure time does 
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not enter into the behavioural equation in the way it does in a more advanced economy. 
To the contrary, leisure time is taken to be something people are positively disgruntled 
at having too much of. Recognition of this leads to the claim that the fair-trade premium 
does not necessarily engineer an inefficient allocation of labour because, in this 
circumstance it is not matter of drawing people out from one productive activity into 
another. Rather, it is about drawing from a pool of labour that is underemployed and 
involuntarily unemployed – largely inactive labour which does desire to be active at the 
current market wage. The situation is further aggravated by the tendency of employers 
(farm gate purchasers) to not have to compete over the prices they offer.  
Accordingly, Hayes (2006) applies Pigou’s (1932) and Robinson’s (1933) theory of 
employer monopsony to the plight of the developing world’s agricultural position – and 
by default to fair-trade. It is considered that a suboptimal outcome of allocative 
efficiency is the product of heavily asymmetric positions of bargaining power. It is 
hypothesised that fair-trade can foster the sort of local organisational competency 
required to counter this disparity. Essentially, fair-trade is seen as an entity that can 
enhance the competition for rural labour. Let it be noted that Hayes’s chosen framework 
offers no definition of ‘fairness’ outside of the standard Paretian criteria. The subject 
matter of concern is that of evaluating the allocative efficiency of fair-trade, yet the 
author openly acknowledges that matters of distribution will likely require a more 
pragmatic response of theory and policy. Like Milford’s paper, Hayes’s graphical 
depiction takes the form of a standard monopoly/monopsony set-up, only this time more 
purely in the context of labour. 
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Figure 1.4 Involuntary unemployment and cloaked efficiency  
 
 
The schedule labels have been kept consistent with those of the original paper but to 
all intents and purposes they are identical to the ones that have been described in the 
discussion of Milford (2004). Where Milford labels the horizontal axis as quantity (Q), 
Hayes has it as the number of workers employed. For the time being, let it be accepted 
that those two entities are essentially equivalent to one another. The vertical axis is the 
same as it is in Milford (2004), price of the produce, wage of the labourers. W is the 
supply of labour, again relatable to the supply of produce.  
The model is constructed so as to try to expose an illusion. The standard monopsony 
situation renders visible the presence of market power via the circumstance of 
employment (n1) at a depressed wage (w1). The illusion is that the competitive situation 
should be employment (n2) at competitive wage (w2). Whereas Hayes argues, (n2, w2) 
is actually not Parato optimal under conditions of involuntary unemployment, rather the 
MRP schedule at full employment (MRPL-F) is further out to the right. It is precisely as 
 63
a result of underemployment and involuntarily unemployment for which it is permitted 
that ‘missing’ labour be absorbed into the economy at no significant cost to any other 
sector. Therefore, the true Pareto optimal condition is said not to be (n2, w2) but rather 
(n3, w3). Hence the problem, as Hayes sees it, is not in trying to shift the outcome to 
(n2, w2), but rather pushing towards the (n3, w3) equilibrium.  
An additional problem is identified as there being the possible presence of a 
discriminating monopsony – a situation in which producers are faced with a single 
buyer and at the same time subjected to different prices for the sale of identical goods. 
In the more traditional sense of the word, a ‘market’ will of course, by virtue of having 
numerous buyers and sellers under the same roof, provide a natural and time-honoured 
antidote for discriminatory pricing. Yet where infrastructure is poor and transport 
resources scarce, a discriminating monopsony may indeed be a predicament with which 
some farmers are faced. It is claimed that fair-trade can provide a means for solving 
these two problems by acting in a similar fashion to how unionisation or minimum 
wage attempts to remedy.  
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Figure 1.5: a minimum price (wage) co-operative countering for monopsony conditions 
 
 
The ‘intervention’ (fair-trade minimum price) alters the marginal cost curve such that it 
shifts to the right and becomes perfectly elastic between the set minimum and the point 
where it hits the labour supply curve (B on MLC-U). As is visible by the horizontal 
section (w1 – B) of the MLC-U curve, the conditions of a discriminating monopsony 
are thus removed – or at least capped. A new equilibrium is now created (E), in which 
more people are employed (n1+) at a higher wage (W1+). Thereafter it is claimed that 
the controlling association (fair-trade, union, co-operative etc), would gradually ‘ratchet 
up’ the minimum price to an acceptable level.  
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Figure 1.6: Gradual increase of the minimum (wage) price (‘ratcheting’) 
 
 
The above figure depicts hypothetical ‘ratcheting’ such that the minimum level has 
been pushed up to the competitive level (B→A, w2, n2). By way of the interests of non-
members and employers (buyers) coinciding, the fair-trade collective is prevented from 
going too far with its demands. This conflict of interests ensures that neither a position 
of employer monopsony nor a position of fair-trade collective monopoly can make for a 
stable equilibrium. Hence the appearance of a potential avenue to independence affords 
Hayes a view in which the fair-trade consumer and the retail premium are neither 
necessary nor sufficient in the long run.  
An initial criticism of this style of collective action might be that it depends very 
heavily upon the organisational discipline of its members. The classical trade-off 
manifests itself as ‘the greater the numbers the greater the bargaining power of the 
group’. But, the greater the numbers the more difficult it can be to enforce discipline 
because the greater are the rewards for defection – classical game theory. At a local 
level, or perhaps stretching it to a regional level, this sort of action may at a push be 
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possible. Yet one may wish to question whether such an alliance could be forged and 
counted upon at the sort of global scale that would be required. Ultimately this 
minimum wage model of eventual independence does not appear to sufficiently respect 
the fact that competition in these agricultural commodities is extensively global. 
Looking at coffee for example, one does not observe any fair-trade deal for Vietnamese 
coffee, precisely because Vietnamese coffee growers are obliged to sell their output at a 
guaranteed set price to the state owned enterprise (McCargo 2004). This Vietnamese 
arrangement may be viewed as a component of a wider strategy of national 
industrialisation. The example of Vietnam may be more the exception than the rule, but 
it is especially significant to the coffee debate as Vietnam has become world’s second 
largest coffee producer. Other nations generally employ much more subtle approaches 
than Vietnam, but it is hardly atypical as there are other developing countries which 
prejudice (i.e. negative protection) against their agricultural sectors in order to facilitate 
wider aims of industrial development. This is merely an example of just one of the 
barriers that conspires to hinder the sort of collaboration that would be a requisite of 
successful collective bargaining – rest assured there are many more. 
A consecutive criticism as to whether or not this is achievable would be that a closer 
look needs be taken at what involuntary unemployment might mean for the elasticity of 
the labour supply. It is arguable that the presence of involuntary unemployment makes 
for a situation in which the labour supply schedule exhibits a duration of perfect 
elasticity (or at least very close to). A note to cement consistency: this may at first 
glance appear to contradict the previous assertion of agricultural supply being highly 
inelastic. To assimilate the claim that is being made here with the previously made 
claim of labour and its product being the proxy, one needs to accept the stance that there 
is a momentary divergence between the injection of labour and the supply of its product. 
To be as clear as possible: labour moves first (immediately if it is involuntarily 
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unemployed) and a lag necessarily precedes the harvesting of the finished product. 
What this says is that the quantities of labour and the quantities of its product proxy in 
the long run, but not the short run. This is how to reconcile figure 1.7 below with the 
previous statements about agricultural supply being highly inelastic.  
Intuitively, the levelling should occur sooner (at a lower p, w) rather than later (at a 
higher p, w), and as such may place a cap on what a minimum wage (fair-trade price) 
can legitimately extract. This makes for an important consideration in terms of trying to 
reach the Pareto optimal point under conditions of involuntary employment (w3, n3). 
Figure 1.7 illustrates the issue that this suggestion gives rise to.  
Figure 1.7 Involuntary unemployment with the possibility of perfectly elastic labour 
supply  
 
The fair-trade minimum price (wage) (W-FT) has been set at such a level so as to 
enable it to reach the competitive outcome under the assumption of full employment 
(n2, W-FT). However, if it is realistic to assume that involuntary unemployment allows 
for a sustained duration of perfect elasticity of supply, then the level very easily calls 
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forth those who are involuntarily unemployed. The noteworthy difference between 
Figures 1.7 and 1.6, is that Pareto optimality is theoretically satisfied by the same 
number of people being employed, but at a lower wage (W-FT < w2).  
The duration of perfectly elastic supply will expire at some point of price and turn 
again to tend upwards. Equating point F with this secondary turning point of the labour 
supply schedule and the intersection of MRPL-U, indicates that any further increases in 
W-FT would solicit workers who are already involved in productive activities. If it is 
indeed the case that involuntary underemployment facilitates the existence of a stint of 
perfectly elastic supply, then the distance between A and F makes for an important 
consideration. It suggests that minimum wage ‘ratcheting’ may potentially call into 
action more labour than Hayes (2006) anticipates. So, bringing the condition of 
involuntary unemployment to the forefront of the debate makes for a valuable 
contribution to the literature; whether the agricultural sector is the best point of 
absorption for that labour is a more contestable matter.  
This leads to a more central criticism of the model. Hayes, like Milford, seems to 
have given insufficient consideration to the ability and willingness of the export market 
to absorb extra supply and the likely effect that will have on aggregate prices. As will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter III, there are a number of hindrances to ascertaining 
the presence of oversupply. Some of the key issues are that supply is global, 
productivity gains render equilibrium to be a moving target, and distortions are 
omnipresent and at times clandestinely packaged. As has already been noted, the fair-
trade movement responds to this suggestion of oversupply by pointing to the fact that 
licensed traders are themselves profit makers (makers but not necessarily maximisers 
it’s worth noting); they are subordinate to market forces and so they do not buy in 
excess of what they can sell. This is a credible enough answer. However, if it is 
accurate, it carries with it the implication that, unless demand is growing, the quantity 
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increases observable on the graphs of Hayes and Milford must coincide with either 
quantity decreases elsewhere in economy, or else appropriate growth in effectual 
demand. This in turn gives rise to the issue of trying to recognise the possible 
rearrangements of welfare that take place between participating and non-participating 
producers. It is precisely that reshuffle of welfare that Chapter III undertakes to simulate 
and evaluate.  
Aside from the partial equilibrium set-up, Hayes (2006) contains further passing 
remarks that are uniquely relevant to the story as a whole. One such point is a response 
to the acknowledgment that children’s education may suffer when the price of labour is 
temporarily high. In order to distance fair-trade from this detriment, Hayes falls back on 
the proposal that, “it is typical of many low-income households that priority is given to 
children’s education as soon as income rises above a minimum level” (2006 p.7). This 
may intuitively be the case, but the importance of it is such that it is in itself a very 
worthy question to examine empirically. In conjunction, one may seek to enquire if 
producers perceive the incomes from fair-trade to be either permanent or transitory. It 
would seem reasonable to suppose that those whose perception leans to the former are 
better placed to convert their gains into something of future consequence.  
A final remark on Hayes (2006) relates to his assertion that, “It is precisely because 
individual households and local fair trade organisations do not possess such technology 
that they are unable to compete in the product market.........This analysis therefore 
suggests the main benefit of the fair trade partnership to the producer is in the process 
of investment in equipping local organisation with efficient technology.” (pp 15-17). 
While there is logic in what is being said, careful consideration needs to be given to the 
category of technology in which the producer is being advised to invest. Technology 
associated with efficiency definitionally alters the input-output ratio in favour of the 
latter. And if each unit of labour is made to go further, holding constant the number 
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employed, supply increases. Labour-saving technology is of course not a grace to 
demonise, not at all, it represents productivity-driven progress. Seldom was a truer 
sentence spoken than Krugman’s (1990) famous opening remark, "Productivity isn't 
everything, but in the long-run it is almost everything.”. 
Now, regarding the aims of fair-trade one need consider the medium term friction 
that might be associated with advancements in productivity. Fair-trade is no exception 
to all economic endeavours, in that if in the long run it ignores the need for productivity 
gains, it does so at the peril of the descendants of those it conspires to assist in the 
current day. It does at times appear that fair-trade struggles desperately to comprehend 
the intergenerational trade-offs with which it may be dabbling. It is the suggestion of 
this discourse that a carefully guided choice of technological investment represents the 
most effective way of excising the deeply embedded demons of the intergenerational 
trade-off. To be clear, when it comes to prescriptions of technology, one much be 
precise about what one prescribes, and think not exclusively of technology that 
economises on production, but in addition, consider technology that facilitates an ascent 
up (adjustment of) the value chain – one need differentiate carefully between these two. 
If an appropriate balance can be struck, it may grant the means by which fair-trade 
could stake a greater claim to effectively accommodating the intergenerational issue. 
Moreover, investments in physical capital must necessarily be accompanied by 
appropriate investments in human capital. By appropriate, what is meant is not merely 
that people be equipped with the capability of operating new machinery, or that their 
agrarian talents are enhanced. Rather, what is meant by appropriate is that workers be 
equipped with the sorts of skills that best place them to weather the restless winds of 
developmental progression. Equate those most vulnerable with the dignity and security 
of feeling that they have the ability to adapt should the forces of economic change 
demand they do so. The well trodden paths of development permit us to speak bluntly 
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on this: give to appropriate generations something they can potentially take to the 
metropolis of industry. The reasoning behind this is very simply that it is merely akin to 
requesting that all technological bets be sensibly hedged.  
 
 
1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
From a review of the literature it would appear that a number of gaps can be identified. 
The developmental question of what it might mean to kowtow to agriculture at the 
potential cost of smothering the lure of the industrial wage is more a chasm than a gap. 
Truthfully, the speculative answering of a question as large as that, captivating as it is, 
goes far beyond the scope of fair-trade, and knocks more on the door of developmental 
and industrial policy debates. We obviously can’t settle this, but will at appropriate 
moments usher forth commentary and evidence that adds some colour to that debate.  
In more refined terms, this thesis will target three gaps in the literature, each of which 
takes as its primary focus the welfare a separate categorical actor: the consumer, the 
participating producer, and the non-participating producer. 
The first and most apparent criticism of the available literature is that it is too awash 
with anecdotal evidence. While such testimonies add value and play a vital and 
informative role, the time has surely arrived where the vagaries and particulars must be 
cemented by the rigour of more systematic data. This is not just a matter of requiring 
additional substance, but equally of involving further balance. As has been detailed, 
some researchers have broken ground on this endeavour. It will never be a question of 
one definitive piece of evidence, but rather a matter of vindication by attrition. 
Accordingly, one identified gap in the literature is to gather further hard data and 
process it at a systematic level – the need for reports in which the data does at least as 
much talking as the researcher. Chapter IV of this thesis takes aim at that task. 
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Identification of a consecutive gap in the literature points to contentions that stem 
from the prospects and consequences of oversupply. The most basic of economic 
reasoning suggests additional supply will deliver a decrease in price – the polar opposite 
of what the fair-trade movement desires. Recognition of this opening is based not just 
on it being the most standardised and frequent complaint in the article informative 
literature, but also because some of the most dominant theoretical perspectives appear to 
struggle with this. By means that were discussed in the previous section, the fair-trade 
movement mounts what is ‘in principle’ a reasonable enough defence against it being 
associated with oversupply. It is certainly not inconceivable that fair-trade can be 
rescued from the cardinal sin of oversupply, however the by-product of a stay of 
execution is that, holding demand constant, an increase in the output of some producers 
must necessarily be met with a decrease in the output of others. With that tight corner in 
mind, Chapter III will put together a logical explanation of what this implies for 
possible welfare reshuffles between fair-trade producers and their non-participating 
neighbours. 
A further understudied ingredient of fair-trade relates to the motivations on the 
demand side. In terms of human welfare, this aspect of fair-trade may be considered by 
some to be somewhat less urgent. Nonetheless, without consumption the concept goes 
nowhere, and so it is important to understand how this side of the relationship maintains 
the existence of fair-trade. In addition, exploring the demand side makes for a rounded 
picture in terms of the overall welfare effects of fair-trade. In a sense, we seek to 
comprehend and measure the interaction between disposable income and consumer 
psychology that underpins effectual demand for so-called ethical goods, and it is 
precisely to that endeavour that the next chapter now turns. 
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Chapter II: Measuring Altruism 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
“Altruism is much more important in economic life than is commonly understood”  
        Gary Becker (1981, p.12) 
 
Suppose a person wanders into a coffee house and is confronted with two beverage 
options, one of fair-trade and one, slightly less expensive, conventional option. The 
agent now has to make a choice between two physically homogeneous products, but not 
perhaps between two physiologically homogeneous products. Traditional economics 
may care to shy away from this distinction; behavioural economics on the other hand 
thrives on it. In order to absorb the clash between altruism and fairness, consider how 
Kahneman et al. appropriate the concept of fairness, “The economic agent is assumed to 
be law-abiding but not “fair” – if fairness implies that some legal opportunities for gain 
are not exploited.” (1986b, p.286). As the purchase of many fair-trade goods is 
generally associated with a price mark-up, fair-trade can, from the consumption side, be 
defined being a situation in which an agent forgoes a legal opportunity for monetary 
gain. It is by that reasoning that we equate fair-trade to altruism.  
The most common stumbling block of altruism is that the giver receives utility in 
exchange for their endeavours, and so some would have us believe that the motive is 
soiled, and therefore by default the concept exists in denial of itself. This discourse 
subscribes to a view of the polar opposite. The claim is made that the utility motive 
purifies more than it pollutes; in other words, it is precisely a person’s propensity to 
receive utility from benevolence by which we should rank and appreciate their 
generosity of spirit.  
This paper attempts to construct a model of ‘utility based generosity’ as regards fair-
 74
trade and altruistic behaviour. The usual problem in modelling such action comes by the 
way of income and utility having to move in opposite directions, and of the 
maximisation constraint being endogenous and unobserved. An attempt to sidestep 
those issues is made by viewing charity in terms of it being a request that is put to a 
potential donor, following which the person accepts or rejects the ‘offer’ to donate. 
Precisely because the offers are explicit and non-negotiable, the practice of ‘fair-trade’ 
resolves to be an accommodating medium by which to transmit this discussion. At first 
glance this appears to contrast with the more usual state of affairs in which the donor 
decides for themselves the amount that they wish to give. It should however by the end 
of this discourse be clear that the framework is generalisable such that it is able to 
encompass most if not all forms of altruism.  
Some would argue that fair-trade is akin to charity and so it is erroneous to 
differentiate between the two. Others will insist that it is neither respectful nor accurate 
to refer to fair-trade as charity. There is substance behind both arguments, but it is a 
disagreement that this thesis makes no direct attempt to settle. It is however 
appropriated that fair-trade may equally be described as ‘altruistic trade’. Terms such as 
‘charity’ and ‘donation’ are employed for convenience and are in no way intended to 
pose disrespect to the concept of fair-trade. On a similar note, the term ‘ethical 
consumer’ will be used in relation to those consumers who purchase fair-trade goods. It 
is a matter of linguistic default that both of these terms, ‘fair’ and ‘ethical’ cannot 
escape the value-laden packaging in which they are wrapped. Yet, unreservedly, this 
discussion does not employ those terms in their usual normative dimension; the words 
are kept merely as a matter of convenience for the reader. Moreover, it will in fact be 
proven that there are circumstances in which a person with a relatively meaner 
disposition will be an ethical consumer, whist a person of a kinder disposition will 
refrain from that category of consumption. Hence the normative dimensions shrink to be 
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near meaningless.  
To begin with, some of the literature on altruism is revisited. Piecing together the 
messages of that rich history leads to the tabling of a definitional framework unique to 
this discourse. Section 2.2 oversees the model acquiring its shape. In particular, 
‘generosity’ is theoretically decoupled from the influence of income, such that we may 
look at how altruistic a person is irrespective of their income. As this is very much an 
information based model, some time will be taken to elaborate on the types of 
information that the model actively processes. 
In Section 2.3 the common agents of the model are formulated and brought to life 
with some hypothetical numeric examples. Section 2.4 attempts to increase the model’s 
sophistication by way of incorporating the purchase/acquisition of ‘specialised’ 
information as regards the effectiveness of the potential donation. The proof within is 
that informed choice always leads to superior levels of long run utility for the potential 
donor; this holds to be true even when the gathered information reflects negatively on 
the performance of the altruistic act that is being considered.  
Penultimate to some conclusive remarks, an empirical design shall be offered by 
which to tout the framework’s experimental potential. Methods are formulated such that 
the theoretical values of the previous sections resolve to be empirically identifiable. The 
outcome of this allows for income-neutral comparisons to be made between the 
different levels of generosity that various individuals harbour. It is intuitively speculated 
that the worth of being able to identify such a metric potentially holds value for 
furthering a quantitative understanding of that what is commonly referred to as a ‘social 
consensus’. 
 
2.2 REVISITING AND REDEFINING ‘ALTRUISM’ 
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The term ‘generosity’ seldom passes the eye of an economist in absence of a brow being 
raised – shamelessly so some might ‘naively’ say. For while it is the self-serving hand 
that goes most praised, still it would be a mistake to view theory of economics as being 
universally cold. Homoeconomicus is not without a heart. As a requisite of precision 
rather, the theory is merely a reflection of the temperature of the people it aims to 
comprehend. Hence in accordance with the balance that humanity itself does straddle, 
every behavioural discourse would be well advised to embody a mantra that goes like 
so: People, they are the best of things and they are the worst of things.  
As far back as the classical underpinnings of economics allow, the existence of pure 
benevolence is a question that left Adam Smith at odds with his mentor Francis 
Hutcheson (Ridley 1996, p.21). Where the latter denied the uncontaminated existence 
thereof, the former considered the view of his teacher to be overly harsh, and ultimately 
an unjust mark of disservice to the patrons of altruism. Many a scholar may sympathise 
with Hutcheson’s cynicism, but few capture it as eloquently as Michael Ghiselin does: 
“Scratch an altruist and watch a hypocrite bleed” (1974, p.247). 
When it comes to a more contemporary engagement with the issue, economists 
appear almost unanimous in their decision to adopt the intertwined contexts of evolution 
and game theory. The former weighs in heavily and abides closely to the seminal 
contribution of W.D. Hamilton (1964) that is enshrined in the tenet that bears his name. 
The easiest way to ingest ‘Hamilton’s Rule’ is by way of J.B.S Haldane’s semi-serious 
joke (quoted from Boyd and McElreath 2007, p. 82). On being asked if he would 
sacrifice his life for another, his reply was that he would, but only for a minimum of two 
brothers and eight cousins. The reasoning goes that ‘willingness of assistance’ is based 
on the amount of common genes that the parties share, or more accurately, the 
associated likelihood that a recently a mutated (or rare) gene is present in the person that 
one is choosing to assist. In the sense of a recent mutation, the probability relationship 
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from a parent to a child is ½, a sibling ¼, and so on and so forth. Haldane’s personal 
sacrifice does of course sum to one, the irony of course being that you only sacrifice 
yourself for yourself. In essence Hamilton quantified the degree to which one may 
expect blood to be thicker than water. This, quite literally, is what biologists refer to as 
‘kin selection’. However, considerable care needs to be taken in how one interprets 
Hamilton’s rule (kin selection). Consider for example that humans and chimpanzees 
have in common more than 99% of their genes (King and Wilson 1975). We then quite 
easily share an even higher percentage still with all our fellow humans. Hence one lay 
interpretation of Hamilton’s rule is that we should ‘all’ be bending over backwards to 
assist one another (prolific universal altruism). However, given that we do not observe 
such unbridled levels of self-sacrifice, how then are we to understand the percentile 
linkages that Hamilton’s rule specifies? In clarifying the common pitfalls of 
interpretation, Dawkins (1979, p.12) qualifies Hamilton’s assertions as so, “Siblings 
may share 99 percent of their genes altogether, but only 50 percent of their genes are 
identical by decent, that is, are descended from the same copy of the gene in their most 
recent common ancestor.” Therefore the answer to the question of why we observe kin 
altruism and not universal altruism can be put as so, “kin altruism is stable against 
invasion by universal altruism, but universal altruism is not stable against invasion by 
kin selection.” (Dawkins 1979, p.14). According to its eminent author that statement 
amounts to the best possible non-technical explanation of Hamilton’s mathematical 
argument that he can muster.  
Rejecting the species, denouncing the animal and replacing it with emphasis on the 
gene, as typified by Dawkins (1989), is a paradigm of remarkable scientific strength. 
One thing that should however be made clear is that referring to group selection as a 
fallacy does not entail the rejection of people (animals), or groups of people (animals), 
appearing to perform altruistic acts towards non-relatives. To appreciate the genetic 
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argument one must differentiate between ‘effects’ on the one hand and ‘motives’ on the 
other. Genetic programming is taken to work more as ‘rules of thumb’ (e.g. jump when 
you are startled). It does so happen that some of these rules of thumb make visible 
actions that we socially encode to be co-operative or altruistic (e.g. carefully warm the 
eggs until they hatch). 
Determining precisely how parasitic or how symbiotic the relationship is between 
the entities of the gene, animal, species and the inter-species, goes far beyond the scope 
of this discourse. Yet, the fact that the social world is rife with examples of symbioses 
does grant some credence to the suggestion that, however biased the ratio, one would 
have some concerns in accepting it to be 1:0 (a pure corner solution), with no overlap 
whatsoever. For instance, it is surely no accident that nature has chosen pleasure (pure 
utility) as one of its primary vehicles for genetic proliferation (win-win between the 
animal and the gene). Or for that matter, if we were to take the aim of the gene as being 
straightforward proliferation, how could a pure 1:0 ratio of dominance be reconciled 
with the tendencies of better placed people to consciously opt for quality over quantity 
as regards their offspring – as is suggested by the well worn time paths of population 
pyramids (see US census bureau IDB)7. Admittedly, there is perhaps a fallacy of 
composition to be found somewhere in there. For, if everybody moves to increase their 
wealth by having fewer children, then a pending pensions and care crisis plays gently to 
the irony of developed countries becoming dependent on the labouring populations of 
their so-called less developed counterparts – inadvertently greasing an entropy based 
wheel of convergence perhaps. As one law of economics shamefully dictates, people 
                                                 
7 This appears supported by a ‘developmental paths’ perspective, but at the microeconomic level, 
theoretical stances (e.g. Becker 1965, Becker and Lewis 1973) hold up better than the empirics; the 
efforts of which have been hindered by problems of endogeneity and multicollinearity (see for example 
Augrist and Evans 1998). 
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tend to consider themselves wealthy only as long as the wages of others permit them to 
do so.  
Placing the possible contradiction of development and low birth rates to one side, 
above that, simple ‘non-related’ friendship, and aimless charity offer themselves as 
occurrences that require an explanation outside of reasoning that is purely concerned 
with the selfishness of our genes. Ridley (1996) undertook to reconcile the tensions 
between the gene, the animal and the species, and it’s worth noting that his work 
received the very public applause of Dawkins. To solve issues such as these, scholars, 
particularly game theorists, typically turn to reciprocity. 
With multidisciplinary overlap, ‘reciprocity’ has surfaced as the most prominent 
decoder of altruistic cooperation. Setting the scene, I would wager heavily that few who 
read the statement which opens Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments pass by uninspired. 
While the body of text is too lengthy to quote here, one may see that Francis Bacon 
summarises its message with flawless simplicity and elegance, “Friendship, without 
which the world is but a wilderness8.” 
The earliest explicit use of reciprocity as an explainer of social behaviour was 
probably extends to David Hume. In acknowledgement of a subsequent trail of 
continuous rediscoveries, Robert Aumann (1995) considered that engagement of 
reciprocity be regarded as folk knowledge9. Accordingly, his famous encounter with the 
concept became known to economists as the original ‘folk theorem’, a thesis from 
which much analytically rich research has subsequently been spawned. A simplified 
                                                 
8 Essay: ‘Of friendship’ 
9 From personal correspondence with Ken Binmore (UCL), I can affirm that nobody seems to know who 
was the first to produce something recognisable as this Folk Theorem.  The credit however goes to 
Aumann because he appears to have been the first to have publicised its full significance. As such the 
(1995) reference for “Repeated Games with Incomplete Information’ postdates Aumann’s initial 
contribution.  
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explanation of this is; where backward induction of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
renders that there is no difference between the outcome of a one-off game and the 
outcome of a multi-round repeated game, the original folk theorem formally tells us that 
many more Nash equilibria exist, (including that of cooperate-cooperate). This comes 
about provided repetition is accompanied by three important conditions. The first is that 
participants each play at least their minimax values. Secondly, each player must believe 
that there is a sufficiently high probability of there being at least one more game to 
follow the one that is currently being played. Thirdly, all moves must be fully visible to 
all players (i.e. no defection goes unnoticed). 
The most explicit end to the ‘rediscoveries’ of the ‘reciprocal policeman’ occurred 
with the publication of Axelrod (1984). His widely celebrated computer tournament 
very publicly dragged cooperation from the lands of anomaly to the realms of clinical 
rationality. Moreover, with combined10 contributions from George Price (1970, 1972) 
and Maynard Smith (1982) the literature began to appropriate the extraordinary concept 
of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). The emphasis on ‘stability’ does thus serve to 
reinforce the cardinal role of reciprocity. It has however been argued that pinning 
everything on reciprocity fails to explain the assistance that is given to one who is 
unlikely to, or unlikely to be able to, reciprocate. Yet, any arguments that demote 
reciprocity fail to properly recognise that the so-called limitations of Aumann’s folk 
theorem actually work to overcome almost any qualms the detractor might have. As, by 
the requirement of defections being visible, we are informed of the real world truth that 
cooperation is far from the ‘pair-wise’ issue that some theorists have inadvertently taken 
(and modelled) it to be. The giving of assistance in circumstances of no expected pair-
wise return, resolves to be a mater of ‘reputation’, and what is reputation but ‘a 
                                                 
10 Referred to as ‘combined’ because Maynard Smith acted as a referee for Price and contributed a great 
deal in making Prices’s heavily technical contribution comprehendible to non-mathematicians.  
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repetitively underlined signal.’ In other words, nobody would want to be friends (form a 
coalition) with someone who abandons the friends they already have. The natural world 
is rich with examples (Trivers 1971, Wilson 1975), but in particular, the vampire bats 
studied in Wilkinson (1984) provide a fascinating and unambiguous instance of 
reciprocity enforcing non-genetic aid. On a night’s scavenging some 8% of the bats 
failed to acquire adequate substance, and starvation would surely occur in the absence 
of blood sharing. Wilkinson observed that sharing occurred between bats that were not 
close genetic relatives, and that over the course of the game, the bats appeared to 
remember the ‘culprits’ that refused to share in past rounds, and subsequently punished 
them with a boycott in their own times of need (classic tit-for-tat).  
Relating this to something more human, conventions such as the US military’s 
policy of leaving no soldier behind makes for an illustration of a similar flavour. 
Risking the lives of many healthy soldiers to save just an injured minority appears to 
reek of individual irrationality – remember the soldier that you go back to save will 
probably never have the opportunity to directly return the favour. Yet from the macro 
perspective of the ‘continuous group’ it is a convention which makes much sense. As, 
by equipping the soldier with the expectation that ‘somebody else’ of the same 
institution would do the same for them, it perceivably ensures a less risk-averse military 
– which one may presume might well make for superior conquerors (ESS in a world of 
persistent conflict perhaps). Hence it can be seen that the condition of a ‘continuously 
stable set’ of players is not a requisite for having reciprocity play its vital role. Or, to put 
it another way, reciprocity recognises not just the person but the uniform.  By which 
note, it would thus appear that Annam’s folk theorem was far ahead of its time in the 
sense that its limiting assumptions paid early homage to the importance of reputation, 
and the related implication that altruism extends not just beyond non-genetic 
relationships but also embody a temporal quality. 
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Indeed, Bergstrom and Stark (1993) build a model that mixes genetic inheritance 
with ‘cultural inheritance’ and pose the argument that selfish people may be induced to 
act altruistically if they believe that their activities will be imitated by those around 
them. Within the model’s predictions, ‘maximisers’ always end up doing at least as well 
as ‘imitators,’ but in families in which imitation is more probable, everybody does 
better. In a similar vein, Cox and Stark (1994) empirically and theoretically propose 
that, by way of a demonstration effect, parents have an incentive to let their children see 
them treating grandparents well, in the hope that their own children will follow the 
example. Thomas Carlyle could surely be forgiven for offering a wink from the grave.  
Closely linked as they are to the force of reciprocity, the imitation and 
demonstration effect perspectives are sometimes touted as being paradigms challenging 
the more established economic explanation of the Bequest. A fine example of such is 
provided by Bernheim et al. (1985). With an impressive longitudinal dataset and 
thoughtfully gathered control variables, the authors show that the attention children give 
to their parents is strongly associated with bequeathable wealth. Complementary to the 
search for a strategic motive, the relationship disintegrates in single child families. The 
empirical evidence is strong, however one should bear in mind that the data is likely 
based on two generations. This in turn informs us that, by virtue of dissimilar time 
observations, this is a very different study to that of Cox and Stark (1994).  
Supportive of the message from Bernheim et al. (1985), Lucas and Stark (1985) find 
strong empirical evidence to back up the presence of enlightened self-interest 
(‘tempered altruism’ as they term it), and pure self-interest in the influencing of urban–
rural remittances. Leverages such as the aspiration to inherit, the desire to maintain 
home assets, and the itch to return home with dignity appeared to play an amplifying 
role. One interesting observation is the discovery of positive association between 
education and remittances, fuelling both a ‘pay-back hypothesis’ and the bold 
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suggestion that educated people retain closer ties with their families. 
Taken together, the messages of such papers should not be interpreted as a demotion 
of pure altruism to the point of insignificance; rather the reader should appreciate that 
we are dealing with a number of complementary forces of different magnitudes.  
Refocusing on the search for a classification, the traditional definition of altruism 
that Herbert Simon (1993 p.158) subsequently describes as ‘useless’, is “Any choice that 
decreases the utility of the chooser while increasing the utility of the others”. Simon 
claims that the worthlessness of this definition is derived from the understanding that 
one may ‘selfishly’ donate all one has to charity – note the similarities with previously 
mentioned disagreement between Adam Smith and Francis Hutcheson. Evidently, for 
every unit donated the philanthropist receives at least one plus epsilon units of utility. 
Simon goes on to propose that altruism is better defined as a sacrificial transfer of 
‘fitness’ rather than ‘utility’. By this reasoning, the charitable donation is judged to be 
either selfish or altruistic simply by the effect the ‘gift’ has upon the progeny of the 
donor. He further implies that this is superior because, “fitness arguments do not imply 
that the desire for economic gain is the dominant human motive” (1993 p.158). This is a 
most insightful shift of direction, and one from which this paper will draw heavily in 
regards of the construction of its own definition. Nonetheless it must be called to 
account that the polymath appears to have heavily undervalued the term ‘economic 
gain’. While moving from utility to fitness stands the perspective in good stead, Simon 
still appears to skip over the likelihood that the fitness of the offspring will be of future 
benefit to the original donor; as will soon become clear this is a convention which had 
already been established in earlier papers. A predated flavour of the explanation that this 
discussion is gravitating towards can be put simply as “altruistic families have more 
insurance” (Becker 1981 p.4).  
It is arguable that the gap in Simon’s reasoning stems from him failing to appreciate 
 84
a key relationship that economists (often implicitly) hold to be self-evident i.e. that the 
term ‘economic gain’ is encompassing of far more than capital acquisition. It is true that 
wealth poses as a near perfect instrument in the economic definition of fitness; for an 
individual, household, firm or country, capital accumulation represents resilience and a 
strong (but not exclusive) means to acquire most other components of economic fitness. 
However, in defending the broadness of the term ‘economic gain’, one may recall that 
the erroneous belief that wealth consists of precious metals constituted the cornerstone 
of Adam Smith’s assault on mercantilism. Where do things now rest in a more 
contemporary setting of economics? Well, in particular, modern inquiry does also hold 
that the accumulation and passage of knowledge is of at least equal importance to 
capital accumulation. It is the opinion of this thesis that, the origin, and continuance, of 
wealth is knowledge based. 
The old idiom that ‘a fool and his money are easily parted’ comes to mind, and one 
may consider how an expression such as that is relevant not just to an individual but 
equally a nation state. For while monetary wealth represents choice, knowledge 
represents ‘statistically superior choice’ and thus knowledge does itself facilitate the 
continuance of capital accumulation, health and (arguably) utility. Economists care only 
for money per se in so far as they care for the institutional means that cuts and preserves 
a path to a sighted end, for they, like Lenin, recognise that to overly erode the ‘store of 
value’ is to spike the Achilles’ heel of progress. So, for the neglect of non-genetic 
assistance (friendship), and for failing to appreciate that the term ‘economic gain’ 
equates to more than just utility or capital gain, Simon’s (1993) arguments appear 
somewhat unrefined in comparison to some earlier contributions.  
In particular, almost two decades before, Becker explicitly incorporate fitness into 
his model by way of taking the price of goods which are used to alter fitness as being 
the “shadow price” of fitness (1976 p.832). The ability to pay the price is then deemed 
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to represent access to fitness. Across three related papers, (1974, 1976, and 1981) 
Becker formulates and comments on a model in which altruism is shown to be efficient 
in a family environment, but inefficient in a market setting. The model revolves around 
his simple but extraordinary ‘rotten kid theorem’ and is based upon the dependent’s 
recognition of collective fortune within a small closely knit group. Just prior to 
indulging the theorem, it is perhaps worthwhile reminding ourselves of something one 
‘so-called’ high-priest of individualism once wrote, “The ultimate operative unit in our 
society is the family, not the individual” (Friedman 2002 p.33).  
The story of ‘the rotten kid’ is one in which a selfish dependent rejects the 
opportunity to increase his own income if the gains come at the expense of his family’s 
social income – siblings included because they are linked by a common benefactor. So 
why then is the kid rotten? He is rotten because his actions follow enlightened self-
interest, he is wary of damaging the utility of the benefactor and plays by the crafty 
understating that the benefactor views her children’s utilities as being superior 
commodities. The ‘nice’ outcome revolves around a desire for harmony in production 
(family income and parental utility) so as to best maximise distribution (the child’s 
income). 
Becker’s theorem predicts that rotten kids will only act rotten if their parents are 
rotten. Such a statement is of course rather bold, as it highlights certain interpretative 
pitfalls that some will claim fail to nestle comfortably into the real world. For example, 
from a myopic perspective it panders to the suggestion that richer parents are better 
placed to raise children who are not rotten, and less well-off people are at a natural 
disadvantage in parenthood. While this may not be an out and out mismatch, we know 
from what we see that behaviour is lot more mixed than that. However, I argue that 
mixed behaviour does not scupper the theory. It should serve to remind us that 
economic theory is seldom suitable for too literal an interpretation; we must constantly 
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be aware that ceteris paribus is as much a limitation as it is a sought-after jewel to 
admire. Becker’s definition of ‘a rotten parent’ is, I believe, not a monetarily poor 
parent, but rather a parent whose propensity to feel utility from the utility of their 
children is sufficiently low. Moreover, while ‘income’ is the economic transfer that 
Becker uses to explain parental benevolence, substituting a non-monetary transfer of 
fitness (e.g. ‘quality time’) in place of money can put to rest the lame interpretation that 
poor parents are at an out and out disadvantage. Again, recognising that a substitution of 
‘time’ for ‘money’ poses no inconsistency for how this paper is opting to comprehend 
the term ‘economic gain’ (economic transfer), should serve to reinforce the ‘devaluation 
criticism’ that has been tabled in response to Simon’s (1993) employment of the term.  
Ultimately, for Becker, altruism prevails in the family, and not in the market due to 
reasons of relative efficiency. The altruistic transfer is efficient in the family because, 
simply, the donor gets more utility for her money than she does in the impersonal 
market place. Put another way, envision two concave utility functions with altruistic 
transfers on the horizontal axis, and recognise that the curve for the family (or those 
close to us) is steeper and turns at a higher point. To put it as bluntly as Becker does, 
“the scarce recourse ‘love’ is used economically” (1981, p.5).  
Very much in line with the message of Becker’s contribution to the literature, albeit 
under quite restrictive assumptions, Ishikawa (1975) formulates an elaborate model that 
shows how the children of altruistic parents fare better in the labour market. The reason 
for this relates to benevolent parents being more prone to invest in the human capital of 
their offspring. 
Taken together, utility alterations, fitness perspectives, the cardinal role of 
reciprocity and the required expectation of another game, combine to allow for the 
generation of a more refined definition of altruism. Fitness may be a more linguistically 
legitimate component of sacrifice than utility. However, given that money can be used 
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as a near perfect instrument by which to bridge the acquisition of the two, we needn’t 
tear ourselves to philosophical pieces in deciding which to use. I suggest the term 
‘economic transfer’ be properly recognised for the full array of variables that it is. This 
paper makes the argument that ‘economic gain’ (stock increase) is comprised of two 
separate but potentially overlapping entities; fitness and utility. ‘Economic stock’ can 
itself be comprised of both utility and fitness, else it can be a package that contains 
either or both of those two entities. The problem on the surface is that transactions that 
are undertaken between these two entities lack a common unit of account. Money comes 
close, but because of the inverse relationship between consumption and savings, it is not 
wholly satisfactory. The more fundamental problem – that is both cause and 
consequence of the unit of account problem – is that fitness and utility as a pair have the 
propensity to move in either the same direction or opposing directions. The idea to 
incorporate fitness into the definitional framework owes much to Simon (1993), 
However, for the criticisms that were outlined above (i.e. non-generic assistance and the 
procreative patters of better placed people), we must deviate from Simon’s definition of 
fitness, “The number of progeny an individual produces or, for a species, the average 
number of progeny of members of the species (Simon 1993, p.156), and replace it with 
something that economists would be more inclined to describe as welfare. From this 
point on, this discourse shall subscribe to a definition of fitness that goes as so: Fitness 
is anything that increases an agents ability employ their recourses in such a way so as 
to add to the ‘economic stock’ that they already hold, and as such also strengthens the 
agent’s ability to deal with any exogenous (unplanned) shocks that they may incur 
along the way. The inclusion of the latter part of this definition is designed to 
accommodate the instance that in times of negative shocks, ‘maximisation’ is akin to 
‘loss minimisation’. This ‘ability to weather the storm’ connotation of fitness is 
included in order to pay direct homage to ‘knowledge’ being a prominent economic 
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good.  
The resemblance of my definition of ‘fitness’ to what some would term ‘welfare’ is 
more than academic; but for my insistence of utility being thought of separately, I 
record no distinct difference between the two and would raise few qualms with any who 
choose to use ‘fitness’ and ‘welfare’ interchangeably.  
This discourse will however stick predominately with the term fitness for a number 
of reasons; firstly because the idea of stepping aside from just utility stems from Simon 
(1993), and secondly because it is considered here that “Economic wealth and 
biological wealth are thermodynamically the same sort of phenomena, and not just 
metaphorically” (Beinhocker 2007 p.317). This in turn meets well the requisite of 
dynamism with respect to the agent’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances – as 
opposed to ‘welfare’ which has a much more static feel to it. Accordingly, the same 
circumstance of perfect inter-changeability cannot be extended to utility and fitness and, 
by default, utility and welfare. Ng (2004) offers numerous examples in which welfare 
and utility can be deemed to move in opposing directions, which is the crux of what I 
will later refer to as the ‘no common unit of account problem’ in economic stock. 
An understanding of the fluctuations of ‘fitness and utility’ that are associated with 
‘saving and consumption’ behaviour can provide a vehicle for refining one’s 
comprehension of the no common unit of account problem. At the same time this breaks 
trail for the definition of altruism that this discourse is steadily gravitating towards. 
Saving is generally associated more with fitness than utility. At first glace this may 
draw criticism via the suggestion that a person may very well gain some utility from 
having the security of some money in the bank. That is not being disputed here; the 
definitional outline does not at all preclude it. All that is being requested is that the 
reader appreciate that saving is predominantly a fitness-enhancing operation, one that 
places enhanced utility inside the bracket of ‘tomorrow’ (inter-temporal optimisation, 
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investment in future utility). As such, even though there may be some utility gain, the 
acquisition of fitness by saving is still likely to involve a net opportunity cost of utility 
in time period t=1.  
An inversely similar story exists as regards consumption, one where consumption is 
predominantly but not exclusively biased towards utility. While in the long run most 
non-autonomous consumption prejudices towards utility, some consumption will be 
geared towards fitness rather than utility. Consider for example investment in one’s own 
human capital; again, as with savings, this is not to deny that a person might experience 
utility from ‘learning’ but merely to principally associate it with a significant 
opportunity cost of utility in the current time period. It may thus be argued that, 
paradoxically, some forms of consumption bear a closer resemblance to saving than to 
consumption per se, and vice versa. This twist may be observed in realising that while 
this discussion has deemed saving to be chiefly associated with fitness at the 
opportunity cost of current period utility, excessive saving can itself also be associated 
with an opportunity cost of fitness – precisely because the person may forego the act of 
consumption which is associated with investment in their own human capital.  
For the purposes of this thesis, it’s enough to simply remark upon the imprecise fit 
of the ‘fitness-utility’ balance with the ‘savings-consumption’ balance; it’s the most 
fundamental way of illustrating the ‘no common unit of account’ problem. However, 
one may in one’s own time care to ponder what implications the imperfection of that fit 
might herald for consumption theory as it currently stands. My own feeling is that there 
is the potential birth for something new in one of oldest and most fundamental puzzles 
of economics, and that it helpfully tears tare a bit at the barrier that supposedly separates 
microeconomics from macroeconomics.  
In accordance with the framework that is in the process of being laid, definitions 
take shape as follows: when money is donated, the donor gives away fitness and gains 
 90
utility, while the receiver in that transaction initially acquires both fitness and utility. It 
is important to note that the definitions, as formalised in Figure 2.0 below, are 
concerned with first round conditions. What the receiver does with the money after it 
has been donated is a second round condition and as such is not the definitional concern 
of this paper – depending on their own preferences and circumstances, they may later 
divide it up between any possible combinations of fitness (predominantly 
savings/investment) and utility (predominantly consumption). All that we are formally 
interested in is the initial change which is that the donor exchanges fitness for utility 
and the receiver acquires a moment of both utility and fitness. This breaks from 
Becker’s assertion that, “Altruism does not by definition necessarily reduce personal 
fitness” (1976, p.824), but that is because Becker is dealing predominantly with the 
family, and he is recognising it as an autocatalytic unit. A state of affairs in which 
economic gain is bidirectional and repartition of fitness occurs with a reasonably high 
probability (but not p=1). However it must also be appreciated that, while utility 
transfers are relatively smooth and straightforward, transfers of fitness are more lumpy 
and temporal. For the family, say, the parent customarily gives everything in the 
beginning, and gradually over the years things level out and perhaps finally the reverse 
might be true in the twilight years of the parent (think time and energy not just income). 
Of equal recognition should be that a wider model of altruism must incorporate 
circumstances in which no fitness will ever be returned, or at least account for situations 
in which the probably of fitness being returned is sufficiently close to zero. 
To deal with this, and to formalise what is being said, it is suggested that we hold in 
our minds the master category of ‘altruism’, and define two subgroups within it, Pure 
Altruism and Normal Altruism, and one residual subgroup, Pure Self-interest disguised 
as Altruism the group membership of which some might care to question.  
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FIGURE 2.1 FORMALISED ALTRUISM 
 
           Altruism: A giving to B 
 
 
 
   Pure Altruism                                                               Normal Altruism 
 1=+ tABA UU                                     1=+ tABA UU  
1=− tABA FF                            1=− tABA FF  
0)( 1 =+= ntBAFE             0)( 1 >+= ntBAFE or 0)( 1 >+= ntBAFE (if xF ntA <+=1 ) 
       
     
 
Residual subgroup: Pure Self-interest disguised as Altruism (SDA) 
                          UFUUFF AAABAt
ABA =⇒−=− =1  
   11 )( =+= > tABntBA FFE  or FFFE CAtAntA += =+= 11 )( where FF ABtCA >=1   
             111111 )()( ==+===+= +>⇒+>∴ tABtAntAtABtAntA UUUEFFFE    
 
U indicates utility; F indicates fitness; C represents any 3rd party which observes the altruistic act. x 
represents a mayday level, by which if the person’s fitness falls below that level (x), it is then expected 
that past beneficiaries will provide compensatory fitness. The sequence of the northwest superscripts 
indicates who is giving to who; the first character is the donor, the second is the receiver. 
 
The first case is ‘pure altruism’ (at least as pure and pure can be – utility gains are 
always present). Pure altruism can be defined as being an economic donation to a 
person whom the donor never realistically expects to ever receive any reciprocal 
assistance (fitness) from. The fair-trade consumer and general activities of charity fall 
into this category. The second is ‘normal altruism,’ and this can be defined as being an 
economic donation to a person whom one does expect that there is a significant 
probably of receiving future assistance (fitness) from, or at least that assistance would 
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be forthcoming if it wherever called upon in the future – a blank cheque in case of an 
emergency 0)( 1 >+= ntBAFE (if xF ntA <+=1 ). One could arguably demand further precision 
by requesting that a stricter theoretical distinction be made between those that expect a 
future return irrespective of their own future level of fitness, and those that only expect 
one in certain circumstances of personal loss. Mixed family behaviour will be 
highlighted later, but for now it is sufficient that these two instances be grouped 
together under the banner of ‘normal altruism’.  
A twist of language may be helpful in making formula arrangement more intuitively 
digestible. The ‘expected value’ term is used; taken clinically this is of course literally 
something we ‘anticipate’ to observe above other possibilities. However, say in the case 
of family altruism, some will understandably refute this ‘expectation’ and insist that 
they ‘expect’ nothing in return from the kindness they bestow upon their children. So, 
instead, say in the case of 0)( 1 >+= ntBAFE  and 0)( 1 >+= ntBAFE (if xF ntA <+=1 ), where 
person A is the parent and person B is the child, one may prefer to read it as ‘I would be 
‘very surprised’ if my children refused me any assistance at all in the future, and 
especially so if I fell on hard times’. One who is more intimately acquainted with 
statistics might object to the replacing of ‘expected value’ with ‘surprised not to get’, on 
the grounds that nothing has been mentioned about the variance; as it is of course 
possible to have an expected value far from what one actually expects. Nonetheless, 
noting that the binding condition is nothing more than a very broad inequality (>0), the 
suggested turn of phrase is sufficiently valid.  
That which has been labelled ‘normal altruism’, some might understandably prefer 
to call ‘enlightened self interest’, ‘strategic altruism’, or similar. There is an air of 
validity in all of these. However, to avoid confusion with the area labelled as ‘self-
interest disguised as altruism’ (SDA), this thesis has refrained from employing labels 
such as those. Undeniably, there is a strategic element to both normal altruism and 
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SDA, but the main difference is that the normal altruist is not a cold accountant as 
regards their expectations of returns. In contrast, the SDA player only acts because in 
the long term he expects to be given back more fitness than he originally paid out. It is 
the motivation of a net ‘transfer gain’ that drives his actions. 
This leads us into a complex area of motivations, because saying that the 
expectational conditions exist is fine for categorisation, but it might not be fine for 
declaring to which category a particular action belongs; this depends on whether or not 
the expectations (motivations) are strictly binding. If the conditional expectations are 
not binding, then the act falls into the category of pure altruism because looking again at 
the expectational condition of pure altruism ( 0)( 1 =+= ntBAFE ), we realise that literally 
nothing is expected of the receiver. 
Realising people’s motivations and whether or not they are binding is of course 
another matter altogether. We can however illustrate what is being implied via a 
hypothesised world of truthful answers. Consider, for example, the scenario of a family 
tending a young infant. The question could be put to the parents, “Do you expect that 
when your child grows up she will assist you in any way at an expense to herself in the 
future?” (Remember the broadness of the economic stock definition; think of time and 
energy, translating into sacrificial fitness and/or utility, not just money). Alternatively, 
in terms that are perhaps more intuitive to everyday life, “Would you be surprised if in 
the future your children offered you no assistance at all, even in the event that you fell 
on hard times?” 
One may speculate that the honest answer of the parent would be to confirm those 
expectations. Admittedly there is a speculative value judgement embodied in these 
hypothesised answers. Ultimately it is up to reader whether or not they accept them; 
self-evidently I believe them to be intuitively sound or I would not pose them – ditto the 
ones that follow. 
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Acceptance of that reasoning deems that the expectational condition for normal 
altruism has been established, ( 0)( 1 >+= ntBAFE ) and/or 0)( 1 >+= ntBAFE  (if xF ntA <+=1 ). 
A subsequent question is then posed, “Would you still care for your child if you knew 
for sure that in the future she would not return any of the care or kindness you would 
bestow upon her?” Given that the child in question is at a helpless age, one would 
expect the parent to answer that they would not withdraw their aid, in which case, 
although the expectational condition for normal altruism exists, it is not binding, and so 
the actions of the parent may well be better placed into the category of pure altruism, 
( 0)( 1 =+= ntBAFE ).  
This is a straightforward enough scenario to anticipate; it is after all a parent and a 
vulnerable relative. However, skipping on many years to when the child is no longer a 
dependent, we might expect that the expectational condition of normal altruism will 
potentially become properly binding. Indeed, implicit empirical support for offspring 
being fearful of this is given in Bernheim et al. (1985). In this case, it may be argued 
that the altruism within a family comprises a mixture of both normal and pure, perhaps 
heavily split along the lines of generational dependency and exceptional circumstances.  
Yet, outside a world of theoretical questions and hypothesised answers, things can be 
much more difficult to gauge, and we are generally forced to rely on revealed signs and 
intuition to inform us. Money anonymously dropped into a charity box, is of course a 
sure enough sign of pure altruism, because the chances of the donor and the recipient 
ever meeting is close to zero. However, there are other less clear-cut situations in which 
one may find it difficult to identify the expectational condition and whether or not it is 
binding, for example if what looks like a donation of pure altruism takes place, but 
thereafter the donor goes out of her way to advertise the donation. If the donor can only 
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possibly receive extra utility from advertising11 his donation, then we are still in the 
context of pure altruism. If on the other hand the loud donor stands to have some of his 
fitness repatriated to him, then this is likely to be normal altruism, but if the donor 
explicitly aims to gain a return of fitness in excess of what he donated, we may then 
rightfully deny that this be categorised as any type of altruism at all and place it in the 
residual category (SDA) – our altruist has been scratched and our charlatan is bleeding. 
So, with something like fair-trade, the consumer is engaging in pure altruism. However 
the retailer that employs a PR department to announce to all its involvement in fair-trade 
is unlikely to be a normal altruist; it is better placed under the label of SDA. 
It was indeed this ‘retailer perspective’ that motivated the inclusion of the SDA 
script on the altruism diagram above. On this note, the script hypothesises that the 
player does not differentiate between utility and fitness 
( UFUUFF AAABAt
ABA =⇒−=− =1 ), and also that the repatriation of fitness can come via 
third parties ‘c’ who were not involved in the benevolent-looking act. If SDA were to be 
stated for an individual rather than a business, the ‘fitness equals utility’ assumption 
might have to be amended.  
To summarise, every act of altruism, pure or otherwise, involves a non-zero sum 
economic transfer. The recipient receives both utility and fitness, the giver receives 
utility and, for at least an instant, loses fitness. Under pure altruism, the giver considers 
that the fitness will never be returned. Under normal altruism, the giver recognises that 
there is a reasonable probably of some, but not a binding amount of, fitness being 
returned to them in the future, or at least that some can be called upon if a fitness 
requirement materialises. The magnitudes of loss and gain are circumstantially 
dependent. The next section attempts to model this, and in doing so goes against the 
                                                 
11 Similar to what Ariely refers to as “reputational utility”  (2008 p.237)  
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suggestion that altruism is not altruism because the act is contaminated by the giver 
receiving utility – to the contrary, the more utility the person can experience by giving, 
then the more altruistic is that person. 
 
 
2.3 THE MODEL AND THE INFORMATION IT EMBODIES 
 
For the sake of coherence and approachability, the model is initially put together as if 
there is no distinction between the general and the specific; Section 2.5 abandons this 
tool of simplification. The story revolves around a simple utility function that can, for 
now, take one of two forms. It is stressed from the onset that the utility parameters are 
ordinal rather than cardinal.  
 
Θ+Ω+Ω= )( tpU      or Θ+−+Ω+Ω= )()( RU tpFT π  
Letting )( tp Ω+Ω=Ω  
∴ Θ+Ω=U  and Θ+−+Ω= )( RU FT π      
 
pΩ  and tΩ  are nominal income variables, which respectively represent permanent 
and transitory income, as seminally identified by Friedman (1957). Regarding this and 
considering some of the more classical literature on utility, one may make the assertion 
that income belongs to the function more as a constraint than as a component. The reply 
to this is that the difficulty in modelling charity is precisely that income is not the 
effective constraint with which the utility-maximising individual has to contend. Also, 
including Ω  in this manner serves to give the reader an intuitive feel for the utility 
functions themselves – especially in relation to the negative R. In addition, as the first 
derivative of U with respect to Ω  is positive, it’s not at all incorrect to display Ω  in this 
fashion. R represents the value of what is given away; the gift, the donation, or the fair-
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trade mark-up. Θ  is everything else that impacts a person’s utility and will be held 
constant in this model. It is Θ  that allows the stated income variable to be nominal 
rather than real as it saves us trouble by silently taking into account two important 
things; utility changes that result from actual purchases, and the changing value of 
income with respect to changes in price.  
π  along with its Z component resolve to be the central variables of this discussion. 
π can be described as being a person’s ‘income-dependent charitable disposition’. Z 
captures all that is circumstantially benevolent about an individual irrespective of 
income and will be discussed in more monetary based detail. 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Ω=
R
Z p
fr )(π  
 
P
frΩ  is net permanent income associated with the frequency (fr) with which a donation 
is requested. For example, if we are considering annual income and a charity asks, “Will 
you be willing to commit to donate x  amount of money per month?” Then PP
fr Ω⇒Ω 12  
which means we are considering the permanent component of a person’s net monthly 
salary. There are other contenders for the income variable that one may wish to 
consider, for example disposable income, a PPP weighted income variable, or likely a 
combination of the latter with permanent income. However, for reasons of tractability 
and coherence of explanation, let us for the time being just refer to our income variable 
as permanent income.  
In the construction of π , as crucial a parameter as it is, Z can be described as a 
person’s ‘income-independent charitable disposition’. Z is an ordinal measure by which 
to compare people’s kindness irrespective of their income. Strictly speaking, Z is only 
income-independent for ‘normal’ changes to income. That is to say, some ‘big income 
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shocks’ can, via an endogenous transmission mechanism (e.g. self-esteem), exhibit 
influence on Z. In theory Z ≥ 0 because there is no cap that can be put on a person’s 
ability to experience utility from giving things away. In extreme circumstances it’s 
possible ∞→z , say for example in the giving of all one has in order to fund the 
lifesaving operation for a loved one. However, excluding such extremities, 
circumstantial Z is deemed to predominantly occupy a range of 10 <≤ Z . The empirical 
setup in Section 2.5 will attend to this. The higher the value of Z, the greater the 
individual’s ability to ‘feel good’ from undertaking activities such as helping a friend, 
buying a fair-trade good, giving a gift, or making a donation to charity. If a person could 
never possibly receive a single drop of utility from giving away anything to anyone, this 
is encoded as Z = 0. From the formula it can easily be seen that π  is an increasing 
function of Z and p
frΩ , whilst being a decreasing function of R. The partial derivatives 
line up as follows: 
 
0>∂
∂
Z
π  0>Ω∂
∂
p
fr
π  0<∂
∂
R
π   
 
A graphical depiction can hopefully add some clarity to the equations. 
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FIGURE 2.2 THE BENEVOLENCE CURVE  
 
* At a better scale the triangle MINMAXR πΦ  would be far larger than  ΦMAXπ0  and ΦMAXAπ would 
be far larger than MAXAπ0 . 
 
The vertical axis measures utility (U) and the horizontal axis measures the value of the 
donation (R) (reduced fitness). Hence the line RU represents utility with respect to 
donation. The individual can end up with any range of utilities between MAXU and 
MINU , however as charity is choice based, the person is not going to choose negative 
utility, so they will end up receiving a level of utility between 0 and MAXU . RC is 
technically the ‘real’ constraint, in the sense that a person cannot give more than they 
have even if they wish to. Therefore, with the exception of extreme circumstances, RC 
does not enter the equation in any meaningful way. As was previously mentioned, the 
main problem with modelling the situation of charity is that the constraint is 
endogenous and largely unobserved. This renders that one is prevented from making use 
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of the standard Lagrangian method by which problems of constrained maximisation are 
typically solved. The multiplier would usually serve to punish violations of the 
constraint, and thus allow the limitation to play its rightful role. However in the instance 
of charity the Lagrangian has nothing to touch. This latent constraint (LC) can however 
be recognised by the presence of MAXπ . The basis of the reasoning behind this 
MAXπ assertion is that if a person chooses their donation for themselves, they should 
naturally select the donation that corresponds to the global maxima of their RU line. 
Hence point A marks the preferential (optimal) donation. It can be seen from the graph 
that in order for a donation to be accepted it must fall to the left of Φ (Φ is an important 
variable and will be elaborated on in Section 2.5).  
The section of the graph represented by MAXAπ0 is likely to be by far the smallest 
section of the picture, at least in normal circumstances. It is the anomaly by which a 
person’s utility increases with respect to a reduction in their wealth (i.e. with respect to 
R). The amount is likely to be small enough to be determined exclusively by Z. The 
brief upward slope (0 to )MAXπ represents the sentiment that one would feel 
uncomfortable making an embarrassingly miniscule donation. For example, 
notwithstanding that pennies add up to make pounds, to hand a beggar a penny is still 
likely to be perceived as more of an insult than a donation, and so one typically refrains 
from doing so. 
Z in the equation can be viewed as being a number which represents that size of the 
MAXOAπ  area. π in the model can occupy any value on the schedule between MAXπ  
and MINπ . s'π  positive first derivative with respect to income, and negative first 
derivative with respect to R prevent it from occupying a position between MAXπ  and 0. 
The line MAXπ  to 0 is predominately determined by Z, but income does have some say 
in the positioning of MAXπ  as it’s a jointly determined turning point. The influence of Z 
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on π can be observed via the control it has over the distance and the gradient of 0 to 
MAXπ , and what it says about the distance from 0 to A. Therefore Z and the income 
variable together dictate the final positioning of the highest acceptable ‘offer’ (Φ).  
As Z is independent of income, a normal change in income has no effect on the area 
MAXAπ0 . The effect of an income change can appear in two categorical ways, 
necessarily recognisable by a movement of MAXR ; to the right in the instance of an 
income increase, to the left in the instance of an income decrease. This is of course also 
associated with a definitional shift of RC and MINπ . The individual may or may not 
adjust their MAXπ ; it likely depends on the magnitude of the income change. If it is a 
non- MAXR  adjusting increase (decrease), the slope of the ΦMAXπ  line becomes more 
subtle (steep) by way of Φ moving to the right (left). If the change is more dramatic the 
line ΦMAXπ  shifts right for an increase, left for a decrease, and MAXR is accordingly 
repositioned. It must be confessed that having strict points for MAXR ,Φ  and A is a 
simplification. They do in reality occupy a sort of indifference plateau that can, to a 
degree, be stretched and shrunk with small changes in the sentiments of the moment. 
The textbook solution for dealing with this lack of precision is to factor in the welfare 
assumption of ‘completeness’, by which the person can perfectly decide and rank their 
various preferences. It certainly helps to keep the graph neat, but whether the 
assumption is employed or not makes little difference to the overall message that is 
being delivered; it’s just good manners to admit that it lurks in the background.  
Taken as a whole, the graph does thus depict that π is comprised of the relationship 
between Z and the donation-adjusted income variable ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Ω
R
. 
Prior to introducing the agents of the model, it is necessary that parameters Z and π  
be properly brought into focus. Both are essentially circumstance-dependent products of 
processed information. Being income independent implies that Z is a product of all 
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relevant information, except for that of income )(Ω  and the cost of the potential 
donation (R). π  on the other hand is a product of all relative information; it directly 
picks up the relevant proportional changes in income by means of ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Ω
R
, and absorbs all 
other relevant information indirectly via parameter Z.  
Information in this model fits into one of three categories: (i) endogenous 
information, defined as information which is free and unavoidable. (ii) Weakly 
endogenous information is the type of information that is weakly avoidable and can be, 
but is not necessarily, free. At the very least it entails a negligible ‘preference based’ 
opportunity cost. As consumption of this sort of information is essentially choice based, 
unlike endogenous information, it can be avoided (weak avoidance). (iii) Purchased (or 
exogenous) information is specialised information and as such requires an explicit 
monetary outlay. This invariably involves an opportunity cost and can perceivably be 
quite monetarily expensive. This information is specially tailored towards a specific end 
and as such it is expected to be of a certain quality.  
Information from all three categories exerts influence on Z. However, as the 
appropriation of purchased information significantly alters the algebraic set-up, 
engagement of it is postponed until Section 2.4. The other two types of information are, 
by virtue of their omnipresence, the most important forms of information in this setting 
and so some elaboration is required.  
Endogenous information is anything the individual considers as being matter-of-
fact, takes for granted, holds to be self-evident or acquires simply by way of life passing 
by. A second glance at the final entry of the list calls for the offering of an example so 
as to cut through the hazy demarcation line that sometimes separates these two closely 
related categories of information. Consider for example that the media one chooses to 
ingest in one’s leisure time makes for a classic example of weakly endogenous 
information. This kind of information may or may not be free of charge. Say for 
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example if one buys oneself a book, it entails a cost; but, holding social etiquette 
constant, if it is a gift it entails no monetary cost. The reading of the book does however 
necessarily involve an opportunity cost of time. Therefore in this example, the 
distinction between the two types of information gets certified by the presence of an 
opportunity cost, and by the ability of the reader to avoid reading the book if she so 
wishes.  
The idea is to now take these two categories of information and discuss how they 
are likely to influence parameter Z. It should become apparent that charitable causes 
receive an all-important free ride on these sorts of information but, to be clear, the 
assertion of a ride being free is in no way meant to suggest that the ride is illegitimate or 
undeserved. To the contrary if the information is accurate it is an entirely justified lift.  
Considering endogenous information first; this is the very fabric from which the 
individual weaves her understanding of the world. For example, it is a matter of fact 
that this person to whom I am about to give some money is my brother. It is known full 
well to me that he has helped me in the past, and it is within my rational expectations 
that if I am in trouble in the future he will be there to help me. How that particular 
scenario of facts and expectations is likely to influence the value of my Z should be 
quite obvious. Indeed, Section 2.2 bore testament to the fact there is no shortage of 
scholarly explanations to suggest that closeness of kin and reciprocity combine to be the 
two most significant inflators of a person’s Z. 
Excluding perhaps what geneticists offer in respect to kin selection, an exact 
measurement of how a given piece of information influences Z may be very difficult. 
However, based on intuition, the proposal of a directional relationship would appear to 
be a straightforward enough estimation. Similarly, it should not be overly difficult to 
roughly envisage the comparative ordinal magnitudes that various pieces of information 
affect Z. 
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Taking things to an even more basic level, in what may be articulated as ‘the first 
pillar of charity’, the piece of endogenous information that underpins all scenarios of 
charity goes as simply as, ‘Ceteris paribus, giving money to a person makes that person 
better off.’ There will no doubt be some who care to denounce that assumption as crude. 
So, to clarify, I am not saying that in all circumstances it does make the person better 
off, just that it is the endogenous belief of the voluntary donor.  
Gift-giving to friends and family is almost exclusively based on endogenous 
information. While charitable donations and the premiums paid on fair-trade goods do 
also readily rely on endogenous information, at the same time, weakly endogenous 
information inevitably seeps into the picture. 
Firstly there is the existence of charitable marketing budgets, which seek to inform 
donors and potential donors of the plights and benefits respectively associated with a 
particular group of receivers. However large they may or may not be, these promotional 
budgets are but the tip of the informational iceberg. It is the other more peripheral 
elements of weakly exogenous information that provide the bedrock for any externally 
funded messages. Envision for example a person deciding to watch a televised 
documentary about sub-Saharan poverty or suppose that while watching the evening 
news a person is made privy to sights of poverty in the developing world. Interpretation 
of that information and all accompanying complements will work to influence Z. The 
contribution of any given piece of information does not have to be dramatic, it may just 
shore up the value at which Z already stands. The interpretative consumption of 
information such as this constitutes the second pillar of charity, ‘the conscious 
recognition or belief that a problem exists in a specific place.’ This does in effect 
amount to an almost indispensable subsidy to all externally funded messages that the 
charitable organisation puts out. 
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This is not to suggest that such forms of information always work to the benefit of 
charitable organisations. There have for example been a small number of mainstream 
articles which have sought to tout the negative aspects of fair-trade (see for example 
Economist 2006). This does however highlight the critical element of trust and the hasty 
breakdown that can be brought about by the departure thereof. Charities which are 
shown to be bogus can disintegrate overnight – a circumstance in which people’s 
circumstantial Z parameters promptly resolve to zero. There are however more subtle 
and interpretive elements of trust erosion that can reduce Z without having it fall to zero, 
for example, retailers who adhere to the legislative standards of fair-trade, but at the 
same time recognise the likely affluence of the ethical consumer and so put in place 
predatory margins above and beyond the norm. Instances of precisely this are detailed in 
Pierre (2006 p29).  
To summarise the message that this thesis is seeking to offer, there are two 
fundamental central pieces of endogenous and weakly exogenous information which 
prop up the entire structure of charity. The first pillar is that, holding all else equal, if a 
person receives money they will be better off (endogenous). The second pillar is the 
undying belief that a genuine problem exists in the place where the funds will be 
channelled to (weakly endogenous). The next section builds on this by showing how 
something as simple as a well designed label can, by virtue of the information it 
harnesses for free, pose a value far in excess of any promotional budget. 
Using both the formula behind π , and information based on discussion of how Z 
acquires its value, one may care to ponder how comfortably this all sits within an 
economic interpretation of the world. What it says is this:  
Question: How generous are you?  
Answer: it depends who’s asking, and even then I am only as generous as I feel I 
can afford to be. 
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This serves as a stable platform from which to introduce the agents of the model.  
Not least because Z requires a particular circumstance, the agents are discussed 
predominantly in the context of fair-trade. However it should be kept in mind that as far 
as the broader picture is concerned, the general reasoning within can be applied to 
encompass a much wider array of altruistic endeavours. 
 
 
2.4 THE AGENTS OF THE MODEL 
 
We are about to deal with interpersonal comparisons of utility, and it seems only just to 
mention that not all economists agree with this line of reasoning. Albeit solely based on 
personal intuition, Lionel Robbins (1938) provides distinguished company for those 
who disagree with what is being done here.  
The model accommodates a wide array of agents, some more realistic than others. 
All agents are confronted with a common problem; they must make a choice between 
one of the following two utility functions.  
 
(i) Θ+Ω=U  
 or 
(ii) Θ+−+Ω= )( RU FT π   
 
Logically, the agent will select whichever function maximises their utility. Taking the 
context of fair-trade, If U  is chosen the agent will purchase the conventional good 
rather than the fair-trade good. If FTU  is selected the person buys the fair-trade good 
(makes the donation), and as such becomes a so-called ethical consumer. Now, a word 
of caution in how this thesis will use the term ‘rational’ with respect to describing the 
choices undertaken by agents. Notwithstanding that his major contributions to the field 
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are heavily characterised by dependence on ‘pure rationality’, lecturing to a public 
audience, John Nash has expressed the opinion that ‘economics is over-reliant on 
rationality’. Providing back-up for that assertion, Taleb (2004, p.284) extracts a brave 
confession from John Harsanyi. That being, that if agents are not empirically rational, 
then by virtue of showing how people ‘should act’ rather than how they ‘do act’, 
economics fails in its quest to be a positive science (rather than normative social 
philosophy). Not claiming pure science nor wishing to wade too deep in normative 
enquiry, the reader is advised that the genre of ‘rationality’ that is being spoken of here 
should not be regarded as the usual suspect of mainstream economic literature. Rather, 
what is to be described as ‘rational’ in the context of this discussion is the more humble 
‘behavioural economics’ approach to rationality. Simply, any time any of us make a 
choice we subconsciously hold two comparable entities in our mind – numbers are of 
course the only entities that we can universally rank. Therefore, each of us acts in 
accordance to how we have subjectively ranked the options before us. Hence, what is 
being said here is not that being an ethical consumer is either rational or irrational, just 
that it is personally rational to be an ethical consumer if the cost of being one is less 
than the utility based benefit of not being one. This form of rationality is based 
predominantly on ‘real-time experienced utility’ which is essentially ‘decision utility’ 
(see Kahneman and Tversky 2000 Ch.37) 
Next, the agents themselves. The most obvious person to first consider is an 
Ebenezer Scrooge type of character, the like of which will always reject the charitable 
request on the grounds that they cannot derive a single drop of utility from giving 
anything to anybody. The model captures this person as so: 
 
0,0 =⇒= πZ ∴ Where R >0, FTUU >   
Hence this person always chooses U  over FTU  
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Thought of in terms of the benevolence curve, this equates to complete collapse of the 
MAXAπ0 area, such that both MAXπ and point A, converge on 0. Therefore Z = 0 is the 
defining characteristic of this person, all positive values forπ  automatically disintegrate 
and so this person would only be indifferent to buying a fair-trade good in the presence 
of no mark up (R = 0). Therefore, holding information constant, this person would never 
acquiesce to this charitable request. But equally it should be clear that by having had to 
state that information be held constant, Z is as much circumstance-dependent as it is 
personality-dependent; hence the ‘Scrooge’ tag is appropriate in more ways than one. 
From one perspective, the famous Dickens tale is not just the story of a mean-spirited 
man, but equally a chronicle of how fluctuations in endogenous information were 
sufficient to leave behind a much reformed character. Whilst each of us can surely smile 
at the thought of being able to identify one or two, for what it’s worth, it’s unlikely that 
many people truly have an aggregated Z parameter of zero. It’s much more probable 
that their Z is minuscule and/or the refusal to donate is due more to the issue of their 
income dependent charitable disposition )(π . The empirical game in Section 2.5 adds 
credence to that suggestion. 
The next agent grouping moves closer to better encompassing reality, and by 
illustrating it with a set of numeric examples it will be shown that becoming an ethical 
consumer (donor) is not necessarily an authentic signal of a person having a truly kind 
disposition.  
As was the case above, the agent is being asked to choose between U and FTU ; again 
invariably the person chooses whichever expression maximises their utility, and as such 
their purchasing behaviour relates to their chosen function. The simple condition which 
characteristically defines this person is simply Z > 0, and as regards their propensity to 
donate, they only consume endogenous and weakly endogenous information. The 
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information that they have so far acquired over their lifetime is sufficient to ensure that 
they harbour a Z > 0 for the charity in question. Hence in relation to fair-trade, the 
movement gets a free ride on the widely held belief that agricultural producers in the 
developing world are a notably downtrodden contingent of the global community – 
equivalent to the second pillar of charity that was outlined above. The existence of the 
parallel free ride is what was previously designated as being the first pillar of charity; 
holding all other things equal, giving money to a person makes that person better off.  
In order to validate that second pillar assumption within the context of fair-trade, 
one need only subscribe to the following plausible belief; if one were to confront any 
literate adult, and ask that person what they can deduce from the label, the response, in 
some shape or form, shall be to infer that somebody along the supply chain was deemed 
to have been receiving an ‘unjustly small’ fraction of the cost. As such, a proportion of 
the fair-trade cost of the good attempts to correct for the alleged imbalance by giving 
additional monies to that relatively deprived somebody. While people’s perceptions of 
proportional costs’ specifics are likely to differ, it would probably not be too much to 
expect that when pressed on who the likely recipient is, most would suspect it to be the 
farmer or the labourer. 
It can therefore be claimed that the strength of the fair-trade label is to be found in 
the ease by which it exploits information which the viewer likely already harbours. This 
is compounded by appreciation of the fact that, while the information from the label is 
itself formally categorised as being ‘weakly endogenous; the opportunity cost of a glace 
is so minuscule that it comes as close as possible to being fully endogenous. 
Accordingly, Z and π are the recipients of a substantial boost – an indispensable free 
ride. 
Refocusing attention back on to the original utility equations, it is clear that  
R>π  resolves to be the necessary and sufficient condition for a person to be an ethical 
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consumer. If R=π , (Φ  in Figure 2.1) the consumer is indifferent between choosing U 
and UFT, although in a case such as this we could possibility assume the attachment of a 
tiny utility epsilon on UFT to make the person choose it when it involves an extra 
monetary outlay of exactly zero. Where R<π  the person will chose U over UFT. In 
summary, it may be stated that an individual will only be an ethical consumer if they 
satisfy the condition R>π , for which 0>Z  is a necessary but not sufficient condition. 
Table 2.1 offers some numeric examples by which to illustrate the interaction of these 
variables.  
 
Table 2.1 The ‘kindest’ people aren’t always the ones that give 
 Z Ω  R π  FTU  U  UU FT −  
Person A 0.2 2100 20 21 2101 2100 1 
Person B 0.3 2400 20 36 2416 2400 16 
Person C 0.9 250 20 11.25 241.25 250 -8.75 
Person D 0.3 2400 27 26.66 2399.667 2400 -0.33333 
Person E 0.3 2410 27 26.77 2409.778 2410 -0.22222 
Figure 2.3 assumes no transitory income ),0( Ω=Ω=Ω⇒=Ω pfrpt   
 
Person A is the ‘income independent’ meanest of all (lowest Z) but still buys fair-trade 
products. Person C is the ‘income independent’ kindest of all, but does not become an 
ethical consumer. Person E is the ‘income dependent’ kindest of all (highestπ ) but does 
not buy fair-trade. Person B and person D are just as ‘income independent’ kind as each 
other and have identical incomes, but unlike person B, person D does not buy fair-trade 
because she buys her groceries in a place which employs a predatory mark-up. Person A 
is poorer and ‘income independent’ meaner than person D, but still person A becomes 
an ethical consumer while Person D does not.  
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It is perhaps worth pointing out that the R and Z numbers in this example are much 
exaggerated upwards. R in most practical cases is unlikely to account for anything near 
the proportion of income that it does here, and similarly Z makes a boast of 
circumstantial kindness that the empirical game in Section 2.5 will place in a more real 
perspective. The inclusion of arbitrary values (big numbers) is simply to illustrate the 
point, the overall message remains unaffected.  
The next section investigates how things change with the introduction of purchased 
(specialised) information. 
 
 
2.4 INFORMED CHOICE V UNINFORMED CHOICE 
 
Thought of exactly in the context of that what has just been discussed, the new 
information works to rationalise or refine the value of a circumstantial Z. For the sake of 
coherence, things are picked up as close as possible to where the previous section left 
off. Initially therefore it is convenient to think of this as being the situation of an 
individual who is choosing which utility function to occupy. However, in the face of 
what’s going to turn out to be an expensively obtained positive externality, the situation 
will eventually give way to a more institutional-based arrangement.  
The person now opts for a new utility function, similar to before but with the altered 
parameters *π , *R  and the added parameter s . 
 
Θ+−−+Ω= sRU S )( **π  
 
This is the initial utility function of a consumer who cares very much about a particular 
‘good’ cause, but is uncomfortable with making a blind donation. They wish to have 
evidence of a positive effect in order to justify their potential support (R) for the 
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charitable endeavour. They are willing to spend amount s so as to acquire the 
information they require; this is a search cost that is presented in. This serves to refine 
their expenditure decision, such that spending s has the effect of changing π  into *π  and 
R into *R . The information that s purchases gets captured byδ . What follows relies on 
the assumption that δ  will be of a certain quality and that the buyer will recognise its 
quality. If the search produces negative results, then δ = 0 (fair-trade does not work). If 
the search produces positive results, then δ = 1 (fair-trade works)12. This leads to δ  
entering the equation as so: 
 
δRR =*  and απ Ψ=*  where Z+=Ψ δ   
Letting δα ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Ω=
R
 
Θ+−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ΩΨ+Ω=⇒ sR
R
U S δδ  
Θ+−−Ψ+Ω=⇒ sRU S δα  
Θ+−−+Ω=⇒ sRU S )( **π  
 
The new variable Ψ  that replaces Z should not be considered as a new Z per se. 
Altering Z in this manner poses no ‘problems of accounting’ because it was never 
claimed that the model’s accounting was anything other than ordinal. It did however in 
its previous form have a much stronger claim to cardinality than it does in the presence 
of a search cost. The introduction of the search cost requires the understanding that a 
kind of sequential game being played. There will be transitory (round 1) utilities to 
consider, *
1U  and *
1
FTU  as well as permanent (round 2 plus) utilities, *
2 Un+  and 
                                                 
12 This binary value of δ is in fact a simplifying assumption that allows for a more coherent explanation. 
Increased sophistication could be added by recognising δ  to be a proportional probability. 
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*
2
FT
nU+ . This in turn calls for the assumption that the agent knows that s is a one-off 
payment (a sunk cost essentially) the significance of which will expire after it is paid, 
and as such bases their decisions on second round (permanent rather than transitory) 
utility values. 
Evident from the equations, if δ  acquires a value of zero, both *π and *R  will 
disintegrate leaving the consumer selecting utility Θ++−Ω= εsU*1 , where ε  is a 
small immeasurable piece of utility that the person derives from ‘knowing’ that to buy 
fair-trade is a waste of time and money. If on the other hand the information found is 
positive (δ =1), R remains unchanged )( ** RRRR =⇒= δ , while *π  receives a boost 
from for having 1 added to the traditional value of Z )( Z+=Ψ δ . The condition 1=δ  
does not make it strictly definite that the consumer will then choose to buy the fair-trade 
good; the combination of low Ω and higher R could still scupper the deal. If this were 
the case the consumer would be left with the following utility function 
Θ+−−Ω=− εε sU1 , identical to that of *1U  but with a negative epsilon. The negative 
epsilon reflects the ‘touch of guilt’ that the person would experience from not 
purchasing fair-trade, whilst knowing it would make a significant difference to the 
target group. It is however possible to preclude the existence of ε−U
1 by the inclusion of 
a simple but realistic assumption; in advance of deciding to search (the paying of s) the 
person knows the values of Ω and R, considers the ratio to be acceptable, and that ratio 
remains roughly constant over the duration it takes to acquire the value of δ .Therefore, 
on those plausible grounds it is taken that 1=δ  causes the consumer to choose the 
benevolent utility function )( **
1
FT
n
FT UU → . The stages of choice are summarised by 
figure 2.3 below. 
 
Figure 2.3 flow diagram of informed vs. uninformed choice 
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Θ+−−+Ω= sRU )( *** π  
   
  )0( =δ             )1( =δ  
 
Round 1        Θ++−Ω= εsU*1      Θ+−−+Ω= sRU FT )( **1 π   
 
 (If UUs <⇒> *1ε )       
         
 
Round 2          Θ++Ω= ε*2U                      Θ+−+Ω= )( **2 RU FT π  
)( *
2
UU >    )( *2 FTFT UU >  
 
 
 
Foreseeable utility: ∑
=
N
n
nU
2
*            ∑
=
N
n
FT
nU
2
*  
 
From round two onwards, incremental utility stabilises such that **
3
*
2
..... UUU
n===  
for all n >1, and the same for fair-trade utility )( *FT
n
U . This is because the person is 
deemed to be content with the results of the search and so for the foreseeable future 
does go to the pains of undertaking another search. It is evident from the second round 
onwards that, on a one to one match basis, informed utilities outperform their 
uninformed counterparts )( *
2
UU >  and )( *2 FTFT UU > . Table 2.2 offers some numeric 
examples by which to illustrate the claims that are being made. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Examples of Informed and Uninformed Donation Utilities  
  Person A Person A’ Person A” Person B Person B’ Person B” 
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s  - 50 50 - 50 50 
Z  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 
R  20 20 20 20 20 20 
Ω  2100 2100 2100 2500 2500 2500 
π  21 - - 18.75 - - 
δ  - 0 1 - 0 1 
Ψ  - 0.2 1.2 - 0.15 1.15 
α  - 0 105 - 0 125 
*π  - 0 126 - 0 143.75 
R* - 0 20 - 0 20 
U 2100 - - 2500 - - 
FTU  2101 - - 2498.75 - - 
Gains from FT 1 - - -1.25 - - 
*
1U  - 2050 ε+  2050 - 2450 ε+  2450 
*
1
FTU  - 2030 2156 - 2430 2573.75 
Post search gains 
from FT (R1) - -20 106 - -20 123.75 
*
2
U  - 2100 ε+  2100 - 2500 ε+  2500 
*
2
FTU  - 2080 2206 - 2480 2623.75 
Post search gains 
from FT (R2) - -20 106 - -20 123.75 
 
The artificially generated example takes two people A and B and illustrates three 
parallel scenarios for each. In the first two, A and B, are given the same values as they 
were in Table 2.1 (i.e neither agent searches). Indicated by the “Gains from FT” row, 
Person A buys the fair-trade good, whereas person B does not. In the remaining 
scenarios, each individual purchases information about the outcome of fair-trade, and 
for this they pay 50 (s = 50). A’ and B’ indicate instances where the acquired 
information suggests that fair-trade is of no benefit )0( =δ to those it is supposed to 
assist. This then causes the individuals to feel no extra utility regarding fair-trade 
)0( * →π  and so for any instance in which a fair-trade mark-up exists (R > 0) the 
required condition of R>π  fails and makes the person choose *1U over *1 FTU . In the 
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first round, this utility level will likely be below that of its ‘uninformed’ equivalent (If 
UUs <⇒> *1ε ). The search cost (s) is a one-off, so after the first round its value is 
restored, therefore in a one for one match the following condition applies )( *
2
UU > , 
and utility is taken to then stabilise from round two onwards, UU
n >*  for all n ≥ 2. By 
the presence of ε , the summation eventually more than pays back the cost of s. Hence it 
may be claimed that, the informed choice is superior to uninformed choice, even when 
the outcome of the search is not necessarily what the individual wishes to hear. 
Admittedly, the gains are weakest for those who originally bought fair-trade and 
subsequently discovered that it was an ineffective contribution. In addition a high s 
might pose a difficulty in regards the overall payback time, and this problem is 
addressed in due course.  
Scenarios A” and B” relate to instances in which the returned information reflects 
positively on fair-trade )1( =δ . The utilities of both A and B are enhanced, and in the 
case of B it has the effect of turning her into an ethical consumer. The overall message 
is again that within this context of charity, informed choice is superior to uninformed 
choice.  
The practical point that must be called to order is this; would anybody really be 
willing to spend their own money on this sort of investigation? Coupling this question 
with the likelihood of s being very large leads to an answer that is likely to be an 
unequivocal ‘no’. What should be apparent is that δ  needs to be thought of as a kind of 
public good with a positive externality attached to it. δ  is a piece of knowledge, and as 
such it would be overly indulgent to begin talking about increasing returns as it is only 
‘knowledge as a category’ which exhibits that fateful characteristic. Nonetheless, once 
its initial acquisition is paid for, proliferation is relatively cheap. Hence the outcome of 
this model suggests that if a charitable cause is significantly large and boasts a wide 
patronage, it is legitimate that public money be spent on investigating whether or not it 
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really is a ‘worthy’ cause. Doing so not only helps to direct scarce funds, but also 
increases the utility of the donors irrespective of how the attained information reflects 
on the performance of the charity itself.  
 
 
2.6 EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
 
The aim of this section is to outline a technique by which to effectively decouple 
‘income independent benevolence’ from ‘income dependent benevolence’ and de facto 
generate scientifically comparable units of the latter. As income dependence was 
sufficiently dealt with in the previous sections, whenever terms such as kindness, 
altruism and benevolence are now used, unless otherwise stated, they are being referred 
to in the capacity of income independence.  
There are obvious difficulties in attempting to empirically verify the theory, none 
more apparent than the entwined attainment of π and Z. However, this can be overcome 
with a surprisingly simple trick. The experiment proceeds by recognising the following 
set of relationships: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Ω=
R
Z P
fr
π  
Letting RU −=Δ π  and describing UΔ  as the change in utility 
RU =⇒=Δ∴ π0   
R
R
Z P
fr
U −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Ω=Δ  
 
So, the ruse is to isolate Z by clinically obtaining the value of R at which 0=ΔU . What 
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follows is a method that takes the circumstance of fair-trade and solves for the 
associated Z, or to be precise, i
FT z , because strictly speaking we must now move from 
the general to the specific.  
Once again, the person will face a choice of buying either a fair-trade or 
conventional good. It is preferable that the good is something that individual would 
ordinarily buy, as ideally none of this should be based on artificially stimulated demand. 
In an ideal setting, this experiment would be sprung upon an unsuspecting consumer 
while they are making a usual purchase. Obviously this would be difficult to enact and, 
as is the way with many psychology experiments, the best that can probably be hoped 
for is a well orchestrated clinical setup. Nonetheless, for the sake of descriptive colour 
and a glimpse of the trade-offs, the narrative that follows adheres mostly to the real 
world. 
Now, returning us to where this chapter began, suppose person A wanders into a 
coffee house and orders a cup of coffee. The consumer is confronted with a fair-trade 
and conventional option and informed that the price differential is R. The person will 
accept or reject the fair-trade option. If they accept the experiment is repeated, but with 
the price of the fair-trade cup being increased. If they reject the offer the experiment is 
also repeated, but the price of the fair-trade good is then decreased. In each instance 
their answer lets us know which way around the inequality sign is between π and R. An 
acceptance indicates R>π  whereas a rejection specifies R<π . Structured repetition 
continues in this manner until the turning point is isolated. Let’s say that the person 
agrees to pay £0.20 above the conventional price, but when the cost increases to £0.21, 
they reject the fair-trade option in favour of the conventional coffee. We may claim to 
have found their highest acceptable price )( YESR  and lowest rejection price )( NOR . This 
allows for the deduction that UΔ is weakly positive at YESR  and weakly negative at NOR . 
Therefore taking the average of these two values and plugging them into the last of the 
 119
above equations in place of R accommodates the claim to have identified the point at 
which 0=ΔU . In terms of deriving Z, this amounts to the following formal statement: 
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t
i
k
t RR
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=Φ
2
ˆ  
 
i
k
t
Φˆ  is recognisable from Figure 2.2, in which it is depicted without subscripts or 
superscripts. The variable as it is here may be referred to as individual i’s reservation 
donation in circumstance k of context t. I am purposely being strict with the k and t 
superscripts so as to try to mitigate behavioural problems that are associated with a 
violation of ‘the invariance principle’ (preference reversal), and relatedly to account 
for the six conditions13 for interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons laid down by 
Kahneman and Tversky (2000). This notation applies similarly to variable z. For 
simplicity of explanation, the previous sections did not differentiate between the general 
and the specific. This is a luxury that must now be discarded, hence the presence of the 
subscripts and superscripts now attached to the variables. The circumflex (^) and the 
lower case z inform us that, strictly speaking, we are now working with estimates. 
 
As it should be straightforward enough to obtain a person’s P
frΩ , Z can now easily be 
solved for. For the sake of clarity and due to the discovery of a pitfall (see below), 
consider the coffee example from above. Assuming Person A has a take-home 
                                                 
13 Inclusiveness, ordinal measure across situations, a distinctive neutral point, interpersonal comparability, 
time neutrality, and independence of experiences. 
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permanent income of £35,000 per annum and frequents a coffee house once a week, on 
each occasion buying a cup of fair-trade coffee at the reservation mark up of £0.20. 
0000624.0
3.3283
205.0ˆ =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=ACH
FT
z    
The topmost superscript FT/CH indicates the circumstance of ‘fair-trade’ in the context 
of a ‘coffee house’. 
The pitfall which informs us of the requirement for multidimensional subscripts 
surfaces as follows; let us suppose that Person B has an identical income to that of 
Person A. Now, Person B also likes coffee, but does not go to a coffee house, instead 
once a month they buy a 250g bag of percolator coffee to drink at home. The same 
identification of iΦˆ game is played with this person and it is discovered that they will 
buy the fair-trade packet of coffee at a mark-up of £0.35, but reject it at £0.36. 
Therefore: 
0000432.0
96.8215
355.0ˆ =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=BGS
FT
z  
As ‘differential kindness’ is defined as being the proportional difference between 
individuals’ z scores, looking at the above two results might lead one to infer that 
Person A is 44% kinder than Person B. However, this is where the lower part of the 
northwest superscript (GS) informs that an inappropriate comparison has been made. 
There is nothing wrong with the individual estimates per se, but what the mismatch 
serves to show is that, even though a common cyclical period of consumption has been 
controlled for, this still does not take away a problem that is akin to a form of 
unobserved heterogeneity. One must consider the influence of asymmetric opportunities 
and how the individual incrementally encodes the donation. Say for example, if Person 
B were to lose her packet of coffee, would she return to the store and buy fair-trade 
again, or would she consider her monthly donation to have already been made and as 
such buy the conventional coffee? For the 44% figure to hold, the answer to that 
question would have to be that B chooses the conventional coffee. Person A in a grocery 
store would also have to refuse any fair-trade mark-up. Maintenance of the 44% 
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differential requires that numerous other unobserved scenarios such these as hold, few 
of which can be tacitly relied upon. This is all entwined with the other vagaries of the 
environment, for example perhaps the relaxing ambiance of the coffee house helps 
make a person more generous. The less a comparative analysis takes for granted, the 
healthier that analysis is.  
Driven home is the requirement that the experiment be as strict as possible in 
comparing ‘like for like’ not just over a commonly scaled period of consumption, but 
also in appreciation of the various environmental sub-groups and the level of perfection 
within their identification. This may be thought of as being quite similar to the 
econometric refinement technique of ‘propensity score matching’. This helps to 
visualise the process in the form of a tree; as was outlined in Section 2.2, the tree as a 
whole is called altruism, and like everything else in the world it’s the sum of its parts. 
To be specific, altruism is the sum of two parts; pure altruism and normal altruism. 
Likewise each of these is in turn is the sum of its parts. By examining fair-trade, we are, 
by the definitional condition of Section 2.2 ( 0)( 1 =+= ntBAFE ), on the pure altruism 
branch. That is to say, the donor does not expect the receiver to do anything for him in 
the future; the expectation of a repatriated fitness is 0. Setting up a sub-branch 
comparison between two people, i and j, can be visualised as follows: 
Figure 2.4 Theoretical sub-branch comparison tree 
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Where ∑
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In this thesis fair-trade is the context, so in terms of the picture above, i
FT
i
t zz ˆˆ1 = , 
beneath which fair-trade is a is a subcomponent of overall benevolence )( ii
FT Zz ⊆ . In 
the example that has so far been considered, we have identified two consumption 
(donation) based subgroups for one common fair-trade product, coffee. Equally we may 
well have had different sub-branches for different fair-trade products, e.g. bananas and 
cocoa. In the wider design there is much complexity with which to contended, and 
endless scope exists by which to seek perfection. For the purposes of practical 
description however, consider for now just the branches of the tree that Persons A and B 
have been deemed to occupy. 
Figure 2.5 mismatched generosity scores  
                 A
FT zˆ                                                        B
FT zˆ  
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Ideally it would be a matter of arbitrarily summing up all the elements of each 
subgroup in order to make a statement about a particular context (master group), but the 
lesson of Figure 2.3 is that one must be mindful to avoid mismatched comparisons – 
context is sometimes not enough. If a full-context z can be obtained, all the more robust 
is the picture. However as it is solely for the purposes of comparison that z is being 
sought, we are not placing emphasis on an individual’s z value per se, but rather on 
proportional differences between the z values of different individuals. Thinking of it in 
the way a statistician works with a sample, full tree identification is not strictly 
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necessary. What is necessary is that circumstances of judgement be undertaken with 
appropriately matched branches.  
Defining the different subgroup properties can be helpful in organising one’s 
thoughts as regards the effectiveness of the matching process. ‘Perfect Subgroup 
Identification’ (PSI) is defined to be one in which all the outlets of the subgroup have 
been identified. So, in the example above, if it is correct to say that there are only two 
instances in which a person purchases fair-trade coffee, in a grocery store or in a cafe, 
then a perfect subgroup has been identified. ‘Weak Occupation’ is when an agent has 
failed to generate values for all identified subgroups, with or without the condition of 
PSI. Agents A and B fall into this category. ‘Near Perfect Occupation’ (NPO) is when 
an agent has generated a value for each and every entry within all identified subgroups, 
but in the absence of PSI. ‘Perfect Occupation’ combines those two; it’s near perfect 
occupation under the condition of PSI. 
The complementary sets of definitions are ‘match based’ and necessarily involve 
two or more agents. ‘Zero Occupational Match,’ (ZOM) is between two or more agents 
and implies that, of the subgroups they each occupy, none are in common with each 
other. Therefore ZOM describes the situation between A and B. A ‘Near Perfect 
Occupational Match’ (NPOM) is when two or more agents exhibit the characteristics of 
near perfect occupation. Accordingly, a ‘perfect occupational match’ (POM) is a NPOM 
under the condition of PSI. As a final refinement there is the recognition of subgroup 
consumption (donation) being either symmetrical or asymmetrical. For example, if two 
people went to the coffee house to buy coffee, they are matched, but if one buys two 
cups and the other buys one cup, then the match is asymmetrical.  
A few examples can perhaps assist in making this framework and these cumbersome 
acronyms more digestible. Three people are added to the two that already exist, Persons 
C, D and E. Person C and Person D each go to a coffee house for a weekly cup and also 
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purchase a 250g bag of percolator coffee from a grocery store. The reservation donation 
game is played with each of them, and their respective reservation donations are 
discovered. In the coffee house, Person C rejects a mark-up of £0.16, but agrees to pay 
£0.15. In the grocery store, the same person rejects a mark-up of £0.26, but agrees to 
one of £0.25. The respective figures for Person D appear as so; in the grocery store they 
reject £0.31 but accept £0.30, but in the coffee house, they accept a mark-up of £0.25, 
while rejecting one of £0.26. Person E has the exact same grocery store price 
characteristics as Person D, but instead of drinking one cup of coffee in the coffee 
house, their preference is to consume two cups. Holding all incomes constant at £35,000 
per annum, the generosity scores appear as follows: 
Figure 2.6 Simulated generosity scores in context 
              Coffee house                 Grocery store   
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As they are only for the purposes of explanation, these examples are not particularly 
complex. However, it’s not difficult to envisage how knotty things could get in a wider 
empirical analysis, on which note, matching trees make for an organised vantage point 
from which to decipher the legitimacy of various comparisons. The remaining trees 
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from within this example are as follows: 
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For the sake of coherence, it is being assumed that PSI exists in the two 
consumption options (CH and GS). That is to say, other than a coffee house or a grocery 
story there are no other circumstances in which a person will have the opportunity to 
purchase fair-trade coffee. The initial two people, Persons A and B, fall into the 
category of ZOM, and so a direct comparison between the two would be somewhat 
crude. Persons C, D and E boast perfect occupation – they have generated values for all 
identified subgroups under the condition of PSI. POM can be declared to exist between 
agents C, D and E, however it’s only between C and D that POM is symmetrical. Pair-
wise comparisons between C and E are asymmetrical, likewise for D and E. The reason 
for the asymmetry is simply that Person E drinks two cups of coffee, while the others 
each drink one. By exhibiting the same reservation donation each time E acts in a 
consistent manner. If consistency is generalised (as is a standard assumption of welfare 
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economics) it allows for the forcing of symmetry via two possible ways. The 
observation of E buying the second cup could be dropped, or else it could be 
hypothetically claimed that if either C or D were to buy an extra cup of coffee their 
reservation donations would not have to be renegotiated. It’s straightforward enough to 
appreciate that each of these approaches amounts to an identical outcome in terms of 
comparing the values between agents. 
Regarding the trees that have been generated, looking at things crudely (i.e. by 
taking the summation as the basis of judgement) it appears that E is the kindest; 283% 
kinder than C, 75% kinder than D, 261% kinder than A, and 421% kinder than Person 
B. The purest pair-wise comparison is that between Persons C and D, because PSI is 
present and the match is POM symmetrical; it can thus be stated with confidence that 
Person D is around 50% more generous towards fair-trade coffee than Person C. 
The inclusion of A and B without matching would place B as the meanest and C as 
the second meanest, but by pair-wise matching and controlling for symmetry, the 
discrepancy of generosity between A and E falls from 261% to 55%. Meanwhile, the 
margin of difference between B and E shrinks from 421% in favour of E, to be 35% in 
favour of B. If the assumption of transitivity (as is a standard assumption of welfare 
economics) is permitted to intrude, it becomes possible to bring A and B into the 
ranking fold. Via pair-wise matches, A > C (624>357), but less kind than everybody 
else. By similar comparison, B becomes kinder than C, D and E. Therefore as both D > 
A and E > A, from transitivity it can be said that B is kinder than A. Matching without 
adjusting for symmetry places E > D, but controlling for symmetry renders that E is just 
as kind as D (E=D). Table 2.3 displays a summary of how much of a difference 
matching and adjusting for symmetry actually makes in terms of ranking. 
 
Table 2.3 Non-Matched and Matched ranked Comparisons  
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Crudely Ranked 
 
Matched and adjusted for 
symmetry and transitivity 
E (2251) B 
D (1285) E=D 
      A (624) D=E 
      C (587) A 
      B (432) C 
 
Appreciation of the various ‘real world generosity trees’ that different individuals 
harbour suggests that, even after controlling for income, arbitrary summations of 
altruistic scores are unlikely to facilitate a fair and just comparison between individuals. 
Thought must be given to the appropriate matching of subgroups. If the subgroups are 
perfectly matched, a stronger statement can be made regarding the magnitude of the 
comparison. In the absence of subgroup matches, bridges of comparison can be built by 
the inclusion of the transitivity assumption. However, reliance on transitivity dilutes 
what can be said about magnitude and renders that the analysis defaults to rank order 
comparisons. This in turn brings to light some of the important trade-offs that exist 
between the clinic and the real world. In the former, mismatched context and subgroups 
are unlikely to be a problem as the experiment can be designed to generate perfectly 
symmetrical observations. However it is likely that the clinic will fail to capture the 
fluctuations of circumstantial temperament, and one must also be sensitive to potential 
discrepancies between stated and revealed preference. Furthermore, in terms of data, the 
real world offers a genuine unbalanced panel while a clinic can at best tender a kind of 
fictitiously balanced panel. That is to say, Person A claiming that he would be happy to 
go into a coffee shop once a week and pay mark-up R amounts to one clinical 
observation, but the same person actually undertaking such an act amounts to n*t 
observations, i.e. 52 true observations.  
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Amidst the focus of the artificially generated examples, it must be emphasised that 
all statements of kindness strictly relate to the specific context of fair-trade coffee. How 
much one may wish to generalise things upwards/more widely is, in the absence of 
estimation, one’s own intuitive call. For example, from the scenario here, one would 
surely have few qualms in swallowing the suggestion that if a person is 50% kinder than 
another person as regards fair-trade coffee, then that same person is quite likely to be 
similar when it comes to fair-trade bananas. If on the other hand such a statement were 
to be put as a generalised assertion of a person’s entire charitable disposition to the 
developing world, it would obviously become less acceptable. Nonetheless, the 
outlining of altruism as lying in an additively decomposable framework essentially 
provides a means by which to make scientific judgements in respect of proportional 
differences in income-controlled kindness.  
 
 
4.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Contrary to the claim that utility gains for the donor pollute the definition of altruism, 
this discourse has measured how altruistic a person is precisely by that person’s ability 
to experience utility by giving something away.  
This thesis has sought to formalise altruism and to develop a technique by which to 
make more scientific comparisons between individuals. A theoretical landscape has 
been offered in which the ‘income independent’ component of altruism can be viewed 
separately from the ‘income influenced’ element of altruism. It was shown that to pass 
judgements based merely on the presence of donations can be misleading in terms of 
whether or not a person is truly ‘generous of spirit’. The theory was further 
complemented by the design of a clinical game which sought to empirically isolate the 
income independent element of altruism. The circumstantial nature of altruism rendered 
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that individual acts of benevolence be viewed as being additive components of a bigger 
picture. Recognition that a great deal of ‘asymmetry of opportunity’ likely exists 
between different individuals led to a matching process being deployed as a means by 
which to increase the validity of the hypothetical comparisons. In addition, it has been 
shown that informed judgements of charity can theoretically in the long run be ‘utility 
superior’ to uninformed judgements, even in the case when the information reflects 
negatively on the charitable cause. This in turn builds a case for such information to be 
regarded as a sort of public good, the deliverance of which is justifiable if enough of the 
tax-paying population are active donors (i.e. fair-trade consumers).  
This thesis sought to sidestep the latency of the relevant constraint by viewing 
charity in terms of a request being put to a potential donor, and the person thereafter 
accepting or rejecting the ‘offer’. Precisely because the decisions to accept or reject are 
explicit and binding, the scenario of fair-trade resolves to an accommodating medium. It 
does however take only a small adjustment of one’s thoughts to generalise the situation, 
because there is precious little difference between this ‘accept–reject’ setting of charity 
and the more usual choice-based set-up; it’s just a matter of recognising the little voice 
of one’s internal utility auctioneer. As you approach a charity box, the auctioneer asks 
you, “Do you want to kindly drop a few coins into the box?” If you answer no, you walk 
on. If you answer yes, the auctioneer dusts off her underused charity hammer and 
negotiations commence. Having a sense of humour she asks, “How about £20, would 
you like to put £20 in the box?” You accordingly baulk, after which she smugly replies, 
“OK, how about a penny, would you prefer to put a penny in the box?” You blushingly 
decline and inform the auctioneer that it would pointless and possibly rude to deposit 
such a measly amount – especially when other people might see. This bidding process 
continues until a figure is finally agreed upon. The auctioneer undertakes various tests 
of refinement by way of marginal increases and decreases until she is confident that 
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figure represents your maximised chartable utility (point A in Figure 2.1). There are of 
course various stochastic elements of the moment that render consistency to be more a 
radius than a point – satisfying rather than maximising – but that’s just cosmetic to the 
explanation. Consecutively you reach your decision and make your donation. However, 
why stop there? This should sound very familiar to those who have laboured to turn the 
pages of Bentham and Mill, because in effect there is no fundamental difference 
between choice based acts of altruism and choice based acts of anything else – and to 
acknowledge that devalues not a shred of anything. Agents’ time horizons may differ, 
but the sole and categorical reason for action itself never for a moment wavers. “What 
about non-economic action?”. some may ask. The answer is that there exists no action 
outside of economic action – time and energy are finite, and so they face actions of 
allocation. Even for something as distant as a person basing their actions on the belief in 
an afterlife, still it may be argued that the concept of heaven itself is nothing more than 
an unsubstantiated global utility maximum. We do in economics famously speak of an 
invisible hand; why not equally anoint the invisible utility auctioneer that lives inside 
each and every one of us? For the unseen hand surely belongs to her, as it is she who 
mediates each and every action we take – she is what one might honestly call, ‘the very 
person that I am’. 
As well as satisfying general intellectual curiosity, the use of an income independent 
measure of kindness may have considerable practical value in economics. It would be 
most interesting to see if there is any evidence of differing levels of income independent 
kindness between various nationalities and social groups; opportunities for applied 
macro and micro analysis respectively arise. Consider in particular how it might shed 
some quantitative light into the mysterious black box that often gets referred to as being 
as a ‘social consensus. Indeed, various distinguished economists have accredited much 
to the existence of this elusive accord. For example, Sen (1999) equates it to the strong 
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wartime performances of British human development indicators. For a more recent 
phenomenon, the game theoretical explanation of Libenstein (1982) has been applied to 
offer reasoning behind why 1980s Germany was able to grow so strongly in the 
presence of inflexible labour markets. Also, the so-called Scandinavian model that 
combines healthy growth with a relatively large slice of fiscal redistribution is said by 
many a wise man and many a fool to be a functional embodiment of market socialism. 
Others, typically of a less ‘state friendly’ mindset, prefer to view the very notion of a 
social consensus and honest leadership as running contrary to the very fabric of 
economic behaviour: self-interest. For a staunch defence of that perspective see in 
particular Buchanan and Tullock (1963) and Hayek (1976); or more to the ease of ones 
eye, simply count the days to the next red-faced resignation from high office. However, 
by taking repeated games to be the glue, there is perhaps middle ground to be found in 
considering that ‘a group’ itself represents the internally negotiated self-interest of its 
members. Recognition of such may even be said to constitute the difference between 
self-interest and rationally refined self-interest – from the tightly knit family unit up 
unto the grand but fragile continental union, evolution is a story of collations, second-
order coalitions and the limitations thereof. Thus the decomposability of the model 
might lend itself favourably to an exploration of the necessary prejudices that a social 
consensus is likely to actively embody. For example, consider cross-national differences 
in attitudes towards the presence of foreign workers, and the associated institutions that 
mediate the assimilation of those essential workers. From this it may emerge that the 
existence of one type of social consensus runs contrary to the survival of another – for if 
everybody is a member then nobody is a member. 
The claim is not that income independent kindness alone constitutes the entire social 
consensus variable, merely that it could perceivably be an important ingredient of it, 
and/or a proxy or an instrument by which to gauge it. If economists wish to pass 
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judgement by way of accrediting, complementing, criticising or denying the worth of 
social cohesion, it would surely serve the debate well to make the entity more tangible.  
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Chapter III: A Tale of Two Farmers: Welfare Scenarios for Fair 
Trade 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It was the fairest of arrangements; it was the least fair of arrangements. This chapter 
chronicles the tale of two neighbouring farmers, one who receives a fair-trade order, and 
another who does not. As was detailed in the literature review, the comfort of 
conventional reasoning is such that fair-trade may always in the minds of some be 
haunted by the spectre of oversupply. However, ascertaining the existence of that 
apparition is clouded by a blanket of mist. It can be hard to spot a ghost in the fog, yet 
that is what a number of commentators confidently claim they can so effortlessly do.  
This chapter has no intention of making a statement to try to either confirm or deny 
the existence of oversupply. However, its first undertaking will be to conceptually 
address a few of the complexities that undermine the convenience of considering that a 
price rise will automatically lead to a positive supply response – it should be kept in 
mind that ceteris paribus is as generous as it is unforgiving. Encapsulated within the 
reasoning on offer shall be an attempt to shine some light on why the returns to 
agriculture are what they are. 
Having largely abandoned their hostility to the market mechanism, fair-trade 
organisations respond to the often touted accusation of oversupply by pointing to the 
fact that licensed traders are themselves profiteers. Hence those traders are themselves 
subordinate to market principles and it thus follows that they do not (should not) buy 
what they cannot profitably sell. While a claim such as that should not prevent an 
eyebrow from being raised, the answer does have an air of credibility about it, and it is a 
response, the face value consequences of which this chapter will endeavour to evaluate. 
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Assuming their reasoning to be well founded, the following four questions then emerge: 
(i) What does fair-trade mean for the producers whom it does not fold in the warmth of 
its embrace?  
(ii) Under the binding condition of stable supply and demand, is there a welfare 
externality for non-participants?  
(iii) If there is a negative externality, how can it best be visualised so that policy makers 
can better appreciate the potential trade-offs with which they may be confronted?  
(iv) What variables can policymakers influence, and which lie beyond their touch?  
An attempt to answer these questions is the crux of this chapter.  
Section 3.2 and its incorporated subsections attempt to confront these issues via a 
number of modelled welfare scenarios. There are two ‘master scenarios’ in which one 
farmer will be offered a fair-trade order and the other will not. The first master scenario 
imposes the condition of the fair-trade farmer having unlimited spare capacity. The 
second, and much more interactive scenario, imposes the restriction of a capacity 
restraint upon the fair-trade agent.  
The underlying condition of all scenarios is that income may change, but aggregate 
output strictly cannot. At each step we deploy the standard tenets of welfare economics 
by which to judge the outcome. It is not necessary to spend any time directly assessing 
what fair-trade might mean for alterations in income inequality within this model, as it 
will by the end of the discourse be quite apparent that fair-trade has the potential to send 
it in either direction. The interesting upshot of this is that it depends upon more than just 
who receives the fair-trade order and/or who was better off to begin with.  
The aim here is not just to show outcomes, but also to try to afford the policy maker 
a superior vantage point from where to pitch her worth. In places where further 
intervention is considered, it is paramount that he who is tempted to interfere has an 
understanding of the trade-offs with which she will be dabbling. Yet, to pre-empt a 
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point that curtails enthusiasm for intervention, one suggestion of this analysis seems to 
be that policy makers are not exactly spoilt for choice with respect to variables being 
readily open to their manipulation. 
Reminiscent of what was touched upon in the general introduction, throughout 
Section 3 numerous opportunities arise to dwell upon the incompleteness of welfare 
economics. It is a well established fact that the most celebrated cornerstones of that sub-
discipline are renowned for having quantified the impossibility of universal satisfaction 
(seminally, Arrow 1951 and Sen 1970). In addition, it is worth reminding oneself that 
preference for the strongest welfare statement available to us, that of a Pareto 
improvement, is itself essentially a value judgement – albeit a strong one; strong in the 
sense that one would expect few to observe legitimacy in opposing a Pareto 
improvement when it is a straight choice between that change or no change. However, it 
should not be forgotten that something as simple as the externality of ‘envy’ (or 
jealousy to make it stronger) is enough to psychologically scupper Pareto (see Ng 
2004). 
As the predominant concern of this model is income, there is perhaps a need to 
defend it against some of the more philosophical engagements of welfare. Here, 
monetary wealth is ‘relative choice’ – nothing more, nothing less – and choice is 
everything to one who knows how to exercise it. In that respect perhaps it is terminal to 
many of us – alas the tradition of this thesis is ‘liberal’ and ‘positive’ not ‘parental’ and 
normative, hence the aim is simply to explain and understand. By dealing exclusively in 
terms of income, some might regard this chapter as being representative of nothing 
more than crass utilitarianism. Maybe to a degree it is, but maybe the human being is a 
crass utilitarian animal – crass, complex, imperfect, and whatever else. The lacing of 
irony that accompanies a denouement of the divinity of choice, is that even if one did 
believe oneself to be better off in its absence, few if any will renounce the gift of choice 
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when offered. Despite the fact that even the most intelligent of individuals cannot count 
upon their exercising of choice as being flawless past a certain base level, there reaches 
a stage where it is morally illegitimate and undeniably patronising for an individual to 
have choices made on their behalf by somebody who ‘knows’ better. Pure uncertainty is 
unslayable, and so past a certain benchmark of ignorance, one may argue that it is 
wholly legitimate to consider choice to be the most appropriate representation of 
welfare.  
Central as those lingering inadequacies may or may not be, this is a thesis more 
about measurement, and less about the philosophy of wellbeing. The above remarks that 
have been made in respect to philosophical wellbeing are mischievous points of 
conjecture, and the reader is invited to treat them as omnipresent concessions of 
imperfection. The reason for placing these concessions in this opening section rather 
than within the body text is a matter of general politeness, and the related civility of 
doing one’s best to present a story that flows. It would be too cumbersome to labour 
them at every perceivable turn. 
Notwithstanding its well documented incompleteness, welfare economics offers the 
most logical and least subjective framework to date. It is consistent and it is coherent. 
Moreover, it is consistent with itself, because, by its own measure, we prefer the 
framework of welfare economics not because it is perfect, but rather because it is the 
least imperfect. 
 
 
3.2 RETURNS TO AGRICULTURE: THE CURSE OF HOMOGENEITY  
 
What is embodied in the term ‘oversupply’ is not necessarily an event that more supply 
equals oversupply. There are plenty of legitimate reasons why more supply is not 
oversupply, ‘productivity’ being the categorical gem within that reasoning. While 
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oversupply is looked upon negatively, economists tend to praise loudly the virtues of 
productivity – rightfully so as the long run existence/material progress of our species 
essentially depends upon productivity. However, it is interesting is that one may adore 
and disdain two concepts which result in essentially the same outcome. The short to 
medium run consequence of each can result in various asymmetries of social pain. In a 
sense we have ‘good extra supply’ and ‘bad extra supply’.  
The virtue of difference of course resides generally in the long run because there is 
no finer way to impoverish a nation than to stunt the extra supply that is resonant of 
productivity. We have at numerous points in this discourse dwelt upon the 
incompleteness of welfare science. It may however be argued that the greatest 
incompleteness surpasses the envy based troubles of Pareto and the disagreements over 
intrinsic and instrumental benefits, and far more manifests itself in the issue of inter-
temporal welfare. In a sense, we are returned squarely to the quandary of failed 
transitivity, unable to rank adjusted outcomes not just for present day people, but also 
for those who are young or not yet born. What creates comfort for an individual living 
in a country today is not necessarily of benefit for the future generations within that 
country. Similarly, hard productive graft in the present day may be forging the morrows 
‘relative’ ease, liberty and leisure. Therefore, if the surplus of fair-trade were to be 
invested in productivity enhancement, we might not observe data that depicts ‘present 
day’ increments in aggregate welfare. At the same time we would likely observe the 
presence of more supply, and in the process of equating fair-trade as our causal variable 
find it difficult to say what proportion of that ‘extra supply’ is actually oversupply – 
what fraction is ‘good supply’ and what is fraction is ‘bad supply’? If we are then to 
make a statement regarding aggregate welfare, we would subsequently have to take into 
account not just the gains of the gainers, but also the possible externality that there is a 
welfare change for non-participants. Few would disagree that this hypothetical dataset 
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would be incredibly complex to compile, and to be complete it would have to straddle 
not just local but global supply and welfare movements. A further associated difficulty 
is that global trade is so awash with price distortions, subsidies, taxes, and all genres of 
covert protectionism. Consequently, when one lets drop a term such as ‘oversupply’ and 
applies it to something as labyrinthine as international trade, one may be guilty of 
applying a largely pedagogical term to a context more diverse. This is not to dispute that 
a consistent framework is an indispensable point of structure for one’s thoughts, but 
merely to assert that pragmatism is an essential ingredient for something as fluid and 
reactionary as reality. As Keynes so eloquently put it, “The theory of economics does 
not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a 
method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking, which 
helps its possessor to draw correct conclusions (1973, TCW, vol. XII, p.856). Aside 
from the penultimate word of that statement, which one may be tempted to replace with 
something more appropriate (such as ‘logical’), the overall message is as worthy and 
clear.  
Unlike the oblique intricacies of supply in global production, determining whether 
or not the actual quantity delivered is acceptable to the market for final consumption is 
surprisingly straightforward. One need simply spot for one of three categorical 
possibilities; perfect equilibrium, shortages, or waste. Not least because in exactness it 
is a moving target, perfect equilibrium is discounted to be as unlikely as it is abstract. 
However, this is irrelevant, because even if it were not discounted, the direction that this 
discourse is taking would remain intact. Simple observations are enough to conclude 
that the foodstuff shelves of Western supermarkets are not (at least at the time of 
writing) looking bare. The realised outcome is that we are usually left with some degree 
of waste – actually quite a lot of waste. It would thus seem that in spite of all the trade 
obstacles that present themselves along the way, the quantity of agricultural produce 
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that reaches the developed consumption market is enough, or more than enough. In fact, 
the effectual demand of the Western consumers is generally equivalent to desire. This 
suggests that one should expect nothing significant from Say’s law, and as well creates 
a severe predicament for the co-operative and monopsony based solutions that were 
discussed in Chapter I. 
Evidently, the more perishable the good the more overtly open it is to being laid to 
waste. Yet perishability is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg insofar as understanding 
why one group may act so wastefully with the commercial output of another group. 
Waste does not come about because Western consumers are suboptimal in their 
planning, it is simply a grace of wealth that resonates from the different 
products/services into which different people in different sectors transfer their labour.  
Fulfilling a promise made in Chapter I, let us draw a valuable lesson from one of the 
true cornerstones of development economics, “It is a matter of historical fact that ever 
since the [18] seventies the trend of prices has been heavily against the sellers of food 
and raw materials and in favour of the sellers of manufactured goods.” (Singer 1950, 
p.477). Prior to offering thoughts on why the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis (PSH 
hereafter) is, in some shape or form, here to stay, one might first consider a mild and 
speculative assault on the concept. Continuation of the PSH may be said to rely on a 
linear, rather than cyclical, model of development – which may or may not be correct. 
Alongside this, who is yet to say that technological change will not come up with new 
non-traditional purposes for agricultural produce? Firstly, the cyclical perspective on 
development is largely a statement of political and economic relations between East and 
West, not so much one to do with sectors (see Frank 1998). As for the possibility of new 
demand being the saviour of the disadvantaged agrarian, think again; here one must 
tread very carefully. As one scholar of the field aptly explains, “High food prices benefit 
only a minority of farmers in the poorest countries. In Africa, South Asia and Central 
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America most small farmers consume more food than they produce.14” In other words, if 
food inflation is generalised across all commodities this amounts to nothing more than 
nominal gains for farmers, which will in real terms end up being more than cancelled 
out by other draws of consumption. As a complement to this, one might apply a 
message that returns us squarely to classical Ricardian foundations of economics; 
upward pressure from food prices constitutes one of the major transmission mechanisms 
by which inflationary pressures make their way to the industrial wage. This does in turn 
imply that higher agricultural prices are unlikely to enable farmers to be any more 
affording of industrial goods. Only productivity within industry can enable that to a 
systematic degree. 
These days one could perhaps take issue with the inclusion of certain raw materials 
in the PSH, but with respect to agriculture the hypothesis retains its air of prominence 
within development economics. The PSH equates its reckoning to the observation that 
the price elasticity of demand for primary commodities is generally much lower than for 
manufactured goods. Despite all the attention the hypothesis has been the recipient of its 
eminence and its age (see Lutz 1999), one cannot help but feel that there is yet more to 
be mined from the core of its message. In particular, viewed in the light of the present 
day, the concept swerves slightly from what at least one of its authors originally took it 
to stand for. It may be argued that the successful industrialisation of many former 
developing countries clearly illustrates that, while once manifest in a so-called ‘North–
South’ divide, the PSH discrepancies of income are wholly blind to national borders. 
Recognition of this may be taken as a swipe at the value-laden taint of political 
economy that at times did appear to punctuate Mr. Prebisch’s famous, but often 
misinterpreted decries of dependency (see Dosman 2008).  
                                                 
14 Christopher Barrett, Professor of Agriculture, Cornell University. Letter to the editor of the Economist, 
April 12th - 18th 2008, print edition. 
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An argument will now be put forth to suggest that the fundamentals of agriculture 
are such that the main conclusion of the PSH is intact and largely unalterable, especially 
while a country remains underdeveloped – cause and effect. First and foremost, there is 
the governing actuality of the agricultural marketplace so closely resembling the 
textbook (Marshellian) conditions of a perfectly competitively market. In particular, 
barriers to entry are negligible and the goods produced are relatively homogeneous. 
This leads to a case in which it is not surprising that the marginal returns are so meagre 
– simply they are competitive. If a government wishes to prop up the returns to 
agriculture, it may turn to the usual suspects of protectionism, tariffs, quotas, subsidies, 
safety standards (fictitious or otherwise)….etc. The affordability of these costly policies 
is such that they are more open to wealthier countries. Of related relevance, the social 
and democratic structures of many of those wealthy countries are such that the farmer’s 
voice is, to say the least, difficult to ignore.  
Governments may of course also support industry by similar means to those just 
listed; however there are two related points of industrial engagement that are 
structurally unavailable to agriculture. Firstly, a double-edged sword if ever there was 
one, some elements of industry receive the protection of intellectual property rights (IP). 
Possibilities for measures such as these cannot be deployed outright in a market of 
homogeneous goods (GM might alter this), hence the agricultural producer is hit 
twofold by homogeneity. Initially, through the price sensitivity of the final consumer, 
and again because if a farmer wishes to purchase industrial goods, he, like everybody 
else must at times pay the returns associated with an institutionally enshrined monopoly. 
IP rights are however only the veneer of a much deeper story, and what is being 
gravitated towards is an explanation that rests more on hard structural characteristics. 
Because, while IP is viewed as being interventionalist rather than structural, consider 
that though IP is a dish served by the artificial hand of government, without the 
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structural characteristic of heterogeneity, a serving such as that would be patiently 
impossible.  
On entering the market of final consumption the assumption of homogeneity can 
begin to wane, or at least be tweaked to appear to wane. Some goods strongly retain 
their homogeneity (e.g. bananas), while for others heterogeneity seeps evermore into the 
picture, e.g. coffee to a moderate degree and wine to an extensive degree. Be it genuine 
or artificially stimulated, a lack of homogeneity implies the existence of multiple 
demand curves of differing elasticities. This affords the supplier the opportunity to 
engage in various forms of price discrimination. Hence, in respect of consumption, 
heterogeneity is the enemy of waste because the existence of heterogeneity is the 
foremost requisite which facilitates a situation in which an increase in wealth is not 
solely associated with purchasing more of something; rather it is allied with the 
possibility of substitution of higher quality purchases. The problem with much of 
agriculture is precisely that strong homogeneity denies or severely hinders the 
possibility of that avenue of value-added relief.  
When one gives thought to the returns to agriculture, care must be taken to not be 
distracted by outliers who perform well due to a large concentration of property 
ownership and/or the ability to produce a very specialised product. What one must 
recognise for comparison, is not the overall value of the sector, but rather that the body 
of labour (landless and otherwise) is divided by the overall value of the sector. Via two 
natural barriers of entry this ‘sale of labour’ perspective serves to further the argument 
being made in this section of the thesis.  
Firstly, the capital intensive nature of industrial production implies that the number 
of people who can chase a particular commercial idea is much more limited than it is in 
agriculture. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the barrier of learning weighs in 
to afford enhanced returns to suitably skilled industrial and service labourers. Not only 
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is it a contemporary requirement that most of those labourers obtain a minimum level of 
education before they can compete effectively in their markets. Also, as ‘learning by 
doing’ takes root, industrial and service based companies have a natural incentive to 
take extra care in discouraging labour turnover, the bidding up of wages being an 
integral part of that discouragement. To say that these are natural shrouds of protection 
that agricultural workers do not benefit from is an understatement. It is wholly more 
accurate to state that these are natural shrouds of protection which the agricultural 
worker cannot benefit from.  
Ultimately, the ‘non-sheltered’ producers of agricultural goods are receiving 
something close to their competitive marginal returns, whereas those who sell their 
labour in higher value-added sectors receive wages above and beyond their textbook 
marginal products. Hence, when these two groups come together to exchange the 
respective fruits of their labours, it is hardly surprising that one walks away from the 
trade so much better off than the other.  
The reason why farmers in developed counters do not suffer this fate is because their 
marginal products are propped up by the unnatural hand of government. The same 
pressures on agrarian returns theoretically exist in the rich world; it just happens that, 
typically under democratic pressures, governments anaesthetise that pain (e.g. through 
CAP). The cost of that anaesthetic is a pinch that developing world producers and rich 
country consumers each feel in some shape or form. Evidently, the former probably feel 
the teeth of that bite to be sharper than does the latter.   
The discussion around the PSH and general returns to agriculture that has been 
constructed here is intended to go further than citing various elasticities as the cause of 
the declining terms of trade. Reasoning has been put forth to assert that the PSH and its 
predictions of relative agrarian impoverishment will remain in place because the most 
important causes behind those sectorial elasticities are structurally entrenched. Nothing 
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definitive has yet appeared to suggest that it is time to disown the core message of the 
PSH. Moreover, the presence of newly industrialised ‘late-comers’ lends itself 
generously to the perspective that this conflict of relative income is no longer (or ever 
really was) a North–South issue – at its nucleus it is more a sectorial matter. The 
tendency of the originators to write in terms of ‘North–South’ almost certainly stems 
from the time of their writings; back then, that particular divide was a near perfect proxy 
for the industrial and agrarian divide. Today, by the hour, it becomes less so. In 
unbroken accordance with economic history, it is valid to argue that developing 
countries which remain overly infatuated by the production of agricultural goods are not 
doing themselves any long term favours. Admitting as much does not condemn fair-
trade; merely it suggests that fair-trade organisers should not just deny the problem of 
oversupply and police the quandary of weak returns, but should in addition make a 
concerted effort to deploy their funds such that fitter people will be better prepared for 
the possibility of later selling their labours in a different sector. A statement such as this 
is particularly relevant to landless labourers. 
Where does this lead us in terms of a welfare model? Well, it must be confessed that 
we might struggle to detect oversupply, especially in the presence of productivity 
investment and a complex global trade structure. What can be said is that we are 
presented with a status quo, an equilibrium between buyers and sellers. Next, the ‘newly 
introduced demand’ for fair-trade does not represent new demand per se, rather it is a 
new preference for the same fundamental product. That is to say, if a person switches 
from conventional coffee to fair-trade coffee the increased demand for fair-trade coffee 
should be met with a perfectly equal decline in the demand for conventional coffee. 
There is no reason to believe that any more of anything is being demanded (consumed) 
because of fair-trade. Now, if under these conditions we take at face value the proposal 
that the liberated profit motive is sufficient to prevent buyers from buying more than 
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they can feasibly sell, some will regard acceptance of that as being a statement of 
optimism or naivety. However, I feel it is better to take it as an assumption that can be 
used to develop one scenario based model. Accepting such a statement to be the case, 
this all amounts to a model that must be (i) zero-sum in supply and (ii) non-zero-sum in 
producer income. The remainder of this chapter attempts to construct something from 
these two conditions, and by generating a number of sub-scenarios, considers what fair-
trade implies for aggregate welfare gains, and in turn for welfare transfers between 
participating and non-participating producers. The next section breathes life in the 
model. 
 
 
3.3 SCENARIO 1: FAIR-TRADE FARMER WITH INFINITE CAPACITY 
 
We are faced with two farmers, Farmer A and Farmer B. The baseline equations from 
which the model is to be built are: 
 
SDBA EQQ =+   ))(( AMA QPY =  
YYY BA =+    ))(( BMB QPY =  
 
where:  
YA is Farmer A’s gross income. 
YB is Farmer B’s gross income. 
Y is the total farming income of this modelled economy. 
QA is Farmer A’s supply. 
QB is Farmer B’s supply. 
ESD is equilibrium in the final market – or more precisely, the present stable condition of 
supply and demand in the final market, the status quo. 
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With no fair-trade and only a conventional market, let us assume that both farmers 
receive the same ‘one market’ price )( MP for their respective crops, in which case the 
income of both farmers is determined solely by the amount they produce and their 
respective levels of productivity. To keep things simple, productivity is held constant as 
this means there is no need to complicate the message by having to bring in various 
dynamic production functions. This assumption may be precarious in terms of 
international differences, but for localised comparisons there is no obvious reason to 
consider it unacceptable.  
A fair-trade order is placed with Farmer A but not Farmer B. Under the condition of 
‘unlimited spare capacity’, Farmer A can accommodate the order without having to cut 
back on the conventional order. 
FTSDBFTA QEQQQ ˆ)( +=++  
Where MFT PP >  because ε+= MFT PP  
=FTP  Fair-trade price 
=ε  Fair trade mark-up 
 
FTQˆ  momentarily shows up as a disequilibrium residual on the right-hand side of the 
quantity equation. This represents the fact that the conventional trader will face lower 
demand for their product due to the preference shift that has occurred in the final 
market. FTFT QQ =ˆ  so, when FTQˆ  moves to the left-hand side of the equation to restore 
equilibrium, it carries with it a burden of loss which gets split between the farmers in 
any number of possible proportions.   
 
SDFTBFTA EQQQQ =−++ ˆ))((  
Where, FTFTFT QQQ )1(ˆ αα −+=  and 10 ≤≤α  
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SDFTFTBFTA EQQQQQ =−+−++ )))(1(())(( αα  
Letting FT
A
FT QQ =α  and FTBFT QQ =− )1( α  
 
α  is taken to be an exogenous variable that determines, respectively, the required 
quantity adjustments of Farmer A )( FT
AQ  and Farmer B )( FT
BQ , which materialise as a 
result of the fair-trade order. Note that for Farmer A, FT
AQ  represents only part of the 
net quantity adjustment, because she will be receiving a fair-trade order, whereas for 
Farmer B, FT
BQ  dictates her entire net quantity adjustment. 
 
Placed accordingly: 
 
SDFT
B
BFTFTA EQQQQQ =−+−+ )()( α  
Letting AFT
A
FTA QQQQ
*)( =−+  and BFTBB QQQ *)( =−  
SDBA EQQ =+⇒ **  (original equilibrium intact) 
 
where AQ
* and BQ
*  are the new post fair-trade quantities associated to each farmer, so: 
QQQ AAA −=Δ *  and BBB QQQ −=Δ *   
FTFTAA QQQQ α−+=*  
))(1(* FTBB QQQ α−−=  
)(* FTFTBB QQQQ α−−=  
FTFTBB QQQQ α+−=*  
 
FT
A QQ −=∂
∂
α
*
  FT
B QQ =∂
∂
α
*
       Evidently,  0
*
>∂
∂ BQ
α  and 0
*
<∂
∂ AQ
α  
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Assuming that these farmers have a preference for income over leisure at their current 
positions of wealth, it’s now straightforward to see that α  serves as kind of a damage 
allocation parameter to Farmer B. B’s quantity decline is minimised (neutralised) at 
1=α , and maximised at 0=α . Of direct consequence to the zero-sum condition, A’s 
quantity gains are minimised at 1=α  and maximised at 0=α  which is plainly visible 
via the straightforward implication that BA QQ Δ−=Δ .  
To see what this means in terms of actual welfare, we have to look at the reflective 
changes in income, the major difference being that unlike the quantity set-up, the 
income adjustments are potentially non-zero-sum. That is to say, unlike SDE in the 
quantity equation, the aggregate level of income )(Y  in the producer’s economy 
)( YYY BA =+  is permitted to change. 
The original income equations, ))(( AA QPY =  and ))(( BB QPY =  change such that, 
after the introduction of fair-trade, the income identity for the producer’s economy is 
written as YYY BA
*** =+ . AY*  is A’s new post fair-trade income, and BY*  is B’s post fair-
trade income. Dealing first with Farmer A’s income, the changes appear as follows: 
 
AAA YYY Δ±=* . 
FTFTMFTMAMA QQPQPQPY εα ++−=*  
FTM
A QpY −=∂
∂
α
*
,                     0
*
<∂
∂
α
AY  
FT
A QY =∂
∂
ε
*
,                             0
*
>∂
∂
ε
AY  
εα ++−=∂
∂
MM
FT
A PP
Q
Y*           0
*
>∂
∂
FT
A
Q
Y  
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Appendix 3.1 depicts the full generation of Farmer A’s income. Dealing next with 
Farmer B’s income: 
BBB YYY Δ±=*  ⇒  BBB YYY −=Δ * . However, as we know in this scenario that B will not 
be receiving any extra income from fair-trade, and the best he could possibly do is to 
maintain his current income (i.e. the expression is maximised at 0=Δ BY , for which 
BB YY =* ), to avoid potential confusion, let us reverse the sign to make it BBB YYY *−=Δ . 
Accordingly, Farmer B’s new income can be written as so: 
 
FTMFTMBMB QPQPQPY α+−=*  
FTM
B QPY =∂
∂
α
*
 ⇒   0
*
≥∂
∂
α
BY    
(The fair-trade mark-up )(ε  is of course inconsequential to BY* ) 
What is more telling in terms welfare adjustments is:   
αα ∂
∂−=∂
∂ AB YY **   
 
This condition informs us that alterations in welfare are zero-sum in relation to the 
proportional adjustment factor of the fair-trade order )(α . In other words, the marginal 
income gains that Farmer A receives from decreases in alpha, are exactly mirrored as 
marginal declines in Farmer B’s income. This dictates that the value of alpha alone 
creates no aggregate value; it represents only a transfer. Moreover, digging further 
beneath the surface there is a less than subtle indication that Pareto optimality will not 
be satisfied for any perceivable value of alpha other than 1. This will become ever more 
apparent when we move to evaluate aggregate income change, which follows evaluation 
of Farmer B’s individual welfare alterations with respect to the size of the fair-trade 
order.  
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FTMFTMBMB QPQPQPY α+−=*  
 MM
FT
B PP
Q
Y α+−=∂
∂*    ∴   ⇒=1α 0
*
=∂
∂
FT
B
Q
Y ,  ∀  11 <⇒≠ αα  ⇒ 0
*
<∂
∂
FT
B
Q
Y , 
 
For all possible values of α  except for 1, the size of the fair-trade order reduces the 
income of Farmer B, thus reinforcing the actuality that Pareto will be recognised only 
by 1=α .However, what emerges of most relevance is made evident by contrasting the 
two individual income derivatives with respect to the demanded quantity of fair-trade. 
We are of course no longer dealing in a zero-sum transfer, but note that while the size of 
the fair-trade order is good for both Farmer A and the overall economy, at the same time 
it places a larger threshold of risk on the non-participant.  
 
Comparing     MM
FT
B PP
Q
Y α−−=∂
∂*     to      εα ++−=∂
∂
MM
FT
A PP
Q
Y* , 
 
this time, the gains of the gainer are such that they are greater than losses to the loser, 
i.e. the pie as a whole has grown. The gains will exceed the losses by a factor of .FTQε  
Referring this to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, in this instance both parts of the test are 
now satisfied. Theoretically, the loser can be profitably compensated by the winner 
(Kaldor), and in addition the loser is unable to profitably bribe the winner to oppose the 
change (Hicks). Remember of course, that just because she can compensate him, it 
doesn’t mean she does, and if she is forced to compensate him there may be an 
intervention cost that will have to be subtracted.   
Turning next to the economy as a whole: 
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YYY BA
*** =+  
)))((()))(())(((* FT
B
BMFTFTFT
A
AM QQPQPQQPY −++−=  
)))(1()((()))(())(((* FTBMFTFTFTAM QQPQPQQPY αα −−++−=  
)))(1()((()))(())(((* FTBMFTMFTAM QQPQPQQPY αεα −−+++−=  
 
YYY Δ±=* , and since fair-trade can only increase aggregate income, YYY Δ+=*  
and so YYY −=Δ * . Some readers may find it helpful to look at the equation in terms of 
change, )()( ** BABA YYYYY +−+=Δ , so if one cares to do so, prior to touching the 
derivatives one may glance at the full change equations, and full income equation 
expansion in Appendix 3.2. 
 
FTMFTMBMFTFTFTMAM QPQPQPQPQPQPY αα +−++−=*  
 
FTMFTM QPQP
Y +−=∂
∂
α
*
     ⇒      0
*
=∂
∂
α
Y  
 
αα MMFTM
FT
PPPP
Q
Y +−+−=∂
∂*    ⇒     0
*
>∂
∂
FTQ
Y  
 
Again, as could be observed from the opening up of Farmer B’s new income, 1=α  
stands firm as the governing requisite for generating a Pareto improvement. Therefore, 
along with alpha’s irrelevance to the size of the pie as a whole, this indicates that 
preferring a value of 1=α  is the strongest welfare judgment that can be extracted from 
this model in this scenario. However, one should note that the value of FTQ  which 
maximises both Y* and AY
*  (limited in reality but not theory), is the same as that which 
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most endangers the income of Farmer B )(* BY . In theory, if 0=α  and BFT QQ = , fair-
trade could hypothetically wipe out the entire income of a non-participating producer. 
This may be just a theoretical extremity of the model, but it should nonetheless be 
enough to have fair-trade organisers and supporters pause for thought. 
 
 
3.4 SCENARIO 2: FAIR-TRADE FARMER WITH FINITE CAPACITY  
 
The purpose of this scenario is the same as for the previous section, and in addition we 
may compare the welfare movements in this scenario with the welfare changes that 
were observed in the previous one. It will be shown that a lack of production capacity 
serves to limit the potentially negative impact that fair-trade can exhibit on the excluded 
producer. The trade-off is that the condition of limited capacity will complicate matters 
for the fair-trade producer and actually expose her to a potential loss.  
As the path is longer and more winding than in the previous scenario, let us set up 
the notation and state a clear aim regarding what we desire to learn from this quantity 
arrangement.  
In the full spare capacity scenario AFT
A
FTA QQQQ
*)( =−+  and BFTBB QQQ *)( =−   
became our post fair-trade quantities. What we now want to derive are the quantity 
adjustments that relate to limited spare capacity (LC) on the part of the fair-trade 
recipient, respectively A
LCQ* , and B
LCQ* .  
A number of additional conditions that define this scenario are: 
=AQ The maximum capacity of Farmer A (full employment). Maximum capacity is, by 
definition, equal to what the farmer is already producing plus all spare capacity:    
1uQQ AA +=  
∞≠1u  1)( =≤ tAA QQ  01 >⇒ u         
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1uQQ AA −=   shaped so as  we can regard 1u  as being the pre-fair-trade unemployment 
of Farmer A. Applying further form so as to differentiate it from the previous scenario, 
limited capacity is such that the farmer is not going to be unable to fulfil her fair-trade 
production obligations without an adjustment of what they were previously producing: 
 
ntAFTA QQQ +=>+ 1)(  1uQFT >⇒  
 
This renders the condition of limited capacity binding and relevant. Note, nothing is 
being assuming as regards limiting the capacity of Farmer B. This is justified because, 
as is the case with many two agent models, the second person essentially represents 
‘everybody else’. By that measure, Farmer B represents all local farmers who miss out 
on fair-trade. He is a composite producer in the same way that microeconomics 
typically makes use of a ‘composite good’ )( ∞=∴ Bu . 
 
Commencing with the same formulation as before, a fair-trade order is placed with 
Farmer A: 
FTSDBFTA QEQQQ ˆ)( +=++  
 
The )( AFTA QQQ >+  condition dictates that this time Farmer A cannot accommodate 
the order outright without releasing some conventional orders: 
 
ConFTSDBConFTA QQEQQQQ ˆˆ)( −+=+−+  
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=ConQ  the amount of conventional sales that Farmer A ejects in order to participate in 
fair-trade. As before, the ‘circumflex variables’ are the scars of disequilibrium that must 
eventually be repatriated to the left-hand side of the equation.   
 
Maintaining the previous set up of FTQˆ , recall that FTFTFT QQQ )1(ˆ αα −+=  where 
10 ≤≤α  and FTAFT QQ =α  and FTBFT QQ =− )1( α . 
ConSDFT
B
BFT
A
ConFTA QEQQQQQQ ˆ)()( −=−+−−+  
 
For the time being let’s pretend that ConQˆ  does not exist in this model – we will return 
to it in due course. Now, in recognition of the role that uncertainty almost always plays, 
one needs to pause for thought because the scenario potentially becomes unstable. The 
sequential reasoning is this: when Farmer A ejects a quantity of conventionally priced 
produce, is the amount she opts to discard personally optimal? Optimality in this case is 
defined to be a situation in which she is left in a position of full employment. Formally, 
we wish to consider the divergent variable 2u  between the following two conditions (i) 
and (ii):  
 
 (i) AFT
A
ConFTA QQQQQ =−−+ )(  
⇒−= 1uQQ AA 1)( uQQQ FTAConFT =−−  
211 uuu =Δ+  
AFT
A
ConFTA QQQQQ =−−+ )( ⇒ 00 21 =⇒→ uu  
where 2u  is described as transitional unemployment, and it is the defining characteristic 
of (i) that 2u  resolves to be zero.  
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(ii) AFT
A
ConFTA QQQQQ <−−+ )(   ⇒  1)( uQQQ FTAConFT <−−  
)()( 11 uuQQQQQ AFT
A
ConFTA Δ+−=−−+  
2)( uQQQQQ AFT
A
ConFTA −=−−+  
 
The defining characteristic of equation (ii) is 02 ≠u .  
Specifying these two equations gives rise to a design that will facilitate a better ‘real 
world’ understanding of what certain ‘soon to be derived’ variables will represent. The 
first condition (i), is the definitional representation of theoretical optimality; precisely 
because Farmer A resolves to be in a position of full employment post the emergence of 
fair-trade )0( 12 uuu =Δ⇒= , all of her unemployment is eradicated.  
One of the key problems with tacitly assuming solution (i) is that for it to 
consciously materialise, amongst other things, Farmer A would have to possess a 
flawlessly accurate forecast of the value of FT
AQ  (i.e. know or perfectly predict the 
value of α , bearing in mind that the value of FTQ  is already known to her); only then 
would she be able to deliberately tailor her rejection of ConQ  to suit α  in such a way as 
to have herself resolve to a position of zero unemployment.  
This exposes a raw nerve of economic theory, as many would regard the blind 
importation of equation (i) to be the implicit adaptation of two very familiar scoundrels; 
perfect information and perfect rationality. However, the politeness of this model is that 
it requires neither an ostentatious denial of, nor a beleaguered bow to, either of those 
two related rascals. Rather, by actively accommodating a spectrum of rationally 
associated values, the model may be used to craft scenarios which inspect for direct and 
indirect welfare externalities with respect to an actor’s varying ability to act rationality. 
The touch of impoliteness that lingers is that there is a cumbersome overlap between 
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‘forecasting rationality’, ‘attitude to risk’, and ‘completeness of information’. This 
quandary is of course not unique to this thesis – it prevalent in a lot economic theory. 
Progressing the story, Farmer A now has to make a decision as to how much 
conventional quantity to eject. The values of AQ , FTQ  and AQ are all know to her, and 
so she bases her choice of ConQ  on her expected value of FT
AQ . Her gamble takes the 
following form:  
 
2
*)( uQQEQQQ opAFT
A
FTACon +−−+=   in which 2* uop  is a component of 2u that may or 
may not exist; the choice of notation will become clear shortly) 
 
Bearing in mind that the only two variables which Farmer A holds sway over are ConQ  
and )( FT
AQE , the next step is to measure how well Farmer A was able to anticipate the 
market adjustment. By generating the actual, minimum and maximum levels of 
transitional unemployment )( 2u , we are able to produce for comparison a number of 
solutions – how Farmer A performed in relation to how poorly or how faultlessly she 
could have performed. In undertaking this exercise we will also uncover that transitional 
unemployment is itself comprised of two different types of unemployment.  
Rearranging quantity equations (i) and (ii) generates Farmer A’s optimal and 
suboptimal choices. Taken from equation (i) it is straightforward enough to state what is 
optimal; simply, Farmer A is perfectly correct in her statement of the expected value 
variable:  
 
AFT
A
FTACon
op QQQQQ −−+=   
which is optimal because, FT
A
FT
A QQE =)( αα =⇒ )(E   
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There is no unemployment precisely because Con
op Q  may take a theoretically negative 
value. If Con
op Q  is negative, the number which is required to balance it at zero makes for 
our first indication that some transitional unemployment will be present. It is of course 
impossible for the farmer to reject a negative value. Hence, we have to make a 
distinction between theoretical optimality, which we shall keep as Con
op Q  and practical 
optimality, which we will distinguish with a star Con
op Q* . The disparity is that practical 
optimality is strictly non-negative and becomes zero whenever its theoretical 
counterpart is negative )00( * =⇒< conopConop QQ . The negative value is however highly 
relevant to this story; it represents a net stock deficit that has been created by a market 
reshuffle that has fallen strongly in favour of the non-fair-trade farmer (high alpha):  
 
0<∂
∂
α
Con
opQ  
 
When Con
op Q is negative, it depicts the amount of unemployment that Farmer A will 
have to contend with even if she is flawlessly accurate in her gamble on alpha. In 
practical terms, something must be added to Con
op Q  so as to minimise its value at zero. 
In essence, what gets added is a component of transitional unemployment; let us state it 
as uop*  (the choice of notation will be explained shortly): 
 
AFT
A
FTACon
op QQQQQ −−+=  
 
uQQQQQ opAFT
A
FTACon
op ** +−−+=  
0<∀ ConopQ    ⇒  0* =+ uQ opConop  
0≥∀ ConopQ    ⇒  0* =uop  ⇒  conopconop QQ *=  
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This permits us to construct the real value of the rejected quantity. We simply replace 
the actual value of FT
AQ  with an expected (gambled) value: 
 
2
*)( uQQEQQQ opAFT
A
FTACon +−−+=  
AFT
A
FTACon
op QQEQQQu ++−−= )(2*  
Evidently, uu op*2≥  because uop*  is best that Farmer A can do. 
 
Amongst other things, that there is a difference between theoretical and practical values 
informs us that ‘part’ of Farmer A’s unemployment comes about through no fault of her 
own. This means that we cannot just look at ‘unemployment’ as one entity and cite that 
as the parameter by which Farmer A’s rational response is measured. Rather, we must 
analytically separate the proportion of unemployment for which the farmer is directly 
responsible from that which she has no control over. The only feasible place for the 
remaining element of unemployment to hide is inside )( FT
AQE , and this will be 
extracted shortly. In order to first gain an overview of that what we intend to extract, let 
us define three types of transitional unemployment.  
Theoretically Optimal Unemployment: AFT
A
FTACon
opop QQQQQu ++−−=2 .  Bound 
by the balancing possibility of con
opQ being negative, this will always be zero, hence it is 
simply a control variable. Following previous notation, Practical Optimal 
Unemployment: AFT
A
FTACon
opop QQQQQu ++−−=*2* . Bound by the lower cap of zero 
that is embedded in con
OpQ* , and evident from the condition, 0<∀ ConopQ  ⇒  
0* =+ uQ opConop , when conopQ  is negative, its value will be inversely mirrored by 
Practical Optimal Unemployment 2
* uop . 2
* uop  can be described as being the 
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unemployment that is not the fault of the fair-trade farmer; it is the best she can expect 
irrespective of her own abilities. In other words, this unemployment stems only from 
what Farmer A would regard as being a painful market reshuffle (high alpha), and has 
nothing whatsoever to do with her ability to anticipate the market reshuffle.  
 
FT
op
Qu =∂
∂
α
2    02 >∂
∂
α
uop  
 
The additional component of 2u  may therefore be referred to as Fault Based 
Unemployment )( uF . This is the unemployment that results solely and directly from the 
fair-trade farmer making an inaccurate gamble on the market reshuffle (underestimation 
of alpha). We can discover its hiding place and define it by opening up the only variable 
where Farmer A can be at fault, )( A
AQE : 
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It is the addition of Fault Based Unemployment to Practical Optimal Unemployment 
that generates Total Transitional Unemployment:  
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It is therefore plain enough to see that uQQQQQ opAFT
A
FTACon
op ** +−−+=  is optimal 
precisely because ⇒Conop Q*  FTAFTA QQE =)( ⇒  0=uF , and thus by definition Conop Q*  
implies that none of the resulting unemployment is the fault of the farmer; in practice it 
is the best she can do.  
So that Fault Based Unemployment and the assumption behind it is clearly 
understood, let us define a suboptimal outcome as so: FT
A
FT
A QQE <)( αα <⇒ )(E , 
which dictates that uF  is present by definition. This also imposes the assumption of ‘no 
overestimation’. This is justified as the application of αα >)(E  might give rise to an 
untenable condition of AA
LC QQ >* . Admittedly, reality may differ, and this assumption 
is placed here mainly to assist with the flow of the story; later, in its own sub-scenario, 
it shall be relaxed.  
 
For reasons that require some elaboration, Fault Based Unemployment is indicative 
of naivety and/or risk averseness, and/or completeness of information. To say the least, 
the relationship between these entities seldom affords the smoothest of engagements, 
and here is no exception. In terms of this model, the most intuitively friendly way to 
deal with this problem of entanglement comes via a description of what might be aptly 
referred to as the tyranny of zero in respect to )( A
AQE . When 0=− uQ FFTA , under 
present assumptions, uF  is maximised, and we can read from this either ‘extreme risk 
averseness’ and/or ‘pure naivety’, or some weighted combination of the two. That is to 
say, we may choose to say that the farmer is possibly very short-sighted and so 
anticipates no repercussions in the form of the FT
AQ  market adjustment (naivety). 
Alternatively, she does actually expect some repercussion from FT
AQ , but is too anxious 
about damaging her commercial reputation to risk accepting more orders than she can 
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fulfil, and so hedges the safest bet she could possibly make (extreme risk averseness). 
To summarise, under the condition of no overestimation, pure naivety and/or extreme 
risk averseness is associated with low and inaccurate gambles on alpha.  
Quantitatively, variables are what they are. Opinions may however differ in respect 
of descriptive interpretations. How one chooses to interpret certain interactive variables 
in this model is relevant to the overall message of this chapter. With the aim of 
breathing further life into this economic fairytale, let us indulge some of the reasoning 
that underpins how it is proposed we extract meaning from the fault based variable.  
Consider the following arrangement; it is the vice of a world dominated by 
probabilities that one may simultaneously be ‘statistically correct’ in the moment, but 
‘outcome incorrect’ in a later moment – rational but wrong. In addition, ‘willingness to 
risk’ automatically implies neither success nor failure, whereas the term ‘rational action’ 
does carry with it a general air of success – at least, what one may refer to as ‘statistical 
ex-ante success’. It is indeed the difference between ‘realised success’ and ‘statistically 
ex-ante (best response) success that culminates in failure’ which generates the problem 
of declaring an agent’s actions to be either rational or irrational. Furthermore, while 
‘incomplete information’ feeds into the picture as regards both naivety and the person’s 
willingness to risk, ‘incomplete information’ is itself a separate variable (or set of 
variables) from a person’s actual ability to comprehend ‘the extent to which’ 
information is actually incomplete, and thereafter factor that piece of information into 
their willingness to engage in risk. Furthermore, an agent’s ability to act rationally also 
takes into account that person’s ability to minimise the degree to which information is 
incomplete. The social linguistic default is to fall back on terms such as shrewd, 
intelligent, astute etc. Therefore, when one employs vocabulary such as this, one is 
often inadvertently talking about ‘a bundled variable’ that embodies any possible 
combination of a person’s social and cognitive ability, and their willingness to 
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undertake a risk based on how confident they are in their abilities in relation to the 
relative punishments (costs) and rewards.  
The problem of analytical separation is not the aspiration of this thesis; we must 
however generate some practical ground upon which to stand, and coupling Paul 
Samuelsson’s well renowned concepts of stated and revealed preference, with an ‘ex-
ante – ex-post’ distinction of rationality cements partially an avenue down which we 
may proceed. An imperfect but helpful illustration of this can be made via a thoughtful 
comparison of how differently the world passes judgement upon an 
entrepreneur/investor who risks his own capital, and alternatively how it judges a 
forecasting technocrat. This is an imperfect illustration because these are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive agent categories. Nonetheless, some may find this depiction helpful; 
an entrepreneur/investor is predominately judged by ‘ex-post revealed rationality’ – the 
actual outcome of the performance. A technocrat on the other hand, while not being 
fully immune to judgement by ex-post revealed rationality, is relatively sheltered from it 
by way of a tendency for the world to judge him via ‘ex-ante stated rationality.’ The 
following real world example illustrates this. While he considers himself a philosopher 
in the tradition of Karl Popper, theoretical academia does not look particularly seriously 
upon George Soros (at least not in a scientific publishing sense); the real world on the 
other hand looks upon his achievements, not least for their consistency, with outright 
awe. For Nobel laureates Merton and Scholes, the opposite is largely the case (see 
Ferguson 2008 and Lowenstein 2001). Technocratic failure is the quintessence of the 
‘statistically correct but outcome incorrect circumstance’ – the ‘rational but wrong’ 
paradox. An entrepreneur/investor may also be rational but wrong, yet the sympathy of 
the paradox is not typically extended to them. In essence, part of what I am seeking to 
describe is the classical insight of Keynes, that even if markets [eventually] tend to 
rational outcomes, still, “markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain 
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solvent”. Furthermore, on commenting upon why men as eminent and intelligent as the 
likes of Irving Fisher came so undone in 1929, Galbraith elegantly articulates a 
component of the point I am trying to make, “Wisdom, itself is often an abstraction 
associated not with fact or reality but with the man who asserts it and the manner of its 
assertion……often in our culture, it is far, far better to be wrong in a respectable way 
than to be right for the wrong reasons” (1975 pp.100-109). To bind that to the paradox 
that I am seeking to describe, we might add that ‘luck’ (i.e. randomness) is a ‘wrong’ or 
at least ‘scientifically illegitimate’ reason to be right. 
Under the strictest definition of the term, is it even a paradox? Outside of 
pretentious abstractions it probably is not; it merely carries the conceited appearance of 
one (see Taleb 2004).  
At first glance, one could argue that this simply boils down to an exposure of 
personal risk and the agents’ related attitude to risk. The businessman gambles, the 
technocrat does not. Therefore, personal attitude to risk is not something that the 
technocrat need actively factor into his predictions – for the most part, his is more of a 
sportsman’s bet. A somewhat light and partial dent in such reasoning is that one could 
argue that the technocrat does gamble; he gambles with the value of his reputation (i.e. 
risks the future market value of his labour – not that failure does not pay; indeed (at 
times quite handsomely) it does through its association with ‘experience’. Taking that 
into account, it is perhaps not so much ‘the explicit exposure to risk’, but more the 
different degree to which each is personally insulated from the consequences of their 
failure. The technocrat has up his sleeve a number of legitimate ‘get out of jail for free’ 
cards – stochastic elements, black swans, exogenous shocks, and (the economist’s 
Newtonian darling) ceteris paribus. The entrepreneur/investor may also have justifiable 
reasons for failure, yet the curse of being judged ex-post is that those reasons, however 
legitimate, will for the most part pass the eye of the beholder relatively unnoticed. Even 
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in the peculiar event of the entrepreneur’s failure being formalised and communicated, 
it is still highly unlikely that the wider body of society would care to entertain them. 
Commercial society would generally encode them as excuses and misfortune, and the 
unforgiving temperament of ‘main street’ is such that ‘excuses’ are often heard but 
seldom listened to, as they generally play a distant second fiddle to material 
accomplishments. Therefore, while making allowances for definitional difficulties, the 
farmers in this model are businessmen, hence their abilities to act rationally shall be 
judged by the criterion of ‘revealed ex-post’ – the commercial actor’s ability is what he 
achieves in reality, not what he would have liked to have achieved but did not have the 
zest, ability or information to do so. 
Returning focus to the analytics of the story that is being told, one of the ‘rationality 
variables’ that this text has been endeavouring to describe has already been generated. 
The aim of the above discussion was to try to give an appropriate name to the action 
which generates Farmer A’s Fault Based Unemployment )( uF . At a first glace, 
‘forecasting ability’ seems to stand out as being an appropriate term. However, with all 
due respect to Milton Friedman’s infamous pool player (1953), a term such as 
‘forecasting ability’ is too clinical to accommodate reality (these are farmers not 
physicists). Also, Friedman’s pool player pays adequate respect to neither randomness 
nor the attitude to risk that is embodied in the variable. In line with the above 
discussion, the term of choice is ‘revealed foresight’. uF  informs about the ‘revealed 
foresight’ of Farmer A and captures her miscalculations and preference for risk in such 
a way that is clean of the influence of the unemployment we associate with the market 
reshuffle. Uncertainty is always present, yet as this is a deterministic module we cannot 
mop it up in the way a scholastic model attempts. We can however be candid in 
emphasising the existence of uncertainty, thereafter hypothesising that, as uF  is ‘a 
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revealed gamble’, the degree of randomness is captured in agents’ attitudes towards 
risk, and in turn be sufficiently pragmatic about any interpretations we seek to extract. 
The further uF  is from zero, the weaker the ‘revealed foresight’ of the agent. In 
adherence to the previous description, revealed foresight is a form of ‘ex-post 
rationality,’ whereas ‘stated foresight’ is a form of ‘ex-ante rationality’. As a point of 
academic interest, the ex-ante variable, albeit latent, is theoretically clean of the 
influence of a person’s attitude towards risk. However, no extrapolation of this is going 
to take place here, because, for reasons that have been argued above, the concern of 
welfare ultimately boils down to that what is revealed, and that is what we are sticking 
with. The current picture appears as so: 
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This is the point at which ConQˆ  can be reintegrated into the model, as the next step is to 
see who gets to take it. There is of course a chance that it may not even exist; its 
existence depends entirely on ConQ  because that is the practical value to which it is 
equated )ˆ( ConCon QQ = . So long as ConQˆ exists, solving the problem of who gets it first 
depends on who wants it. Farmer A is only interested in acquiring it if 2u exists in her 
quantity equation. If 2u does not exist, Farmer B is free to take it, and the story is settled 
as so: 
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The above formulation materialises if the market readjustment has been relatively kind 
to Farmer A (low alpha), and if Farmer A has acted optimally with respect to placing an 
accurate gamble on alpha (no Fault Based Unemployment). These two events imply that 
she will then not care what happens to ConQˆ , and so Farmer B is left unopposed to take 
it all:  
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LC
FT
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The above might seem an overly simplistic ending, but it does nonetheless provide an 
intuitively friendly visualisation from which to progress the story and view less 
simplistic endings. Despite being permitted to swallow up all of ConQˆ into his quantity 
equation, Farmer B is not better off, because by acting optimally Farmer A has tailored 
the value of ConQˆ  such that it is smaller than it would otherwise have been had she 
underestimated the value of alpha. Formally, under the assumption of no 
overestimation ))(( αα ≤E :  
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We know already that Farmer B gets hurt as alpha decreases, but here it is very 
important to remind oneself that ‘real alpha’ is determined by the market, whereas 
)(αE  is consciously selected by Farmer A. Therefore, as the choice of ConQ  approaches 
optimality for Farmer A, the overall quantity equation will be associated with a larger 
‘expected value’ of alpha – not necessarily a larger value of real alpha. However, unless 
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Farmer A is extremely risk averse and/or randomness reigns supreme (which it may), 
one would expect there to be some sort of causal link that flows fromα  to )(αE . 
Next it is necessary that we contend with the less benign, but more interesting, set-
up that materialises when Farmer A is struck by a high value of alpha, and/or if the 
farmer exercises weak revealed foresight (underestimation of alpha). We know that the 
presence of 2u  indicates that either or both of those instances have occurred.  
On realising that she is faced with some unemployment, Farmer A will try to wrestle 
back a proportion of ConQˆ , remembering of course that she can only attempt this in the 
presence of 0* >ConQ . The success of her attempt will tell us something about another 
interactive variable, namely her relative commercial strength. This can be formally 
dealt with in a manner similar to the previous partitioning of the FTQˆ  residual:  
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In plain English, Con
AQ  is what Farmer A manages to snatch back, and she can only 
accept a value within her limited given capacity. Con
BQ  is the adjusted component of the 
conventional order that Farmer B is able to capture (keep):  
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Note the change away from transitional unemployment 32 uu →  where 3u  represents 
final unemployment: 322 uuu =Δ± , because conAQu =Δ 2 .  
The question is this; how does λ  acquire its value? So far, Farmer B has been 
standing ideally by – at least ‘ideally by’ in the sense that Farmer A’s )(αE  and 
subsequent creation of ConQˆ , and alpha, are purely exogenous to him. The simultaneous 
emergence of ConQˆ  and 2u  changes this, permitting Farmer B to enter interactively into 
the game. With no hindering issues of capacity, Farmer B will of course want to keep all 
of ConQˆ , hence his optimal choice of multiplier for ConQˆ  is zero constant, 0=λB .  This 
would permit Farmer B to gain 100% of ConQˆ .   
Farmer A on the other hand wants the proportion of ConQˆ that deletes her 
unemployment. She cannot ask for more than 2u  as that would breach her capacity. 
Designed to collapse in the events of 02 =u  and/or 0ˆ =ConQ , Farmer A’s multiplier 
appears as so: 
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If she is permitted to try to rescue some of the conventional order, her optimal snatch-
back would be the proportion of ConQ that is derived by Con
A Qλ , as this is what would be 
required to place her in full employment. If 1>λA , this informs us that even acquiring 
100% of ConQˆ  would be insufficient to delete all of her unemployment. Hence, we have 
to declare a practical multiplier 11 * =⇒>∀ λλ AA , which simply dictates that the farmer 
cannot attempt to attain more than 100% of ConQˆ .  
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In seeking to declare relative commercial muscle, it’s logical to take what Farmer A 
wants, compare it to what Farmer B wants, and base a judgement of ‘market strength’ 
on the deviation from the midpoint of that range. Unlike other aspects of this model, we 
are not now looking at a friendly array of values between 0 and 1. Rather, in seeking out 
the value of true λ  we know that it must fall somewhere between 0 and λA* .  
While Farmer A wants her demand for compensation to be equal to zero, what she 
wants separately from the actual compensation variable )(λ , is that it equals her 
demand for compensation – which will only be zero if she has acted with perfect 
revealed foresight, and if the market reshuffle has not been too harsh on her. Farmer B 
does of course not want Farmer A’s demand for compensation to be zero. On the 
contrary, he wants Farmer A’s demand for ConQˆ  to be as high as possible, and thereafter 
for his counterpart to be unsuccessful in her attempt to summon up any compensation. 
To deal with this, and to measure who gets closest to what they want in the battle for 
ConQˆ , it is necessary to set up a neutral variable. Because Farmer B wants everything, 
this neutral variable can be shown to be equal to exactly half of what Farmer A wants:  
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If λλ n= , the tug-of-war is a stalemate; other things being equal, the players 
demonstrate identical pulls such that each ends up with a Con
n Qˆλ  proportion of ConQˆ . 
Therefore, in order to gauge the relative commercial strengths of our two players, we 
need to know how distant from, and in what direction, ‘true lambda’ deviates from 
neutral lambda:  
 
  ψλλ +=n       { }0, === λλλλ BMinAMax  
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The sign and size of ψ  captures precisely this. A negative value of ψ  indicates relative 
success for Farmer B, while a positive value shows that the balance is tipped in favour 
of what Farmer A wants. { }0, == λλλ MinAMax  specifies the range of values that ψ  can as 
a discrete variable legitimately take: 
λλψ n−=  
λλψλλ nAMaxAMax −=⇒= **    
λψλλ nMinBMin =−⇒== 0   { }λψλλψ nMinnAMax =−−= ,  
 
As is always the case with qualitative information that is condensed to a number, the 
‘real world’ description of ψ  is open to some debate. While the argument is not as stark 
as that what might take place over the qualitative description of how fault based 
unemployment )( uF  is generated, for the purists amongst us, descriptions might be 
considered to be delicate. For instance, because an explicit bet does not have to be 
placed in order to reveal ψ , attitude towards risk appears far less serious an ingredient 
than it might perceivably be in uF . But, the generation of ψ  still comes via a 
commercial act, and so it would seem tenuous to state blankly that attitude to risk is 
entirely absent from the fold. As for the ‘ability to act rationality’ and ‘related 
foresight’, these must play some role. However, given that ψ  represents the outcome of 
commercial battle, and uF  is the derived product of personal revealed ability to forecast 
and gamble, perhaps this just reinforces the sensibility of reasoning that rationality is 
not a ‘one size fits all’ shoe. Is it not telling that one could make a near identical 
statement as regards human intelligence – is it the ability to memorise, is it the ability to 
create, is it the ability to adapt, is it the ability to predict etc?  
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The form of rationality that is embedded in uF  is more the pre-calculated sort, the 
type that traditional economics is most accustomed to thinking about, whereas ψ  
probably captures more of what might be described as being socially adaptive 
rationality remember it’s the outcome of a human based commercial battle. Truly, in 
some shape or form, we are, with uF  and (perhaps more so with) ψ , peering into a 
realm of animal spirits that are not yet fully understood – nor for that matter may they 
ever be. With more humble aims, we are simply trying to generate variables that 
partially capture ‘a representation’ of various animal spirits and abilities, and thereafter 
examining for changes in welfare with respect to them.  
On the back of that understanding, the intuitive argument of this discourse is that the 
predominance of ψ ’s value is representative of ‘relative commercial prowess between 
agents’. ψ  is taken as an indicator of business acumen; simply, the closer it is to ψMin , 
the better a businessperson is Farmer A relative to Farmer B. Note that corrupt dealings 
within the system are not precluded, as the cloaking and cloaked presence of corruption 
with respect to market interactions may very well be an authentic part of what makes a 
businessperson thrive – the legitimacy of illegitimacy, if you will. Equally, being 
relative rather than absolute, a low value of ψ  could imply weak commercial skills on 
the part of Farmer B. While conventional reasoning might suggest that the opposite 
situation is largely maintained, outside of such reasoning one may consider that looking 
at it the other way around (closeness to 0=λB ), possibly leaves the door ajar to a few 
of the more temperamental elements of human behaviour. One aspect in particular 
worth mentioning might aptly be labelled ‘market stubbornness’ on the part of the 
buyer. This can be described as, other things being equal, the previously rejected buyer 
might exhibit a degree of favouritism to Farmer B over Farmer A because the latter has 
already disrupted him by previously turning away orders; or perhaps even as a point of 
hostility to fair-trade itself. Nonetheless, while market stubbornness (agent revenge) 
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may carry with it a personal utility value, one would speculate that the price a 
commercial trader is willing to pay for it is not particularly high – a smile upon one’s 
face does not put food upon one’s plate; it’s generally the other way around. Hence we 
largely reasons that ψ  is a sound enough indicator for ‘relative business prowess’ alone. 
Piecing together what has so far been woven, unlike the full spare capacity scenario 
where AFT
A
FTA QQQQ
*)( =−+  and BFTBB QQQ *)( =−  became our post fair-trade 
quantities, the condition of limited spare capacity has given rise to a slightly different 
arrangement, expressed as A
LCQ*  and B
LCQ* . Thus: 
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As the quantity derivatives contain no surprises or properties more insightful than those 
of the unlimited capacity scenario, we may simply transplant these new quantities into 
their respective post fair-trade income identities. 
Farmer A’s new income appears as so:  
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Farmer B’s new income appears as so: 
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Putting these two together provides us with the new post fair-trade income for the whole 
local economy: 
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Appendices 3.3 to 3.6 respectively detail the full expansions of the quantity and income 
equations of each farmer. Using what we now have, we may generate, and select for 
comparison, a number of welfare movements, looking firstly at incomes with respect to 
the quantity of fair-trade: 
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This underlines the non-zero-sum trade-off that was observed in the limited spare 
capacity scenario. Again, as with unlimited capacity, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is met, 
and the aggregate of the local economy will grow, yet changes in the quantity of fair-
trade will not necessarily result in a Pareto improvement. We again observe the cardinal 
role of alpha in relation to Pareto improvements. As was the case in the unlimited 
capacity scenario, as alpha increases, Farmer B becomes increasingly sheltered from a 
negative effect. Again the exchange is zero-sum, the aggregate is constant. However, 
the possibility of the fair-trade farmer acting with weak revealed foresight dictates that 
0=α  is no longer a necessary and sufficient condition for the generation of a Pareto 
improvement. This does of course constitute one of the key differences between limited 
and unlimited capacity scenarios, as by way of a commercial battle, the latter scenario 
opens a zero-sum transfer window by which Pareto receives a second chance:  
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Cross-referencing these values against changes with respect to the quantity that Farmer 
A chooses to reject moves us towards a more complete picture which illustrates the 
possibility of lambda restoring fair-trade as a Pareto improvement:  
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It can therefore be seen that the relationship between Farmer A’s rejected adjustment 
quantity and the incomes of both farmers hinges on the result of a tug-of-war over what 
Farmer A mistakenly rejects. Hence, poor foresight will harm Farmer A only if she is a 
relatively weak commercial actor (sufficiently low ψ ) because if λλ =A* , Farmer A 
will then have compensated herself and won back everything that she mistakenly gave 
away. Furthermore, if she wins that battle at a value of 1=α , fair-trade will be Pareto 
improving. If she does not win that battle, 1=α  implies that fair-trade will not then 
result in a Pareto improvement. The other side of the coin is that, for values of 1<α , 
fair-trade can still be Pareto improving, so long as Farmer A has not acted with perfect 
revealed foresight (i.e. the farmer mistakenly rejected something he should not have 
rejected) and Farmer B is able to exercise superior commercial prowess.  
 
 
3.5 A NUMERIC EXAMPLE OF FAIR-TRADE HURTING ITS FARMER 
 
As one may have already deduced, the most perverse result to come out of this model is 
that there exists the possibility for fair-trade to negatively affect the participating 
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producer while simultaneously increasing the income of non-participating producers. 
Given that this is our most stark finding, it is perhaps worthwhile to illustrate it with a 
numeric example of this extremity. All it takes for this adverse response to materialise is 
for the fair-trade farmer to feel her capacity constraint, the market to then offer a harsh 
reshuffle (high alpha), the fair-trade farmer to exercise poor foresight, and finally for the 
farmer to possess very weak commercial strength. Formally, 1=α 0=λ . 
100=AQ     The farmer has the capacity to produce 100 
90=AQ    He is operating 10% below capacity, hence 101 ==− uQQ AA ; original 
unemployment (spare capacity) 1uQQ AA =−  
10=MP  At a market price of 10, the pre fair-trade revenue of Farmer A stands at 
900=ALCY ; to ensure an equal starting point let us grant Farmer B the same revenue. 
12=FTP  The fair-trade price is set at 2 above the market price. 
20=FTQ     A fair-trade order is placed, which exceeds the farmers capacity by 10% 
9.0=α        The market produces a painful reshuffle,  
189.0 =⇒= FTAQα  The value of the market reshuffle implies that Farmer A will 
experience a drop of 18 units when the market adjusts. 
2)(1.0)( =⇒= FTAQEE α  implies that through risk averseness and/or poor revealed 
foresight the farmer is only prepared for a reshuffle of 2.  
8*2
* =−−−+= AFTAconOpFTAop QQQQQu  dictates that 8 units of unemployment are 
generated solely via the market reshuffle. The weakness of her foresight is such that she 
is going to drop 16 units, when she should actually drop none; 
=− )( FTAFTA QEQ 16=uF . 16 further units of unemployment have come about as a 
result of the farmer’s personal risk averseness and/or poor revealed foresight. 
Therefore, 242
* ==+ uuu Fop  i.e. total transitional unemployment stands at 24, which is 
a net increase of 14 from the original level.  
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8−=−−+= AFTAFTAConop QQQQQ  displays that the theoretically optimal quantity to 
reject is – 8, the fact that it is negative implies that, even if Farmer A acts optimally, she 
will still be left with 8 units of unemployment. Therefore, in advance we know 82
* =uop , 
a number which is obtainable in negative form from 
AFT
A
con
Op
FTA
op QQQQQu −−−+= *2* . From this we deduce that the ‘optimal practical’ 
value for Farmer A to reject is zero )0(* =conOpQ  because Conop Q  is negative. 
From having pieced together the various levels of foresight and related unemployment, 
we know that the farmer foolishly rejected 16 conventional units, 
16)(ˆ 2
* =++−−+== uuQQQQQQ FopAFTAFTAconcon , when she should have rejected 
none. These 16 units are now floating. Because her unemployment (spare capacity) 
stands at 24, Farmer A wants more than what is available, 5.1100
100/ˆ
2
==⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
λAConQ
u
. 
Hence, in practical terms, her demand multiplier becomes 1 because 11 * =⇒> λλ AA . 
As a composite player, Farmer B has a fixed multiplier in which he wants to take all of 
what is floating, hence, the neutral variable λn , is 0.5, or half of what Farmer A wants 
and therefore ψλ += 5.0 . Keeping to the appropriate available ranges 
{ }0, === λλλλ BMinAMax  and { }λψλλψ nMinnAMax =−−= , , let us set Farmer A as being an 
extremely weak commercial actor; ψ  takes its minimum value of –0.5, and λ  
automatically assumes its minimum value of zero.   
Putting these numbers together provides the sought-after illustration, for example:  
 
Farmer A’s income has moved from 900=AM QP  to  
800* =++−−= FTFTConAMFTAMConMAMALC QPQPQPQPQPY  
Farmers B’s income has moved from 900=BM QP  to 
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1040* =−++−= ConMConMFTMFTMBMBLC QPQPQPQPQPY λα  
 
The non-participating agent has gained at the expense of the fair-trade agent. The gains 
of the gainer are greater than the losses of the loser (Kaldor passed), but the loser cannot 
profitably bribe the winner to oppose the change (Hicks failed). Holding the ‘rational 
indicators’ at the same level, the only way to prevent a negative income impact with the 
same numbers would be for the fair-trade price to be considerably greater than the 
market price. Yet, as the reader may have noted, the margin of generosity was 
substantial in that, the fair-trade premium of this example was 20% above the market 
price. This numerical example has hopefully fulfilled the purpose of bringing the 
equations to life. 
 
 
3.6 RELAXING THE ASSUMPTION OF NO OVERESTIMATION IN THE 
MODEL  
 
For the sake of trying to smooth the edges of this story, let us now relax the assumption 
of ‘no overestimation’ on the part of Farmer A and examine what welfare arrangements 
this might give rise to. Recall the equation which depicts the amount that Farmer A 
discards in order to participate in fair-trade: AFT
A
FTACon QQEQQQ −−+= )( . 
Optimality of this identity was previously defined to be when FT
A
FT
A QQE =)(  which, as 
FTQ  is known, implies αα =)(E .  
Therefore the optimal rejection appears as AFTFTACon
op QQQQQ −−+= α .  
What ‘overestimation’ generates is FT
A
FT
A QQE >)(  αα >⇒ )(E . 
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Employing a northwest superscript ‘OE’ to indicate that we are now in the realm of 
overestimation, and letting Θ  represent the amount by which the farmer overshot, 
formally:  
 
Θ+=αα )(EOE , 
AFT
A
FTACon
OE QQQQQ −Θ+−+= )(  
AFT
A
FTACon
OE QQQQQ −Θ−−+=  
Con
OP
Con
OE QQ <∴  
 
This gives rise to Θ+= AALC QQ*  which is an untenable condition. The instability 
means that Farmer A must subsequently again eject a certain quantity. Ideally she would 
like to eject exactly Θ  quantity, however scorned buyers might punish her. Let Ω  be 
the exogenous punishment coefficient )1( ≥Ω  whereby trading partners potentially 
penalise Farmer A for trying to accept an order of more than she can accommodate. If it 
assumes a value of one, then the buyer (market) opts not penalise her, or else a 
punishment coefficient such as Ω  simply does not exist. So:  
 
ΩΘ−Θ+=ΩΘ− AALC QQ*  
 
Transplanting this into Farmer A’s income equation yields the following outcomes: 
 
))(())((* FTFTCon
A
FT
A
ConAMA
LC QPQQQQPY +ΩΘ−+−−=  
FTFTMCon
A
MFT
A
MConMAMA
LC QPPQPQPQPQPY +ΩΘ−+−−=*  
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Ω−=Θ∂
∂
M
A
LC
PY
*
  Θ−=Ω∂
∂
M
A
LC
PY
*
 
 
Mirroring this with the addition to Farmer B (i.e. performing the move that is necessary 
to maintain the original quantity equilibrium), should give rise to a transfer in which 
Farmer B will be the zero-sum beneficiary of the market’s decision to punish farmer A: 
 
))((* ΩΘ++−= ConBFTBBMBLC QQQPY  
)(* ΩΘ++−= MConBMFTBMBMBLC PQPQPQPY  
 
Ω=Θ∂
∂
M
B
LC
PY
*
  Θ=Ω∂
∂
M
A
LC
PY
*
  
 
This is what one would expect i.e. if the market decides to punish Farmer A for 
rejecting too small a conventional quantity, Farmer B benefits to the tune of a 
straightforward transfer. It should be noted that it is not being asserted that a 
punishment entity such as Ω  definitely exists, just that it might. Interestingly, if it does 
not exist, then the rational farmer should always overestimate by rejecting too small a 
ConQ  quantity. One possibility might be that the punishment variable materialises above 
a certain threshold, as buyers will tolerate a small degree of overestimation before they 
choose to penalise their suppliers. The reader should of course use their own intuition 
and/or empirical knowledge regarding the existence of any such variable. The relevance 
of its existence is that we have identified another avenue by which fair-trade can 
potentially hurt a participating farmer. Equally, and perhaps more realistically in terms 
of net welfare movements, we have identified another channel of compensation by 
which a positive or negative externality can be diluted.  
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In drawing this tale of two farmers to a close, it’s worth remembering that one of the 
key aims of this model was to try to facilitate a better overview for the policymaker. In 
assistance of that objective, Appendix 3.6 offers a tabled summary describing each 
variable and the welfare effect associated with it, and comments briefly upon the scope 
for intervention. It must be mentioned that, intuitively, the scope for intervention 
appears rather limited, or at least in need of some strong imagination.  
 
 
3.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We are presented with a somewhat mixed picture to try to summarise. Under the 
condition of constant supply and demand, the results cannot be described as being 
wholly unfavourable to fair-trade, nor can they be described as unreservedly positive.  
Under the conditions of this model, in all scenarios fair-trade uplifts the local 
producer economy at the aggregate level. Yet a number of surprises have been 
unearthed as regards the externalities faced by non-participants. While fair-trade may 
well increase the welfare of those who are selected to participate, the concept potentially 
presides over a number of zero-sum transfers. In some instances it will culminate in 
changes that satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. While a Pareto Improvement might be 
difficult to navigate, fair-trade does exhibit the possibility of generating one. An 
interesting offshoot is that, under certain conditions, fair-trade may theoretically destroy 
the entire income of non-participants. This is an extreme outcome, the occurrence of 
which is not being predicted as likely; it is merely stated that it can hypothetically occur. 
It is the scenario of limited spare capacity that grants us our cardinal strike against 
conventional wisdom. When this scenario is conjoined with a farmer being a weak 
predictor of market adjustments and thereafter exhibiting poor business acumen, it can 
be shown that accepting a fair-trade order may actually reduce the welfare of the fair-
 182
trade participant. The level of damage fluctuates depending on the various combinations 
of these two stated weaknesses, but may receive some mitigation if the fair-trade mark-
up is substantially greater than the market price. However, even if the fair-trade farmer 
suffers this blow, there is no loss to the local aggregate economy; one for one, the gains 
simply end up in the pockets of other local producers. Again, the claim is not that this 
will take place, just that it theoretically can. This should cause organisers to pause for 
thought, but, perverse as it possibly sounds, it should not necessarily diminish the 
enthusiasm of those consumers who monetarily support the concept of fair-trade; they 
will still be assisting a group of producers who are quite feasibly just as disadvantaged 
as those they thought they were helping.  
It is worth noting that without knowing who is better off to begin with, we cannot 
say outright whether fair-trade increases or decreases income inequality between 
producers. Interestingly, even if we were to know who was better off to begin with, the 
adverse corners of this model serve to inform us that such information is necessary, but 
not sufficient, to make a declaration about what fair-trade bodes for local income 
inequality. It has the ability to either smooth or aggravate it, in favour of either the 
participant or the excluded producer.   
A number of interesting variables have surfaced in this model. Quantitatively, they 
are what they are, but qualitatively, interpretations of them have been presented. 
Obviously I stand by my own interpretations or else I would not have made them. Still, 
if the reader chose to impose different interpretations of α and ψ , I do not believe that 
would lead to the central objective of this paper being lost. In particular, even if one 
where to apply randomness to them, the central contribution of having identified the 
quantitative placement of these variables would not suffer a loss of relevance, as an 
inspection of welfare changes with respect to them would be no less worthy an 
endeavour. 
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By uncloaking a number of theoretical tradeoffs, it is hoped that this model will 
permit the policymaker to have a clearer vantage point in respect of the welfare 
tradeoffs in which they may be dabbling. My intuition however is that many of the 
relevant variables appear to be beyond the direct control of one who would seek to 
intervene.  
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Chapter IV 
Empirical evidence from South Africa  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND: FAIRHILLS PROJECT 
 
This chapter represents an attempt to piece together systematic evidence relating to the 
impacts of fair-trade on landless labourers.  
The Fairhills project stands as one of the largest FLO-accredited endeavours. The 
project is based in and around a picturesque collection of Western Cape wine lands 
situated approximately 80 to 100 km northeast of Cape Town in South Africa’s 
Breedekloof region. The venture is a collaboration between Origin Wine Ltd and Du 
Toitskloof Wine Cellar. At the time of data gathering, the scheme covered 14 of the 22 
grape producing farms that sell to Du Toitskloof. From its participating producers, Du 
Toitskloof divides fair-trade with proportional equality by which 35% of each farm’s 
contribution becomes fair-trade certified wine. Taken together, this amounts to over 900 
hectares under vines, from which 10 million litres of FLO-qualified wine is extracted, 
across which the livelihoods of over 800 people (250 families) are potentially touched 
for the better. Initial FLO certification only took place in 2005, hence when it comes to 
evaluating developmental impact, one must take care to harbour ‘appropriately realistic’ 
expectations.  
In its initial year (2005) the project gave rise to three day care facilities that were 
together run by 24 full time employees who were themselves subject to a number of 
capacity building programmes. Included in this was the assurance that a general 
practitioner would be on hand to provide support for day care operations, plus the 
purchase of a project bus to help facilitate community endeavours such as sports days. 
To this it might be added that one of the main points of mild envy to surface from non 
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fair-trade workers was their disappointment at not being able to participate in such 
activities. 
The consecutive year of the project (2006) bore witness to the construction of 
community centres, and the implementation of an adult literacy program and farm 
management course. In addition, a small craft co-operative was established, a housing 
renovation programme gathered pace, and extra-curricular activities such as sports, 
women’s and youth clubs, were more formally integrated. 
In its third year (2007), the project appeared to divert energies towards the activities 
of ‘capacity building’ that had taken root in the previous year. This included the birth of 
a humble library, a computer literacy initiative, the introduction of a bursary 
(scholarship) programme and training in matters of personal finance. Also, there was the 
appointment of a psychologist to help with perennial blights such as alcoholism and 
domestic violence. Word of mouth indicated that substance abuse had indeed much 
declined over the duration of the project. This we must take as anecdotal, to try to 
corroborate it with hard data is not a feature of this paper.   
At the time of our inspection, the project had set itself a number of further goals, 
including purchasing its own land, constructing a medical clinic, expanding the bursary 
program, and acquiring additional motor vehicles for transport. 
The generalised standards that govern the project are those that relate to FLO’s 
“Generic Fairtrade Standards for Hired Labour15”. Naturally, efforts are of course made 
to adhere to the broader FINE definition (see general introduction p.13), and by its own 
admission, FLO’s standards draw heavily from the internationally recognised standards 
and conventions of the ILO (see in particular ILO Convention 110). In rare instances 
where national legislation sets higher standards than those of FLO, those rules default to 
                                                 
15http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/Generic_Fairtrade_Standard_HL_Dec_2007_E
N.pdf 
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be the fair-trade standards. The plus is that, through certification inspections, the fair-
trade system possibly plugs a gap in enforcement that the state can probably not feasibly 
fill. 
In terms of ownership, the workers ‘as a communal body’ own 25% of the label-
brand that they are involved in, though let it be stressed that this is not 25% of the land. 
Each bottle of fair-trade wine receives a premium of 0.7 South African rand, all of 
which is to be somehow invested into the community.  
Now, the primary concern of this discourse is ‘outcome’ as opposed to definitional 
process or actual enforcement, and that permits us to avoid a protracted discussion of 
legal matters – an area in which others are more qualified. For the kind of analysis we 
are undertaking, one of the first questions which springs to mind should be, “is the data 
randomised?” Regrettably, it would be somewhat fraudulent to claim pure 
randomisation of this data, however we can legitimately claim that it is not too distant 
from being random. It is random in that we imposed no selection criteria and refused no 
appropriate participant, that is to say, our selection procedure was itself essentially 
random. The impurity that lingers is that, by default, every poll and survey suffers from 
the implication that the sample consists exclusively of those ‘who consent’ to be 
surveyed. Particularly true in respect of non fair-trade workers, procuring access did at 
times bear many of the hallmarks of diplomatic adventure, and while no farm workers 
declined to participate, some farmers did turn down our requests for access to their 
workers. There are other practical constraints on randomness, for example the time of 
year that a survey like this can take place precludes all but the least busy times of the 
harvest cycle. Hence we may miss a number of migrant labourers – the winter birds had 
mostly flown away.   
In respect of both randomness and premeditated plans, the field can be an 
unforgiving place; unexpected trade-offs arise to be managed, and resources almost 
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always prove to be more acutely finite than one originally anticipated. It is true that the 
data from which this chapter is derived is a little coarser than much of what typically 
enters an economist’s kitchen. However it may be an underlying strength of this project 
that we did not have delivered to us an agreeably polished spreadsheet of data – 
hindsight not foresight. With cold damp tool sheds for offices, tree stumps and sacks of 
onions for chairs, we shared firsthand the fatigue of our interpreters. Our stomachs 
rumbled in harmony with theirs when faced with the understanding we daren’t stop for 
fear that the elements deny us the morrow’s work. Without hyperbole, it is our 
fingernails beneath which the day’s data and dirt gathered, and we believe that cements 
candidness where there might otherwise be divorced indifference or plausible 
deniability.  
When it comes to ironing out those very human creases in data, respite is of course 
sought in the asymptotic virtue of a ‘big n’. The symmetry of our dataset appears to 
serve us well in that regard. Nevertheless, data of this nature does of course 
inadvertently carry the scent of something other than pure science. With something 
resembling an acquittal, one may wish to bear in mind that one is kidding oneself if one 
tacitly assumes that base level human development data, even that from the likes of the 
World Bank or UNDP, is somehow immune from vagaries of the field. Accordingly, 
and with respect for the alternative methodologies of others, let the underlying 
confession of this chapter be that my claim is too add richly to ‘the impact debate’ of 
fair-trade, I do not claim to settle it beyond all doubt. 
 
 
4.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
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The observations of this paper took place in the South African winter of 2007. The 
questionnaire16 is available to view in Appendix 4.45. Despite the fact that we only 
captured two to three years of official fair-trade certification, as the pre-certification 
process is a stringent dress rehearsal that itself takes a number of years, the treatment 
effect is hypothesised to encompass the last three to five years.  
The total sample size is 381. The fair-trade group contains 273 workers, and the 
control group is comprised of 108 non-fairtrade workers. In this section we will offer a 
comparative breakdown of the descriptive statistics from the survey, the details of 
which are partitioned by the following 3 subheadings: 
 
i. Material welfare: Income, expenditure, and ownership of goods 
ii. Immaterial welfare: Health, Education, and Family. 
iii. Participation, and interaction with FT 
 
The design of this chapter is such that the selective reader should experience little 
difficulty in navigating to whichever variable may interest them in particular. Indeed, 
the sequence of the chapter’s appendices should be of particular value in facilitating the 
aims of a reader who wishes to jump to particular points of interest.  
As ‘production decisions’ are taken by the farmer rather than the workers, the 
potential for inspecting for adverse affects has more limited scope than may otherwise 
be the case. Most notably, the categories of people covered by this data preclude the 
opportunity to conduct any meaningful investigation into oversupply. Nonetheless, there 
do exist other more subtle avenues by which adverse affects may make themselves felt, 
and where a clean path presents itself, an explicit hypothesis shall be stated.   
                                                 
16 The questionnaire is largely a collaboration between Brigitte Granville and Steven Telford, other 
members of the QMUL fair-trade team did add some questions related to their own fields that is legal - 
Janet Dine, ethical - Andrew Fagan, and technological - Rohan Kariyawasam. 
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Reviewing descriptive statistics and simple pair-wise relationships is valuable in its 
own right, however the wider initiative is to employ the insights on offer to piece 
together something more sophisticated. One of the most challenging aspects of sewing a 
model together is in deciding, or rather having the variables decide for you, which is a 
dependent and which is an independent variable – reverse causality (endogeneity). 
There is no silver bullet for this, yet it will become evident that our picture is afforded 
an actuality in which some of the variables which typically stand out as being naturally 
prone to endogeniety are in fact not – at least not in the way we will deploy and 
interpret them. This will be particularly evident in relation to health and education 
variables. We will discuss these issues in more micro detail as they arise.  
Prior to jumping into a reservoir of numbers and statistical tests, it is necessary to 
say something about the initial points of balance and imbalance that the data harbour. In 
terms of the core purpose of this paper, we deal with two primary groups; fair-trade and 
non fair-trade. Hence it is appropriate to first offer some introductory information on 
how balanced these two groups are in respect of their most rudimentary divisions of 
difference.  
In relation to gender, the non fair-trade workers are finely balanced, almost a perfect 
50:50 split. A similar compliment cannot be extended to the fair-trade group, where the 
ratio is skewed at 70:30 in favour of males. Tests for a relationship of association 
between gender and fair-trade confesses that our sample is under-representative of fair-
trade females. With age means and medians all converging on 37, both within and 
between groups, the age distribution portrays exemplary symmetry. The average and 
median number of people per household hovers just below 5 for the non fair-trade 
workers, whereas it strays just above 4 for the fair-trade group. Both groups display an 
identical proportion of marriage and co-habitation (45%), which is encouraging 
because, despite being a plain enough variable, the acquisition of a partner is often 
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thought to hold within its walls a good deal of unobservable ability. As a further point 
of good balance, approximately the same minority of people in each group are ineligible 
to vote, roughly 6%. As one would expect, the lion’s share of interest takes place in 
national elections. While a slightly higher proportion of fair-trade workers display a 
propensity to vote, a chi-squared test on ‘any democratic participation’ strongly 
suggests independence between groups. Backed up by correlation coefficients, we 
cannot conclude that fair-trade workers are any more or less interested in democratic 
participation. The balance of the dataset receives a further endorsement by the fact that 
general voter turnout within the sample is broadly in line with the national average.  
One of the trickiest issues we must steer around is the potential red herring created 
by having both seasonal and permanent workers. Unless otherwise stated, whenever we 
refer to ‘class of worker’ it should be understood that we are referring to whether or not 
a person is a temporary/seasonal or permanent worker. 11% (29 absolute) of the fair-
trade group classify themselves as seasonal workers, whereas that proportion rises to 
28% (30 absolute) for non fair-trade workers. The problem created by permanent and 
seasonal workers is quite multidimensional, and typifies the ‘control problem’ as to why 
descriptive statistics can potentially mislead. It is most helpful that tests of 
independence reject a link between fair-trade and class of worker. However, the 
headache that emerges, albeit a very typical one, is that seasonal labour is 
disproportionately female. In all, 35% of the female population is seasonal labour, while 
the figure for males is closer to 6%. Unsurprisingly, appropriate tests indicate a lack of 
independence between the categories of gender and class of worker. Coupling this with 
the previously hinted lack of independence between fair-trade and gender permits us a 
clear line of sight as to where we should direct our suspicions in respect of descriptive 
statistics. A number of scenarios were considered in which the 29 fair-trade seasonal 
workers were to be viewed separately, given quasi fair-trade status, or repatriated into 
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the non fair-trade group. However, based on the evidence that came to light in the 
participation section 4.2.3 of this chapter, we rejected the need for that action, the 
evidence suggesting that temporary fair-trade workers felt no less involved in fair-trade 
than did their permanent peers. 
It is self-evident that the legitimacy of comparing two groups increases if they were 
closely matched to begin with. In richer datasets one may be afforded the luxury of 
dropping, matching and more purely randomising. Where that luxury is denied, one 
must exercise appropriate pragmatism i.e. try to ascertain if a handicap exists, and 
thereafter, if it does exist, factor that inequality into the analysis and interpretation. In 
the absence of a time dimension, we cannot make a formal statement as to whether each 
group started this race at the same point. We can however fill this gap with a germane 
piece of local knowledge i.e. that all of the fair-trade observations were taken from an 
area which local people refer to as “the dark side of the mountain”17. This term refers to 
the differing degrees of darkness that the shadow of apartheid cast. While the nation as a 
whole bore witness, some enclaves of South Africa offered a deeper embrace of this 
defunct ideology than others. There is indeed anecdotal evidence – folk knowledge – to 
suggest that the fair-trade workers in this sample came from a relatively more 
disadvantaged background than the counterfactuals. In our dataset we find evidence that 
dances to the tune of that local awareness, and when this arises, in line with the term 
employed by local people, it is stated explicitly as ‘The dark side of the mountain 
hypothesis’. Corroboration of this hypothesis permeates both the analysis and the 
conclusion. 
The remainder of this descriptive statistics section will be dedicated to reporting 
proportions and test results for group independence. The reader should bear in mind that 
the dual occurrence of having a binary group variable (rather than an intensity), along 
                                                 
17 Source based on conversations with Prof. Joachim Ewert of the University of Stellenbosch. 
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with the fact that so few of our other variables are continuous renders the statistical 
toolbox a little lighter than might otherwise be the case. With data of this sort, 
‘improvisation is more rule than exception. For example, one may rightly question the 
use of correlation coefficients that are derived from discrete variables. This contention 
is neither new nor settled. Indeed, Pearson and Yule were known to have fallen out over 
a disagreement about the legitimacy of considering discrete variables as approximations 
of underlying or latent continuous variables (Cox 1974, 200818). It is impossible to be 
watertight in matters of this nature and, as is often the case, elegance is not the option 
some may wish it to be. Our strategy will be to deploy an array of measures so as to 
seek legitimacy by way of attrition. As our outcomes can be ranked, we can make use of 
Spearman and polychoric metrics. However the element of patchwork comes via one of 
the group variables being dichotomous, and so we do not think it wise to necessarily pay 
much attention to the intensity of the correlation coefficients. Rather, we will focus 
more on the sign and the significance. The combination of a rank and dichotomy does 
however provide no methodological qualms for Kendall and chi-squared tests. 
Therefore, cross referencing the p-values from those tests with the ones from the 
correlation coefficients should iron out of few of the creases that some will feel exist 
from having had to force a rank coefficient from a combination which is part binary. As 
a further injection of rigour, when appropriate we will convert the rank order variables 
into a dichotomy and see what level of significance can be generated from tetrachoric 
correlation, to see whether or not these p-values corroborate other metrics.  
 
4.2.1 Material Welfare: income, expenditure and ownership of goods 
 
The results of all pair-wise independence tests for this section are listed in Appendix 
4.10. All income and expenditure figures are quoted in South African rand. Income 
                                                 
18 Cox discussed in a number of exchanges on the online Stata discussion forum (Nov 20th 2008) 
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numbers can in this context be a bit slippery, as there exist very human incentives to 
deviate from the truth – and a legitimate preference for privacy. An added twist of 
intricacy being that the incentives are not necessarily unidirectional, rather side-by-side 
there can exist enticements to both inflate and deflate the unit of measurement 
depending on where a person is. It is more intuitive than scientific, but one may be 
willing to offer sympathy to the conjecture that, as the social setting of all interviews 
was identical, propensities to be dishonest can be assumed to be unidirectional, or at 
least symmetrically distributed between the sample and the control group. Ultimately, 
how comfortable one is with the income variable is, up unto a point, a matter of 
personal choice. Irrespective of one’s personal inclinations, the general ethos of this 
analysis is that evidence is cumulative rather than authoritative, nothing is definitive in 
isolation – each observation adds its worth. 
 
Table 4.1 Monthly Household Income 
 
Fair-trade       Non fair-trade 
 Mean 
 
Median Mode  Mean Median Mode 
Household income 
 
2114 1990 1500*  2336 2180 1090 
Household income  
per capita  
581 480 400  555 500 363 
Household expenditure 
 
917 800 1200  1039 1000 1000 
Household expenditure 
per capita 
264 200 200  264 231 200 
*There were two modes 1000 and 2000, so we take the average 
 
The non fair-trade people do slightly better in respect of average absolute household 
income, however given that their households are on average slightly larger, this comes 
as no revelation. The number of dwellers is such that we would expect to move towards 
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convergence or see a slight reversal when we make a per capita adjustment, and that is 
precisely what we observe (Appendix 4.11). The per capita performance is more 
balanced, and the average reverses to favour fair-trade. However, a t-test does not reject 
the null hypothesis of household per capita incomes being the same. So, to provide a 
benchmark of sorts, observations were made of a number of semi-skilled professional 
clerical workers that the winery employed. It is a token sample of just n=7, so the figure 
is ballpark, yet it is interesting because one may be surprised at the modesty of 
difference. The mean and median monthly household incomes of this group of clerical 
professionals respectively came out at 2733 and 2900. This in turn translates into a per 
capita average of 644. 
The story for expenditure is not dissimilar to that of income (Appendix 4.12). The 
per capita figures fall into line and a t-test fails to reject the equality of means. Incomes 
and expenditures are not quite normally distributed, but they are log-normal and it is 
comforting to report that the basic upward trend between income and expenditure is 
intact.  
Accounting pragmatically for those who refused to answer, it’s accurate enough to 
infer that almost none of the workers pay any form of direct tax. Symmetrical across 
groups, there is however a strong take-up factor of between 80 and 85% for the state-
sponsored ‘unemployment insurance fund’ (UIF). As well as being an unemployment 
cushion, the UIF program is designed to provide provisions that relate to a wide variety 
of occurrences; illness, maternity, adoption and dependence. In addition, there is 
balance between groups in respect of governmental assistance, as 12% of each group 
have received some form of state grant.  
When in comes to the punctuality of wage payments there was a margin of 
difference between groups. Around 10% of the control group reported a delay in 
receiving their salaries, whereas the figure for fair-trade is around 1% (see Appendix 
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4.13). Tests for a relationship give rise to disparity. Spearman and Kendall reject the 
presence of a relationship, while chi-squared appears to support it. The reason for this 
lack of continuity is the relative swellings in the two extreme values of the control 
group. Chi-squared does of course not consider category ranks. If one is willing to 
accept the reasoning that, in a repeated game, there is no real reason to consider there to 
be a rank between if a worker is paid in advance or exactly on time, we can craft 
something from this (indeed, there may even be an inverse ranking in that advanced 
payment to a person of ill patience can be more pitfall than blessing). This reasoned 
rejection of rank suggests a preference for the chi-squared result. On balance this 
variable is simply a descriptive statistic which exhibits a slight advantage to fair-trade. 
However, thin as the numbers are, it is better to state a simple descriptive statistics in 
which we cite that there appears no systematic problem regarding the timely payment of 
wages in general. Instances of delay are isolated in that they do not appear clustered in 
any one place or group – all farms are generally good and equal.  
The official minimum wage for farm workers in South Africa is R1,041 per month. 
(US state department 2008). When asked about their actual wage in relation to the 
minimum wage, over a third of the population declined to answer or claimed that they 
did not know (Appendix 4.14). This lack of self-knowledge as to a person’s legislative 
rights is a worthy finding in itself, and it is only candid to mention that the non-
respondents were predominantly from the fair-trade group. When we factor out the 
people who do not know, (see Appendix 4.15), the data gives rise to the following 
proportions. 11% of fair-trade workers claimed to receive less than the minimum wage. 
The equivalent figure for the counterfactual group is 14%. 56% of non fair-trade 
workers stated that they received exactly the minimum wage, and that proportion rose to 
78% for fair-trade people. The largest percentile divergence emerged between those 
whose wages surpassed the minimum wage. A third of fair-trade workers alleged to 
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have a wage that exceeded the minimum wage, whereas fewer than 8% of the control 
group fell into that privileged category. As ‘a lack of knowledge’ cannot be 
accommodated in the rank, the metrics which are reported in line 2 of Appendix 4.10 
relate to the sample which precludes those who ‘do not know’. Within the bounds of 
99% confidence, chi-squared is firm in its rejection of independence, and at similar 
levels of confidence fair-trade receives the backing of the other tests. It is however 
worth mentioning that these findings are possibly prone to the influence of gender and 
class of labour. While males and females are proportionally similar in respect to those 
who receive less than the minimum wage, a disparity occurs in that only 7% of females 
receive above the minimum wage, whereas the equivalent figure for males is around one 
third. All females who enter this bracket of good fortune are fair-trade affiliated. Also, a 
quarter of all seasonal workers end up with less than the minimum wage, and just over 
4% of seasonal workers manage to take home in excess of the minimum wage.  
A person’s reservation wage is defined as the lowest wage that a person would 
accept, below which they would seek alternative employment. It’s difficult to know 
precisely what the reservation wage portrays. Loosely, we can perhaps consider it to be 
a sort of indicator of personal expectations and, possibly, self-esteem. The fair-trade 
group exhibits a significantly wider variance, yet the medians are identical (500), and 
while the fair-trade average (602) is slightly above the non fair-trade average (561), the 
difference is not deemed to be statistically significant.  
Enquiring what a person’s action would be if their wage was to fall below that of 
their reservation requirement is helpful in two ways. Firstly, by dissection of an agrarian 
and non-agrarian option, we may shed some light the on the previously cited 
‘developmental critique’ whereby the process of industrialisation is potentially 
repressed. Secondly, that same dissection of ‘city vs. countryside’ possibly tells us 
something about a person’s current level of contentment. Equal across both groups, a 
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quarter of the population confessed to simply not knowing where they would transport 
their labour in the event of an unacceptable wage level. Dealing with those who did 
have an idea as to their preferred course of action, in terms of straightforward binary 
choice, 45% of fair-trade workers indicated that a low wage would push them into urban 
areas. The equivalent proportion of non fair-trade farmers who claim they would turn 
their backs on agriculture stands at 66%, and tests of independence support that this 
difference is significant (line 3 in Appendix 4.10). It must however be noted that this 
‘city vs. countryside’ dissection is a highly solicited variable, in the sense that we had to 
use a ‘what if your wages fell’ scenario to extract it. In absence of the hypothesised 
wage fall, three quarters of each group indicated that they had never considered 
relocation. Symmetry of the picture was completed by the remaining quarter, those who 
had considered relocation, exhibiting a 50:50 split between urban and rural preferences 
(Appendix 4.16). 
The ownership of consumer durables appears clearly skewed in favour of the control 
group. An index of ownership was constructed across four consumer goods; television, 
radio, fridge and mobile phone. Each is weighted equally, so a person scores a point for 
each good they own (Appendix 4.17). From this we derive a variable that is discrete and 
ordinal. Sporting respective means of 2.1 and 2.4, a t-test of equal means indicates that 
the difference is significant. With the exception of a polyserial test, which sits on the 
fringes of 90% confidence, all other tests firmly support there being a lack of 
independence in which being affiliated to fair-trade is associated with less ownership of 
consumer goods. One may take the view that a mobile phone is potentially a work tool. 
This may at times be the case, however the results are not affected by the removal of the 
mobile phone from the index. This is potentially a stark message for fair-trade, however 
as incomes and taxation appear constant, the most obvious variable to turn to in search 
of balance would be savings. 
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Savings is always an immensely tricky variable to come to terms with. Past the 
autonomous point, one cannot make a blanket statement about as to what degree savings 
are the product of wellbeing. Fluctuations can resonate from any number of factors, 
formulation of the real rather than nominal variable (i.e. purchasing power), time 
preferences (i.e. life-cycle hypothesis), feelings of future security, perceptions of 
continuance and volatility (i.e. permanent income hypothesis), and other socioeconomic 
quirks such as one person’s luxury being another persons ‘taken for granted’. All the 
same, it is broadly healthy that our data show a upward relationship between income 
and saving ability, the significance of which can be turned on or off with different 
sleights of hand. 
Overall savings results are displayed in Appendix 4.18. Just over half of the fair-
trade group insists that their incomes do not permit them to save any money at all. The 
proportion of non fair-trade people who cite their feasible thrift level to be zero is 
significantly higher at 68%. The middle ground is occupied by roughly a third of each 
group. Given that mean incomes show no systematic difference, it is interesting to 
observe that just under a fifth of fair-trade workers appear able to save in excess of 10% 
of their income, whereas virtually none of the control group occupy this bracket of good 
fortune. Tests for independence are unanimous in their rejection of no association, and a 
t-tests strongly supports the alternative hypotheses of fair-trade being associated with an 
ability to save (line 5 in Appendix 4.10). Coupling this finding with the presence of 
equal incomes, one thought to entertain is a state of affairs whereby fair-trade workers 
somehow experience a lower cost of living, hence an inspection of subsidies will appear 
in due course. 
Too large a contingent declined to answer for us to draw any serious inferences 
about how people managed their savings. From those that responded, there were a few 
subtle hints that favoured fair-trade. The control group displayed a higher tendency to 
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keep their savings at home, rather than in a bank, while fair-trade people appeared more 
likely to be making use of a savings program being run by their farm (Appendix 4.19). 
Borrowing, like saving, can be indicative of either health or dilemma – in the case of 
saving, a possible ‘expected’ dilemma. In this dataset, barring the two polarised corners 
of choosing to borrow from family/friends or from an individual private money lender, 
it is difficult to attach a spectrum of ’friendliness’. There is good balance in that three 
quarters of each group have not borrowed any money, but this dictates that when we 
divide borrowers up into subgroups based on their sources of finance, the numbers 
become somewhat slim – too slim for serious inference. A worthwhile observation is 
that the data hints that the people who borrow are those who are slightly less well off in 
respect to income. To be specific, the borrowing households are on average 100 rand 
per month per capita less well off than non-borrowers, and this difference shows up as 
being significant. With respective percentages of 6 to 8, slightly more fair-trade people 
had borrowed from friends or relatives. Across 12 different farms, just fewer than 12% 
of fair trade workers had borrowed funds provided from the farm which employed them. 
The overall proportion of farm-based borrowers amongst the control group was 4% less 
than in the fair-trade group. It must however be noted that, without exception, every non 
fair-trade farm did lend money to at least one of their workers. A small proportion (just 
under 6%) of the control group had borrowed from a bank, while bank borrowers in the 
fair-trade group were practically nonexistent. The numbers are too thin to speak of 
significance, but the mean and median incomes of bank borrowers were marginally 
higher than for non-bank borrowers. Perhaps the most illuminating observation of these 
borrowing statistics is that no fair-trade worker reported borrowing anything from a 
private money lender, whereas just over 8% of the control group had utilized this often 
exorbitant channel of finance. Notwithstanding that the absolute amount of borrowers 
conspires against the making of a more robust statement, it would not seem 
 200
unreasonable to suggest that fair-trade workers have access to more friendly avenues of 
finance. 
When it comes to the basics of present day welfare, few variables can boast a 
gravitas equal to that of hunger. There is room for improvement, but the numbers are 
broadly healthy and the margin between groups is slim. Less than 5% of fair-trade 
workers cited that they have occasionally faced shortages of food. The equivalent figure 
for people who had no affiliation to fair-trade rises to just over 7% (Appendix 4.20). As 
a point of reference, the mean household per capita income of people who suffered food 
shortages stands at 470 per month. The comparable figure for those who experienced no 
dietary shortfall is 580. Variances are unequal, and a t-test does suggest that per capita 
household income is significant in this matter.  
Given that we have observed little difference between the incomes of the two 
groups, it is especially important to inspect for subsidies. Interestingly, the question 
relating to whether or not the farm provides subsidised food and accommodation saw 
15% of the population expressing uncertainty or declining to answer. Of those that did 
respond, the number who were the recipients of subsidised food alone was negligible; 
only 4 in total, residing 3 to 1 in the fair-trade group. These are probably people who are 
close to the farmer, a foreman or the spouse of a worker who may themselves work as a 
housekeeper or similar. These sorts of arrangements are not atypical in the agrarian set-
ups of post colonial nations. The breakdown of the data in this case dictates that we are 
essentially interested in looking at two outcomes; those who received subsidised 
accommodation and those who did not. Within this dichotomy, 84% of the population 
were granted assistance with accommodation, while the remainder were not. Fair-trade 
fares well here, as only 12% of its workers did not receive accommodation; while the 
respective proportion for non fair-trade workers was double that. The corollary is that 
88% of fair-trade workers receive subsidised accommodation, in comparison to 76% of 
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the control group (Appendix 4.21). Chi-squared rejects independence in favour of fair-
trade, and a tetrachoric correlation backs up that result. In spite of the positive outcome 
for fair-trade, this is a classic case in which one may suspect the problematic influence 
of the permanent worker variable. Similar tests of independence between subsidised 
accommodation and whether or not a person is a seasonal or permanent worker indicate 
the sort of balance that could scarcely be more fragile. Chi-squared barely fails to reject 
independence at 5% (p=0.055). The tetrachoric coefficient is slightly more compelling 
in its rejection (p=0.079). The categorical overlay that further fertilises the propensity 
for these descriptive statistics to be deceptive stems from the previously cited lack of 
independence between gender and seasonality of labour. As one may suspect, tests for 
independence between gender and subsidised accommodation tell us that these 
categories are not independent, and that being male carries with it a significantly higher 
likelihood of benefiting from subsidised accommodation.  
 
4.2.2 Immaterial welfare: health education and children  
 
An assessment of health and education variables can be seen to serve two ‘time specific’ 
purposes. There are a number of variables which can be considered ‘true to the moment’ 
variables. For example, a question such as ‘when you are of ill heath, what options are 
available to you?’ relates, of course, to options that are ‘presently’ available. 
Alternatively, there are what we may consider to be ‘maturity’ variables. These are 
variables which straddle different generations. Notable examples include enquires into 
educational attainment and child mortality. Within our sample, fair-trade has not been 
around long enough to have exerted full group influence on variables such as these. 
Maturity variables can be thought of as ‘half ripe fruit’. We can pick them, they give us 
an indication as to the quality of the seeds that were planted, and help to give us an 
signal as to which direction things might be heading. The time may come when these 
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variables fully ripen into reliable dependent variables, but that time has not yet come. 
This does not mean that these observations are not of use; to the contrary, they may be 
put to fine use. The argument being put forth is that, at this stage in the existence of fair-
trade, it is better to employ entities such as ‘child mortality’ and ‘education’ as partial 
benchmarks of ‘general beginnings’ as opposed to dependent variables of present day 
welfare. This matches well with the previously stated endeavour of trying to shine some 
light onto the ‘dark side of the mountain’ hypothesis. All correlation results are listed in 
Appendix 4.22, and a person’s level of education marks the first port of call. 
The numbers for education carry just a subtle haze of difference (Appendix 4.23). 
Around 10% of each group received no formal education. As one would expect, at 51, 
the mean age of those who have received no education is substantially above that of the 
sample mean. All tests for independence indicate that being born more recently is 
strongly associated with higher educational attainment. The next bracket of achievement 
presides over a point of difference; 37% of fair-trade workers started but did not 
complete primary school, whereas the equivalent figure for the control group was 
superior at 23%. The proportions of those who completed primary school are practically 
equal; 18% for fair-trade and 17% for the control group. A point of difference that 
favours non fair-trade people can be seen in those who started but did not complete 
secondary education. 44% of the control group claimed this level of education, whereas 
only 27% of those in the fair-trade group boasted the same level. When it comes to 
those who have completed secondary school we are dealing with a minority of only 5% 
in each group. Tests for independence all support a rejection of independence, and 
correlation coefficients unanimously favour the control group; a minor point of dilution 
being that, with a confidence interval of 90 percent, the polychoric metric shows 
slightly weaker support than the others. At a stretch, less than 6% of the sample 
occupies a demographic group which fair-trade could feasibly have touched in respect 
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of the time it commenced. By that logic, education offers itself as a classic maturity 
variable, in which case, the superiority of the control group supports the hypothesis of 
unequal beginnings.  
Next we turn to child mortality. When we say a person is ‘eligible’ to provide data 
in regards of child mortality, it simply means that the person is not eligible if they and 
their spouse have never conceived. It makes sense that these people are excluded rather 
than recorded as a positive ‘no’. We report that of the 227 eligibles in the fair-trade 
group, around 20% of those have suffered some form of child mortality. With only 95 
eligible people, it’s a slim stable from which to derive our comparative control group 
figure, but of that contingent, 17% experienced some form of child mortality. Hence, 
the proportional performance of fair-trade was slightly inferior. However, as one may 
expect from limited numbers and slim margins of difference, it is not surprising to see 
tests for independence failing to support the existence of a relationship. The 
distributional spread of age-specific deaths was largely symmetrical between groups, 
the only exception being that none of the control group had experienced the death of a 
child over 5 years old, whereas a tiny minority of the fair-trade group had. The 
restriction of ‘eligibility’ designates that we are already dealing with a subgroup of the 
population. If we were to further restrict the numbers to those who have had a child in 
the period since fair-trade arrived, the sub-sample would shrink to be of only anecdotal 
value. Based on that practical limitation, we engage child mortality as a maturity 
variable, and employ a simple dummy such that instances have an equal generational 
weighting. Therefore, it is not discouraging to observe what can be described as either 
the closeness of the two groups or else the edging ahead of the control group (Appendix 
4.24). Limited eligibility and knowledge of previous labour movements conspire against 
the making of a more robust statement. Nonetheless, the observations do offer another 
subtle hint that either the groups are coming from an equal beginning, or else fair-trade 
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people may have started from a less advantageous position. In other words, the evidence 
put forth by this variable refuses to reject the dark side of the mountain hypothesis, and 
if we were forced to bet either ‘for or against’ that hypothesis, we would be sooner bet 
‘for’ than against it. 
Locality of child birth also provides a good indication as to the groups’ relative 
starting points. It is somewhat fortunate that the two most common places of nativity in 
the sample are also the most straightforward to gauge the superiority of. The majority of 
births have taken place either at home or in a hospital. For the dataset as a whole, 30% 
of fair-trade workers experienced at least one homebirth. The equivalent statistic for non 
fair-trade workers falls to 17%. Similarly, 86% of fair-trade people had at least one of 
their children born in hospital, whereas that proportion rises to 97% for the control 
group. In each case, for both hospital and homebirth possibilities, appropriate tests 
reject the suggestion that there is independence between place of childbirth and fair-
trade. The tests appear to suggest that the control group has been more privileged in 
respect of facilities for child birth. There is however a degree of double accounting 
between those two options, whereby 19% of the fair-trade group and 14% of the control 
group record births in both options. While we do not have specific information on 
exactly which child was born where, it would seem plausible that ‘hospital births’ are 
likely to represent more recent births. If we can confirm this, and at the same time see if 
independence prevails for later births we will be afforded evidence both in support of 
the dark side of the mountain hypothesis, and partial evidence in support of a fair-trade 
facilitated catch-up. Factoring in the exclusion condition of ‘only including parents who 
have a child born in the last five years’ does indeed see the groups draw near level. 
Under this condition, the same tests reverse their previous indications and affirm 
independence between fair-trade and locality of child birth (lines 3-6 in Appendix 4.22). 
 205
When people were asked if they expected their children to experience a higher 
standard of living than they themselves have, the response was one of broad optimism 
in both groups. The vast majority of people expected the lives of the children to in 
general brighten (Appendix 4.25). 90% of the fair-trade group exhibited positive 
expectations for their children, the proportion falling slightly to 86% for the control 
group. 4% of each group expressed uncertainty. While the fair-trade group slightly 
outperformed the control group in terms of positive proportional responses, chi-squared 
fails to reject independence, and if the uncertain response is ranked as a midpoint, 
Spearman, Kendall, and polyserial measures of correlation all echo the same opinion. 
With the uncertain responses stripped out, a tetrachoric coefficient backs up the results 
of other tests. It is perhaps worth mentioning that similar tests of correlation between 
age and generational expectations indicate that younger people are more optimistic, 
though results were significant only at the 90% confidence interval.  
Staying on the topic of children, on balance, one may consider that if a person 
exhibits a preference for their children to continue to make a living via farming, this 
could be taken as an expression of general contentment. ‘On balance’ is stated for the 
reason that this variable is perhaps prone to accusations of informational asymmetry. 
For example, some may state that if a participant desires for their children to remain in 
farming, this may be indicative of a lack of knowledge of opportunities that lie 
elsewhere. As is the case with many interpretative variables, one is entitled to deploy 
one’s own interpretation and debate thereafter what the results indicate. The chief 
problem with handling this variable is in how we interpret ‘indifference’, and whether 
or not we decide to consider ‘indecision’ and ‘indifference’ as identical or sufficiently 
distinct from one another. The most sincere path we can follow is to experiment with all 
reasonable combinations. In terms of straightforward responses and proportions, within 
which there is not much difference between the two groups, 41% of each group 
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indicated that they did not wish their children to remain involved in farming. Displaying 
respective percentages of 42 and 47, just 5% more of the non fair-trade group answered 
a clear ‘yes’ to wanting their children to remain in farming (Appendix 4.26). However, 
because a higher proportion of fair-trade people were undecided, proportions each 
converge on 50 if we exclude the 13% of the population who ‘did not know’ or 
‘appeared undecided’. If we go one step further and strip out all possible indifference 
and investigate just the two corner solutions of yes and no, we again observe close to a 
pure tie, with the control group just edging the ‘yes’ proportion 54% to 51%. We 
consider that the most intuitively sound path to follow is by directly transforming 
indecision into indifference, and generating a sequential rank in which that is the 
midpoint – this way we do not waste data. This does of course return us close to our 
original state of play, with the difference not being in the negative responses (which are 
equal), but in just 5% more of the fair-trade group expressing indifference. Unsurprising 
from the reported proportions, irrespective of which combination is tried, sequenced 
discrete, binary, with or without an amalgamation of uncertainty and indifference, 
appropriate tests unanimously point to independence.  
Continuing with the theme of children, we are presented with an opportunity to 
comment on, and inspect for, a possible adverse affect. In particular, a standardised 
hypothesis might be to question whether fair-trade gives workers an incentive to put 
their children into employment at the expense of education – the pull of what may be 
perceived as a transitory draw, so to speak. There is no difference between any groups 
when it comes to ensuring children of primary school age attended five days of school. 
The same is almost true for children of high-school age, with the exception that there 
are a number of dropouts. These dropouts are however, not of a number sufficient to 
generate suspicion, and that is true both for the sample as a whole and between groups. 
When questioned if people sometimes withdrew their children from school during the 
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harvest period, the results offered up a little more colour. If we include ‘refusals to 
answer’ we can report that around 82% of fair-trade workers are adamant that they do 
not withdraw their children from school. However, the proportion for the control group 
rises to 91% (Appendix 4.27), and chi-squared supports the suggestion of the 
relationship not being independent. If however we behave a bit brazenly with the data, 
we can add an interesting twist to the narrative of this variable. If we hypothesise that a 
person may by be embarrassed to report that they withdraw their children, but at the 
same time have no incentive to be elusive if they do keep their children in school, we 
can tease out some cracks in the previously cited rejection of independence. It is 
possibly too bold a use of the data, but the practicalities of mining this hypothesis are 
quite undemanding. If we simply transform the indefinite responses into observations in 
which children are withdrawn, this dilutes the rejection of independence such that it 
only receives 90% confidence (line 10 of Appendix 4.22 records both results).  
Moving away from the subject of children, and more towards the welfare of the 
workers themselves, let us consider some data on personal health. We can report that the 
mean number of days of ill health over the course of a year is 2.65. When split into 
groups, the fair-trade group weigh in with a slightly lower figure of 2.59 as opposed to 
2.8 for non fair-trade. Wider for the control group, variances are unequal, and a t-test 
confirms that the averages carry no significant difference. The mode was by far the 
most dominant statistic for this variable and both groups stood at zero. Over 52% of the 
fair-trade group stated zero days of illness, while the corresponding figure for the 
control group falls to 48%. Taken at face value these numbers paint a picture of health 
that is universally sound. Indeed, the numbers portray an image of health fettle finer 
than many workers in more sheltered nations and jobs. If however one wishes to bring 
that last comparative statement to heel, one may succumb to a touch of ‘cynical 
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balance’ by suggesting that this variable is massaged by a reality in which a person is 
often only as ill as they can afford to be.  
The time period in which fair-trade has been active dictates that ‘injuries at work’ is 
not an overly insightful variable. It is however a fine compliment of balance that the 
dataset records symmetrical values of 90% injury avoidance in both groups. If one 
wishes to use this variable to pass judgement on the occupational health goals of fair-
trade, one is best advised to wait for it to mature.  
When it comes to assessing options that are available to people in the event of ill 
health, the two groups generally have near equal access to clinics and hospitals, though 
fair-trade does however pull ahead when it comes to visiting doctors. 76% of fair-trade 
workers have access to a clinic, the proportion for non fair-trade stands slightly higher 
at 82%. The difficulty associated with ‘clinics’ is that, particularly in developing 
countries, they can vary substantially in terms of quality. It is not that hospitals show no 
variation in quality, however in the regional context that we are in, it is reasonable to 
assume hospitals to be universally superior to clinics. With respective proportions of 
24% and 28%, slightly more fair-trade people have access to hospitals. In respect of 
both options, appropriate tests uphold the case of independence. The one finding in 
which independence is rejected is that of access to visiting doctors. We consider this to 
be a relatively privileged option of health. In all, over a quarter of fair-trade workers 
appear to have this option of visiting doctors at their disposal. This compares to an 
equivalent figure of only 6% of the control group (Appendix 4.28).  
The question whether or not a person’s standard of living has improved in 
comparison to that of the previous generation forms part of a critique by which the 
governance of all nations should ultimately be judged. The history of South Africa 
being what it is, dictates that a question of this nature holds within its walls a more 
intense sort of gravity. There is little difference between our two groups; over 72% of 
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fair-trade people answer positively, compared to 68% of the control group. Slightly in 
favour of the control group, minorities of 4% and 5% felt that their standards of living 
had actually reduced over the course of a generation. Perhaps concern should lie in the 
fact that a quarter of the sample as a whole felt that their standards of living had 
remained much the same as that of their parents. Within this uninspiring remark, via 
respective percentages of 22 and 29, fair-trade workers rank slightly better than non 
fair-trade labourers (Appendix 4.29). Unsurprising from the uncovered proportions, all 
relevant tests of association suggest fair-trade has neither a negative nor positive 
relationship to generational living standards. 
Refining the period of enquiry to the last 3 to 5 years grants us a vantage point 
tailored to the existence of fair-trade in this region. Indeed, fair-trade receives one of its 
most unambiguous compliments via a subjective three-way ranking on what direction 
people’s quality of life has taken over the last 3 to 5 years (Appendix 4.30). Over 80% 
of fair-trade affiliated workers considered their lives to have improved over that period 
of time. The proportion for the counterfactual group falls to 54%. Very few in each 
group considered their lives to have worsened, respectively 3% and 5% in favour of 
fair-trade. Hence the difference is made up by 41% of the control group feeling that 
their standards of living had stagnated over the course of that period. Chi-squared and 
correlation metrics firmly reject independence between groups. The next section offers 
an insight into the relationship between workers and their farms, and aims to look at 
what authors and organisers commonly refer to as ‘participation’. 
 
4.2.3 Participation and interaction with fair-trade 
 
An engagement with ‘participation’ gives voice to some of our most polarised findings. 
Indeed, many of the divisions are so cornered that it would be nonsensical to try to 
subject them to statistical tests.  
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Organised labour of some sort is a principal component of fair-trade. On paper it is a 
stringent condition of certification. In practice the condition is met, however different 
groupings preside over different levels of cohesion and solidarity. The usual binding of 
sellers in agriculture does of course take place via the formation of a co-operative. For 
labour, the like of which we are dealing with in this report, the term of use is ‘joint-
body’. This is essentially a localised union. The concept of the joint-body in this setting 
is neither new nor unique to fair-trade. In line with furthering its stated agenda of 
empowerment, fair-trade makes an attempt to galvanise these joint-bodies. This section 
is an attempt to shine some light on how successful fair-trade is in that endeavour.  
Everybody in the sample has the option of joining and participating in their local 
joint-bodies. Yet, as is to be expected the world over, some people are more enthusiastic 
than others. Some participate with verve, while others are detached and/or cynical when 
it comes to the activities of the elected bodies that represent them. Even if a person 
states that they do not hold membership or if they claim to not really know if they are a 
member, so long as that person works on a farm in which a joint-body engages in 
collective bargaining, then that person can be thought of as a passive member. By that 
mark, we make a distinction between active and passive members. If one cares to accept 
the reasoning that to be associated with active membership is progressing the aim of 
empowerment, fair-trade then stands tall in this dataset. There is a near perfect mirror of 
difference, in which 98% of fair-trade workers are active members, and 96% of non 
fair-trade workers are passive members (Appendix 4.31).  
The next step is to ascertain to what degree a person’s membership is active or 
passive. An index was constructed to try to capture the depth of a person’s participation. 
A person scores 4 if they act as a representative. Non-representatives each receive a 
single point if they involve themselves in any of the following three activities; voting, 
attending meetings and/or participating in discussions. With respective means of 2.20 
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and 1.08, fair-trade decisively outperforms the control group. The mean difference is 
strongly significant, and all other appropriate metrics of correlation support that fair-
trade workers exhibit a much higher degree of participation (Appendix 4.32). The only 
activity in which the numbers come close relate to those who partake in voting for a 
representative. Despite the stated relative lack of interest, 66% of non fair-trade workers 
do actually turn out to vote for a joint-body representative. This is still less than the 72% 
of fair-trade workers who vote, but it is nonetheless one of our closest points of 
convergence with respect to joint-body participation.  
The breakdown was equally as stark when workers were asked if they had 
confidence in the joint-body that represented them. None of the control group explicitly 
claimed to have ‘no confidence’ in their joint-body. The issue that arose was that the 
vast majority of counterfactuals, 96%, shied away from giving a definite response. This 
response (or rather lack of), matches well with the level of disinterest that was observed 
and previously employed to designate whether a person was an active or passive 
member. It is less than positive in respect of participation, but should ‘disinterest’ be 
encoded as negative or pure indifference? It is likely to harbour a degree of each, and 
the reader can make up their own mind as to precisely how they wish to interpret that 
distinction. For now, let us simply review the numbers. The contrast with fair-trade is 
again an inversion of difference. Almost 95% of fair-trade workers cited that they did 
have confidence in the governance in their joint-body. Less than 4% were adamant that 
they did not, and the remaining few offered the same reserve and/or indecision that 
dominated the control group response.  
When questioning whether or not workers believed that the joint-body had helped to 
improve living standards, we observed a continuance of polarised trends. The number of 
plainly negative opinions rose amongst fair-trade workers, but at 7% the figure is 
eclipsed by the 91% of fair-trade workers who where adamant that their joint-bodies 
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exhibited a decidedly positive impact on their standards of living. Bearing a similar 
parallel to the response on governance, 96% of non fair-trade workers expressed 
indifference and/or apathy (Appendix 4.33).   
Further support for the divergence of the two groups in respect of their farms/joint-
bodies can been seen via 34 people in the dataset indicating that their farm had over the 
years afforded them at least one financial loan. All of these borrowers resided on fair-
trade farms, and the distribution was such that it encompassed 11 separate farms. 
Fair-trade workers also had the perception of receiving more health and educational 
support from their joint-bodies. A quarter of the control group considered that they 
received no assistance with either health or education. This compares to only 5% of fair-
trade workers expressing the same perception. Just over half of fair-trade workers stated 
that they received some form of assistance with both health and education, whereas less 
than 5% of the non fair-trade group made that claim. The gap between the two groups 
does however acquire a stroke of moderation in that 70% of the non fair-trade workers 
were of the view that their farm/joint-body provided support for at least one of those 
two possible points of welfare (Appendix 4.34). Something to bear in mind with this 
variable is that it may suffer a degree of inconsistency. For example, sometimes the 
farm or the joint-body delivers support on a ‘case by case’ basis, and so there were 
instances in which a person recorded no medical assistance, when in fact this may have 
been because they simply neither required nor requested any. Nonetheless there is no 
apparent reason to suspect that the number of ‘case by case’ requests is different 
between groups, and so the variable retains its worth. 
Continuing this line of enquiry, one of the few places in which the difference is not 
particularly pronounced is in the tendency of the farm to keep its promises and so meet 
its obligations. The question was phrased to be inclusive of general verbal agreements. 
71% of fair-trade workers looked favourably upon the tendency of their farms to keep 
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their word. 16% of that group expressed the opposing view that their farms did not 
always deliver upon commitments made. The equivalent figures for the control group 
are that 55% offered a positive view of their farms, while 24% felt there existed 
sufficient past examples to call into question the credibility of future promises. 
When questioned specifically about the role of fair-trade, over 90% of fair-trade 
affiliated workers felt that fair-trade bore responsibility for the increase they 
experienced in their living standards; 6% were undecided, while 3% were of the opinion 
that fair-trade had made no meaningful contribution (Appendix 4.35). These favourable 
proportions fell a notch when fair-trade workers were questioned on whether they felt 
fair-trade was sufficient in the provisions it makes for living costs and family 
development. While over three quarters of the relevant population felt that fair-trade 
was sufficient in this context, 16% were of the view that fair-trade fell short of what is 
required. The remaining 8% were undecided or unopinionated (Appendix 4.36). As 
however this point of enquiry essentially asks a person if they feel they need more, the 
ground is particularly fertile for strategically rational responses. 
Pondering whether or not people expect fair-trade to persist into the future generates 
a question of textbook relevance. Equating the response to consumption theory, in 
particular, Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis lays a path by which we may see if 
fair-trade bestows upon its workers the confidence to spend/invest their gains. In terms 
of personal investment, the question may be more relevant for small land-holding 
farmers than what it is for hired workers. Nonetheless, be it for the actions it generates, 
or simply for itself, a feeling of ‘security of income’ is a cardinal variable of welfare for 
most individuals. That said, it is broadly positive for fair-trade that 88% of recipients 
felt they could rely on fair-trade to continue. 7% were unsure and 5% were convinced 
that fair-trade was destined to dry up (Appendix 4.37).  
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As we are dealing with workers rather than farmers, it would be dubious to expect 
the survey to deliver a well focused insight into possible oversupply. We can however 
tweak a ‘would-be’ oversupply enquiry and extrapolate from it a related enquiry into 
labour allocation. When asked if fair-trade affected the worker’s decision to be involved 
in the particular commodity that they were involved with, 35% of fair-trade workers felt 
they would spend more time on a different product if fair-trade did not exist. 43% 
insisted that they would be equally involved in grapes irrespective of whether fair-trade 
existed or not (Appendix 4.38).  
Such was the general inclusiveness of the South African Fairhills project, it comes 
as little surprise to find that fair-trade19 materialises more in communal goods than in 
personal incomes. While we know from local organisers that this is the direction in 
which fair-trade monies are generally channelled, the surveys themselves captured 
people’s perceptions of where finances have gone. 10% of people confessed to simply 
not knowing where the money goes, and a further 5% were entirely incorrect in thinking 
that their share of fair-trade turned up exclusively as a personal dividend. Around a 
quarter of people were partially correct in thinking that the gains of fair-trade were 
distributed to them through a combination of personal income and community projects. 
59% were correct in their reckoning that fair-trade gains made their way to them largely 
in the form of community projects (Appendix 4.39). Indeed, given the numbers of 
people involved in this sort of plantation labour, communal deliverance (i.e. fair-trade 
as public good) likely makes more sense than a straight individual dividend. Guided by 
what we have observed in descriptive statistics, the next section attempts to refine the 
story by piecing together a number of models.  
 
                                                 
19 We are referring to fair-trade as a general entity; we are not differentiating between the premium and 
the price, but simply looking at the perceived net contribution of the entity as a whole.  
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4.3 MODELS  
 
From the onset, it should be well understood that models which employ this sort of base 
level data require a broad reading. We report numbers in the way that general 
conventions demand we do, but advise that the reader pay broad attention to three 
things; the direction of the relationship, relative general magnitudes, and levels of 
significance. As is the case with a lot of socioeconomic enquiry, decimal points should 
be regarded as fair-weather friends.  
The series of models comprises a number of binary dependent variable regressions. 
Options of ordered discrete dependent variables were considered but rejected for two 
main reasons. Firstly the distribution of the responses rendered it impractical. Secondly, 
while numerous ‘goodness of fit’ tests help guide our choice of model, one of the 
particularly satisfying aspects of working with a binary dependent variable is that one 
can actually observe a real hit rate. We see exactly the number of times the model is 
perfectly correct in predicting that a person falls into a particular group. We are not 
afforded this luxury for models in which the dependent variable is discrete. This is 
because a division of the singular threshold (Pr=0.5) into smaller cuts, hollows out the 
middle group(s) by over predicting people into the upper and lower bands.  
The models in use take the latent variable approach. Definitional of this approach, 
*y  harbours an unobservable magnitude, a benefit of some kind incurred to individual i. 
We don’t observe the benefit in the sense of ‘measurable’ (ordered) utility, but we do 
observe if the particular action is present (y):  
 
iii uXy += β*    0=iy if 0* <y  
1=iy if 0* ≥y  
 
)|0Pr( * Xy >  
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Where )(⋅Ψ  is the cumulative distribution function (CDF), in the case of the logit 
model, by definition, (.)Ψ  is the CDF of the logistic distribution (fatter tails than the 
alterative probit specification which employs the CDF of the normal distribution).  
 
)exp(1
)exp()( * β
β
X
Xy +=Ψ  
 
There is no overriding reason to favour either CDF over the other; by and large results 
between the two exhibit only a hairline of difference, and both estimators are 
asymptotically consistent. 
 
Parameters are estimated with maximum likelihood techniques, under which the 
probability of the outcome conditional on X conforms to the following: 
 
{ }yiiXXy )()|Pr( βΨ=  { } iyiX −− 1)(1 βψ ,  1,0=iy  
 
with the log likelihood for individual i stated as so: 
 
{ } { })(1log)1()()|Pr( βψβ iii XyXXy −−+Ψ=  
 
)()(
1
ββ ∑ == Ni iL l  being the log likelihood of the sample which is to be maximised 
with respect to k components of β . While the original equation indicates that jx  
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exhibits a linear effect on *y , the effect on the increased probability of *y  changing 
from 0 to 1 is nonlinear. ()Ψ  is necessarily a nonlinear function of X, so as to prevent 
predicted probabilities from breaking the rational 0 – 1 range. Hence, as is standard with 
models of this genre, the tabulated results are not the coefficients, but rather the 
marginal effects. Formally: 
 
j
jj
X
x
X
X
Xy
x
Xy ββββ ⋅Ψ′=∂
∂⋅∂
=∂=∂
=∂ )()|1Pr()|1Pr(  
 
From here there are a number of options in respect of precisely what gets reported. We 
can report the overall marginal effects, the marginal effects for a specific group, and/or 
the average marginal effects. As well, for reasons of an intuitive interpretation, it can be 
appropriate to report ‘odds ratios’, which, simply and formally, are the unexponentiated 
coefficients )( βe  of the logit model. This in turn may be stated as; odds if the 
corresponding variable is incremented by 1 divided by odds if the variable is not 
incremented. More formally: 
 
)|Pr(1/()|Pr(
)1|Pr(1/()1|Pr(
XeventXevent
xeventxevent
−
+−+  
 
In contrast to marginal effects, individual odds ratios remain constant regardless of the 
values of other covariates. It is largely a matter of personal preference in regards which 
one prefers to read, My own preference of for marginal effects, however believing there 
to be value in knowing both, I report both. For convenience of presentation, the 
corresponding odds ratios are listed in Appendices 4.42 to 4.44.  
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In search of more robust findings, and in a related attempt to counter some 
problems of low counterfactual representation, each model delivers three specifications. 
In each case the pattern is uniform; x.1, x.2 and x.3. Regression x.1 is purely un-
tampered data, the flaw being that it is the specification with the lowest n, and in some 
cases a low representation of non fair-trade workers. Regressions x.2 and x.3 expand the 
numbers by implanting a number of expected values. After regression x.1 is specified 
we look at which unanswered control variables caused particular individuals to be 
dropped, and carefully transplant them so as to bring the individual back into the 
estimation. The dropped observations are not a product of mismanaged data, they are 
products of the ethical guidelines by which this sort of data has to be gathered. Given 
that the balance in the data stands at two thirds to one third in favour of fair-trade 
workers, this means that, in the interests of utilising this dataset for all it’s worth, there 
is a strong case for trying to bolster the counterfactuals. So, we match regressions x.1 
against two other specifications in which we inflate the number of counterfactuals via a 
number of ‘expected value’ replacements. Regression x.2 pulls more counterfactuals 
into the dataset by replacing missing cells with expected values from the dataset as a 
whole. Regression x.3 on the other hand fills the gaps with the expected values of non 
fair-trade workers. The replacements have been kept to a minimum, and are fully 
detailed in Appendix 4.40.  
Thankfully, in most cases we will see the regressions support each other; there are 
however some cases in which regressions appear somewhat unharmonious with each 
other. Naturally, discontinuity makes for a more taxing interpretation. There is no single 
formal benchmark by which to make a precise decision when regressions of this sort 
disagree. In such cases, we look at a combination of entries such as goodness of fit, 
variable reshuffles, and the number of individual replacements across a particular 
variable. Based around those factors we discuss relevant individual cases as they arise. 
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Appendix 4.41 contains an index table from which one can identify all variables which 
are being modelled. Some practitioners warn about the hazards of over-interpreting 
control variables. In terms of focusing the discussion they make a valid point, yet there 
is no consensus on this subject, and so how much one wishes to entertain a discussion of 
certain control variables boils down to personal preference. The approach of this chapter 
is to discuss them within moderation, mainly because we feel it adds some credence to 
the model if they are at least observed to show an intuitively sound direction, in which 
case permitting them to enter the picture contributes to a more rounded discussion.  
 
 
4.3.1 Regressions 1.1-1.3: child to remain involved in farming 
 
The first set of models (1.1 – 1.3) attempts to ascertain whether or not fair-trade directly 
affects whether a person wishes for the next generation of their family to remain in 
farming. Inference is restricted to those with children under the age of 19. The 
dependent variable is 0 if the person answered ‘no’ to wishing their child to remain in 
farming, and 1 if they answered ‘yes’. We will at a later point remind ourselves of the 
different interpretations, but for now let us concentrate on the ascertained relationships. 
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Table 4.2 Marginal effects on whether a person wishes their child to remain in farming 
 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
 *Significant at the 0.10 level 
 **Significant at the 0.05 level 
 *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 Regression 1.1 Regression 1.2 
(sample means) 
 
Regression 1.3 
(counterfactual means)
 
Dependent variable   
? 
child_farm01 
 
child_farm01 
 
child_farm01 
 
Age -0.01208 
(0.00761)    
-0.0138** 
(0.00662) 
-0.0142** 
(0.0065)    
Sex 0.1626 
(0.15064)          
 0.11761 
(0.11621)          
0.12060 
(0.1157)            
Co-Hab -0.03487 
(0.13366)         
 -0.0157 
(0.11469)       
-0.03580 
(0.1147)           
Personal Education -0.00345 
(0.06236)         
0.00735 
(0.05119)        
0.007573 
(0.0510)        
Sick days -0.00014 
(0.00906)         
0.00069 
(0.00777)          
0.002164 
(0.0075)        
Regular savings 0.03155 
(0.05508)          
0.06160 
(0.04894)           
0.06655 
(0.04911)            
Food & Accom -0.12262 
(0.1484)          
-0.00263 
(0.1276)          
 -0.01803 
(0.12793)             
Educational support 0.30351** 
(0.1350)       
0.43089** 
(0.1740) 
0.348306** 
(0.17081)    
Health 
Support 
-0.22923* 
(0.1350)       
-0.1302 
(0.11562)          
-0.23124* 
(0.1219)    
Child mortality -0.28015** 
(0.1249)          
-0.171656 
(0.0869)        
-0.16483 
(0.08696)           
Income per capita 0.00028  
(0.0002)          
0.00029 
(0.00021)        
0.00031 
(0.00021)            
Expenditure per 
capita 
0.00018 
(0.0005)          
0.00026 
(0.0004)    
  0.00018 
(0.00045)               
Financial Assistance 0.26303** 
(0.1230)          
0.0084262 
(0.1021)        
0.078255 
(0.10213)            
Participation index -0.005554 
(0.06118)         
-0.00739 
(0.14952)        
0.02044 
(0.05472)            
Cease Farm -0.4860*** 
(0.09457)         
-0.42447*** 
(0.0869)   
-0.4255*** 
(0.0869)    
Permanent 0.20294  
 (0.16231)        
0.05526 
(0.1495)           
0.06775 
(0.1489)           
Animals 0.27421*  
 (0.1553)        
0.19697 
(0.12684)           
0.199748 
(0.12863)     
Fair-trade -0.23783 
 (0.17598)        
-0.3100*** 
(0.1119)    
-0.2882** 
(0.1283) 
n 
 
Area under ROC 
 
Hit 
 
122 
 
82 
 
75% 
161 
 
80 
 
73% 
161 
 
80 
 
70% 
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The strongest and most significant variable for whether a person wishes their 
children to remain involved in farming is if that person themselves has considered 
ceasing farming. If the individual has personally given serious consideration to 
relocating their own labour, there is around a 45% higher chance that they do not wish 
their children to remain involved in farming. As is to be expected from the limited 
number of significant variables, the odds ratio exhibits more momentum. The odds ratio 
suggests that if a person considers relocating their own labour, this is associated with an 
85% to 90% increment in the odds of that person harbouring a preference for their 
children to find employment somewhere other than faming.   
A somewhat awkward variable to assess is the influence of whether a family have 
experienced past instances of child mortality. The direction of all coefficients presents 
us with reasoning that is broadly intuitive. In each regression the suggestion is that if a 
person’s family have experienced child mortality there is upward pressure on them 
expressing a desire that their children seek alternative employment. The initial 
specification boasts 95% confidence and a magnitude of 28%. However, the two 
subsequent specifications cut that magnitude in half and discard significance. 
Interestingly, the odds ratio specification reduces the significance to 90%, before the 
follow-on regressions again reject significance and cut the odds ratio from 70% to 50% 
for a person being satisfied for their child to remain in agrarian employment. In all, we 
are suspicious of the significance of this variable, but are content to see that the 
direction of its pressure on the dependent variable is intuitively in order.  
In terms of ‘shifting significance’ the variable which represents if a person has 
access to any financial assistance holds a similar challenge of interpretation to that of 
past instances of child mortality. Again, the coefficient is in an intuitively sound 
direction, the initial suggestion being that if a person is granted access to any financial 
assistance, this will increase by 26% the chances that they express an opinion in which 
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they are happy for their child to remain involved in farming. Stated as a singular odds 
ratio, the message is that financial assistance increases the odds that they will want their 
child to remain involved in farming by 194%. While the two subsequent regressions 
support the direction of the relationship, they starkly reduce the size of the coefficient 
and rebuff significance. The marginal effects fall to around 8%, and the odds ratio to a 
percentile of 35 to 40.  
 It would seem reasonable to state a compromised interpretation as; we suspect this 
variable of being mildly significant, we are content with its direction but consider that a 
marginal effect of 26% is an overstatement of its potency. Segregating the individual 
points of financial assistance did not increase the accuracy of the model, and so the 
variable was kept as a generic dummy.  
For reasons which include them being two of our most transplanted variables, one 
must take extra care when interpreting the relevance of organisational assistance which 
is provided in relation to health and education. The negative coefficient on health is 
counterintuitive, and a low internal variance problem with this variable manifests itself 
as a collinearity problem and means that we do not trust the statement of its mild 
relevance in regressions 1.1 and 1.3. Therefore, coupling the rejection of its significance 
in regression 1.2 with the outcome that the two less trustworthy regressions only just 
permitted it to scrape into the 90% confidence interval, we opt to draw no inference 
from this variable.  
While the level of replacement is the same for educational assistance, healthy 
internal variance and cross-model agreement in regards significance permit us to make a 
more robust statement in respect of this variable. As the inclusion of expected values 
inflates the educational coefficients in regressions 1.2 and 1.3, we state the magnitude 
from the first regression. If educational assistance is forthcoming, this will increase by 
30% the chance that a person will express a desire for their children to continue to be 
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involved in agriculture. In addition, this variable carries by far the largest singular odds 
ratio of the model. Exhibiting ratios of between 4 and 6, the suggestion is that in-house 
provisions of education cut by 300 to 500% the odds of a person wanting their children 
to seek alternative livelihoods. The fall in the odds ratio between regressions 1.2 and 1.3 
may be viewed as an indication of a link between fair-trade and organisational 
provisions for education.  
When interpreting the fair-trade coefficient we are faced with a move from 
insignificance to significance and a coefficient with a counterintuitive direction. 
Diagnostic tests indicate that the under-representation of counterfactuals in regression 
1.1 manifests itself in a collinearity problem between non fair-trade workers, ownership 
of animals, and the organisational provision of health assistance. For that reason, the 
fair-trade p-values in regressions 1.2 and 1.3 are considered more legitimate than those 
of regression 1.1. Hence the evidence suggests that, to the tune of 30%, fair-trade 
exhibits a significant and negative marginal effect in respect of people wanting their 
children to remain involved in agriculture. The corresponding odds ratio suggests that if 
a person becomes involved in fair-trade this reduces the odds of them wanting their 
children to remain in farming by around 70%. This result comes as a somewhat of a 
surprise. In one respect it may be taken as negative, but in another respect it may 
possibly be seen as fair-trade not perverting the incentives of a family wanting their 
children to progress beyond agriculture. One is entitled and invited to draw one’s own 
lines of interpretation. 
In terms of the sequence of this story, it’s agreeable to have observed the relevance 
of the ‘cease farm’ variable in the above model, because the natural progression of this 
story is to look next at what factors influence whether a person has considered 
relocating their own labour. This is a variable which some may consider to be a purer 
representation of ‘contentment’ than the previous dependent variable. 
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4.3.2 Regressions 2.1-2.3: whether a person has considered leaving their job 
 
The next set of models takes for its dependent variable a binary measure of whether a 
person has considered moving to work in a different place. In all, 75% of the population 
had not considered moving. The remaining 25% were split equally between wishing to 
remain in farming or move to a city. The split in the data is too thin to further 
investigate the ‘agrarian–urban’ labour moment hypothesis that the previous regression 
knocked on the door of. Rather we combine the numbers such that they are divided 
between those that have considered moving, and those that have not. Therefore, we take 
the latent variable to be ‘contentment’ which, in itself, few would disagree is a form of 
welfare. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the person has considered moving 
to work in a different place, 0 if they have not. We will see from the results below that 
this model resolves to be our least decisive.  
The findings of the initial regression are not at all encouraging for fair-trade, the 
suggestion being that involvement in fair-trade is associated with a 22% increase in the 
chance of a person wishing to relocate their labour, with an odds ratio of 6.3 suggesting 
a more acute relationship still. The expected value models do however offer a reprieve 
for fair-trade in this finding. In one sense it’s discouraging to see the two replacement 
regressions disagree with the un-tampered model. In another sense, the two replacement 
regressions are performing a part of their duty that is equally as important as if they had 
provided support. One cannot ignore the initial regression being vastly superior in terms 
its goodness of fit as measured by the area under the ROC curve. Diagnostic tests do 
however hint that we are suffering a missing variable bias, and it’s quite feasible that the 
dramatic loss of significance experienced when we cross from the untouched model to 
the expected values models is testament to that impurity. Hence, the expected value 
regressions appear to have severed a most worthwhile purpose indeed.  
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Table 4.3 Marginal effects on whether a person has considered relocating their labour. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
 *Significant at the 0.10 level 
 **Significant at the 0.05 level 
 *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
 Regression 2.1 Regression 2.2 
(sample means) 
 
Regression 2.3 
(counterfactual means 
Dependent variable   
? 
Cease Farm Cease Farm Cease Farm 
Age -.007026* 
(0.00394)         
-0.010*** 
(0.0035)          
-0.0102*** 
(0.0035)          
Sex -0.072012 
 (0.10031)        
0.10445 
(0.06885)          
0.103316 
(0.06879)           
Co-Hab 0.08870 
(0.07227)         
0.10183 
(0.0686)           
0.101554 
(0.06833)           
Personal Education 0.06733** 
(0.067336)      
0.03031 
(0.03292) 
0.03035 
(0.0329)            
Sick days 0.00662 
 (0.0066)         
0.00663 
(0.00442)          
0.00646 
(0.0044)            
Regular Savings -0.00486 
(0.0319)         
-0.00212 
(0.03046)    
-0.00159 
(0.03032)          
Future provision 0.1395614 
 (0.08631)        
-0.01896 
(0.1244)          
-0.01186 
(0.1227)           
Food & Accom 0.0745829 
(0.08091)         
0.00532 
(0.0864)          
0.00674 
(0.08688)           
Organisational 
support 
-0.15709 
(0.0721)       
-0.0259 
(0.0610)          
-0.10972 
(0.0653)          
Child mortality -0.1570** 
(0.066)         
-0.1049 
(0.0947)          
-0.10972 
(0.0949)          
Income per capita -0.000048 
(0.00004)         
-0.00002 
(0.00003)       
-0.00002 
(0.00003)       
Expenditure per 
capita 
0.0006182** 
(0.00024)         
0.00020 
(0.0002)        
0.00018 
(0.00021)           
Financial 
Assistance 
0.1646126 
(0.08452)         
0.06240 
(0.06752)          
0.06496 
(0.06753)           
Participation index -0.0208374 
(0.03719)       
0.01021 
(0.03287)          
-0.00889 
(0.0351)          
Permanent 0.1318096* 
 (0.07482)        
0.02974 
(0.0954)          
0.02545 
(0.09541)           
Animals -0.1079453 
(0.07387)         
-0.06988 
 (0.0804)         
-0.07616 
(0.0795)        
Fair-trade 0.21695***  
(0.06933)       
0.04206 
(0.0799)       
0.07802 
(0.0900) 
n 
 
Area under ROC 
 
Hit 
 
154 
 
0.82 
 
77% 
222 
 
0.7 
 
74% 
222 
 
0.71 
 
74% 
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We are granted findings in which we must concede that our data struggles to offer a 
clear insight into what factors influence whether a person considers changing their place 
of work. Consequently we cannot say whether or not fair-trade prevents a person from 
wanting to move away from the farm they are currently on. The only variable we can 
have some confidence in is that past the average age, a person’s propensity to wish to 
relocate begins to fall – a finding which most would consider to be quite intuitive. The 
next relationship to be tested offers a much clearer picture.  
 
 
4.3.3 Regressions 3.1-3.1: change in wellbeing over the last 3 to 5 years 
 
Attempting to compensate for the absence of a time dimension, the third model takes as 
its dependent variable ‘improvement in living standards over the last 3 to 5 years’. 
Representative of the period of fair-trade involvement, the recipients where asked if 
their lives had improved, stayed the same or worsened over that period. The descriptive 
statistics for this have been presented in the appropriate section above. The answer was 
then condensed to be a 0 for those who felt their living standard had either worsened or 
remained stagnant, and a 1 for those who claimed an improved standard of living. 
Incidentally, this variable was tested as a regressor in the previous specification, but 
proved to be neither significant nor at all enhancing of the goodness of fit. 
Of all three specifications this model grants fair-trade its most decisive compliment. 
As well, in terms of estimation and counterfactual representation, the model that is 
reported below was the most accommodating so far. The un-tampered model has a 
much better fit, and there is very little dispute of significance across all 3 specifications. 
What this consistency indicates is that when we discuss inference magnitudes, we can, 
for the most part, focus our discussion on regression 3.1.  
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The lion’s share of upward pressure appears to be generated by two variables; fair-
trade and whether the person considers their organisation to be credible in terms of the 
commitments it makes to them (i.e. general promises that relate to working standards). 
Highly significant across all specifications, those who called into question their 
employer’s commitment to stand by their stated obligations were 30-35% less likely to 
have experienced an improvement in living standards over the period in question. This 
in turn is associated to an odds ratio that lifts the singular odds of citing an improvement 
by an estimated 579%.  
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Table 4.4 Marginal effects on whether a person considers their wellbeing to have 
improved over the last 3 to 5 years. 
 
 Regression 3.1 
 
Regression 3.2 
(sample means) 
 
Regression 3.3 
(counterfactual means) 
 
Dependent variable   
? 
liv_stand35_01 liv_stand35_01 liv_stand35_01 
Age -0.008016** 
(0.0034)         
-0.00748** 
(0.0034)          
-0.007477** 
(0.0034)           
Marriage and 
cohabitation 
0.148157* 
(0.0828)          
0.168803** 
(0.07494)       
0.169167** 
(0.07484)       
Personal Education -0.01653 
(0.0332)         
-0.03198 
(0.03278)       
-0.03355 
(0.0326)          
Regular Savings 0.05070 
(0.03583)       
0.029684 
(0.03424)       
0.029150 
(0.0341)       
Vote 0.020215 
(0.0905)        
0.153120** 
(0.07679)       
0.147714* 
(0.07687)       
Food & Accom -0.06631 
(0.06968)         
-0.05224 
(0.08862)       
-0.04856 
(0.08839)       
Educational support 0.10151 
(0.14592)     
0.144891 
(0.0890)       
0.1595* 
(0.08957)       
Income per capita -0.00019* 
(0.00011)        
-0.000080 
(0.0001)       
-0.000082 
(0.0001)       
Expenditure per 
capita 
0.00056** 
(0.00028)       
0.000205 
(0.0002)       
0.000208 
(0.0002)       
Financial Assistance -0.1108 
(0.07995)       
-0.127427* 
(0.0715)        
-0.132520* 
(0.07182)       
Participation Index 0.01113 
(0.03616)       
-0.008691 
(0.0331)          
-0.00638 
(0.0328)       
Farm Trust 0.3406*** 
(0.10251)       
0.2759*** 
(0.0753)       
0.28155*** 
(0.0750)       
Permanent -0.0335 
(0.0915)         
0.04830 
(0.0910)       
0.04265 
(0.0900)       
Animals 0.13552** 
(0.0566)          
0.13434* 
(0.0708)       
0.13649* 
(0.0701)       
Fair trade 0.29486** 
(0.1278)       
0.24019*** 
(0.07317)          
0.22374*** 
(0.07396)       
N 
 
Area under ROC 
 
Hit 
155 
 
0.86 
 
80% 
225 
 
0.8 
 
75% 
225 
 
0.8 
 
75% 
   Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level 
    **Significant at the 0.05 level 
    *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
More central to the task at hand, all models appear to strongly support the premise 
that fair-trade has exhibited a strong upward force on people’s subjective measure of 
wellbeing. In terms of fair-trade, we still prefer regression 3.1 because of the superiority 
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of the area under the ROC curve. However, unlike the organisational commitment 
variable (Farm Trust), there are no replacements in fair-trade, and so it means that we 
can also pay attention to the coefficients in regressions 3.2 and 3.3 – we can view them 
as a sort of range. If a person is a fair-trade worker, there is around a 25% greater 
chance that they will have cited an improvement in living standards over the period in 
question. With odds ratios ranging from 3.3 to 5.2, the model predicts that being a 
member of fair-trade raises the odds of an improvement in living standards by between 
232 and 289%. 
Summarising the remaining significant variables completes a picture that one may 
find generally rather intuitive – or at least not counterintuitive. The model suggests a 
significant but minuscule influence from age. Above the average age, each additional 
year raises the chances of a person claiming to having experienced an improvement in 
living standards by around 7 or 8%. With odds ratios ranging from 0.94 to 0.96, this 
tells a similar story in which getting older is associated with a singular odds decline of 4 
to 6%.  
The replacement regressions serve a worthwhile purpose in respect of how they tip 
the cohabitation variable from 90 to 95% significance. Taking that small push into 
account, we regard the variable as significant, and report that having a partner is 
associated with around a 15% increase in the likelihood of a person citing a short to 
medium term improvement in their standard of living. At 2.4 to 2.7, the odds ratios of 
this variable are more pronounced, the prediction being that if a person acquires a 
partner the odds of them citing an increase in living standards rises by 143 to 172%.  
The relationship with voting activity is difficult to interpret. In the replacement 
regressions we see it cross the threshold into significance, rise from an upward 
prediction of 2 to 15%, and at the same time double its odds ratio. Given that there are 
only 7 replacements of this variable, we may prefer to give a bit more weight to the 
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replacement regressions; at the least we would cite a positive relationship which is 
weakly significant.  
It is surprising to see income per capita assume a negative value. However, the 
slightness of its strength, less than a tenth of a percent, coupled with it only meeting the 
90% confidence level, and thereafter losing its significance in the replacement 
regressions dictates that we need not dwell upon it.  
Being the recipient of financial assistance generates a negative coefficient and is 
weakly significance. The variable itself and the relationship it exhibits in this model is 
neither intuitive nor counterintuitive. The coefficient suggests downward pressure of 
around 12% in terms of marginal effect, and an odds ratio that cuts in half the odds of a 
person citing an improved living standard. As there were no replacements, we can look 
at the negativity and mild level of significance in regressions 3.2 and 3.3 and consider 
that this variable may add some colour to the overall picture. In terms of piecing 
together a story, it suggests that the type of financial assistance that workers are making 
use of is more associated with ‘assistance for difficulties’ as opposed to ‘finance for 
consumption or development’.  
Lastly we must remark upon the positive and mildly significant influence of animal 
ownership. As no expected values where used within this variable, we would, on 
balance, prefer the statement of mild significance that is present in regressions 3.2 and 
3.3 over the stronger statement that model 3.1 makes, and therefore conclude in favour 
of a 90% confidence interval. The outcome is that the marginal effect of animal 
ownership elevates the chance that a person will have neither regressed nor remained 
stagnant in their standard of living by around 14%. Also, preferring the singular odds 
ratios from regressions 3.2 and 3.3, we would cite the variable to be worth an odds 
increase of around 140%. 
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4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It’s interesting to observe that a number of relationships which we expected to stand tall 
did in the end appear to fall by the wayside. For example ‘direct income’ appears 
somewhat less relevant than one may have intuitively expected. The overall picture for 
fair-trade is one whereby there is a very occasional suggestion of negativity, a fair 
degree of neutrality, and moderate amount of positive influence. 
In terms of material welfare, we have observed that direct income does not appear to 
be a key feature of this fair-trade story. Descriptive statistics paint a picture in which 
incomes are equal but the support and assistance that reaches fair-trade farmers is in 
many cases superior to that which reaches conventional peers.  
The portrayal as regards health and education expresses neutrality or else 
favouritism towards the counterfactual group. Given the time it takes to alter variables 
of this nature we believe that it is more appropriate to employ many of these variables in 
a way that establishes a vantage point over initial (past) points of welfare. In this case, 
we find evidence that provides support for the folk-knowledge that our fair-trade sample 
was taken from the “dark side of the mountain”. If it is indeed the case that fair-trade 
workers began from a less advantageous position, this would imply that ‘neutrality’ may 
itself be indicative of progress. We cannot speculate too heavily on that point but 
consider it so that the reader is aware of it.  
It is something of a surprise to find that fair-trade farmers did not appear any less 
likely to have considered relocating their labour. Indeed there is even a small indication 
in the data to suggest that they may be more likely to have considered relocating. 
Viewed in what many would consider the most apparent light of day, this variable is 
likely to be taken as a proxy for ‘contentment’. 
Similarly, but open to a more multidimensional conclusion, fair-trade workers 
appeared no keener for their children to remain in agriculture than did non fair-trade 
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workers. The interpretation of this may be deemed to capture a mixture of contentment, 
expectations, understanding of alternatives, and developmental tides of labour. In 
addition, the data contains a subtle hint of an adverse affect in which fair-trade farmers 
may be more likely to succumb to the temptation to withdraw their children during 
harvest time, but the numbers were too few to model. This however may be worthy of 
further enquiry.  
Our two strongest most robust relate to ‘participation’ and ‘recent improvement in 
living standards.’ In terms of welfare definition, our clearest dependent variable is if a 
person claims to have experienced an improvement in their living standard over the last 
3 to 5 years. Within this model fair-trade shone brightly. Similarly, results relating to 
‘participation’ are particularly benign towards fair-trade. It does indeed appear that fair-
trade joint-bodies are substantially more energised than those of non fair-trade farms. 
Fair-trade workers appear to be more motivated in participating in joint-body activities, 
and to have more faith in the ability of their joint-bodies to be effective in making a 
difference. Given that ‘empowerment’ is cited as a cardinal objective by fair-trade 
organisers, if one is willing to directly equate participation with empowerment, then the 
data suggest that fair-trade appears to be clearly achieving one of its cornerstone 
objectives.   
The two main criticisms of this study are that practical limitations prevented the data 
from being purely randomised. There is however a degree of randomness in the sense 
that we simply took all we could find and imposed no selection criteria. Secondly, the 
absence of a time dimension severely hinders the degree of sophistication we can 
impose upon analysis of the data. The lifetime of fair-trade is only now entering a stage 
whereby time series and longitudinal analysis present themselves as genuine options. It 
is without hiding from the spotlight of these criticisms that we present a conclusion 
which is broadly favourable to fair-trade.  
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Conclusion 
 
As regards market behaviour, we grasp in our hands something which is both too hot to 
hold, and at the same time too valuable and volatile to just drop. The means by which to 
distribute the stock of an economy rest neither exclusively on the desks of state 
planners, nor purely in the self-interested hands of the people themselves. It is a joint 
venture in which each must play their part. Comprehending and designing the specifics 
of that balance is ‘thee’ central challenge of political economy. Failing to respect the 
system of incentives which governs the behaviour of people is one fundamental and 
time-honoured pitfall. Yet, feeling the answers to be already known, constant, and 
universal, marks its own pitfall and, at times, cements an avenue of conceit. It is via 
recognition of the immodesty of the challenge at hand that discussions of intervention 
are best broken down and examined in small packets as opposed to theories of grand 
design. Fair-trade is one very small element of ‘voluntary orientated’ intervention. It is 
probably more accurate to refer to it as quasi-intervention. It is the guided opinion of 
this discourse that fair-trade is ‘subtle enough’ to satisfy those who trust the market 
more than the planners. To somehow consider it a perversion of liberal values is to show 
a flair for hyperbole. It has been brought to bear that the structural characteristics of 
agriculture, the global political impositions on trade, and the clear concentration of 
power within certain commodity chains, all combine to grant that fair-trade is legitimate 
‘in principle’. The question of whether its legitimacy extends beyond being simply ‘in 
principle’ is one which this thesis has sought to shed some light on. As well as 
identifying the grounds of principled legitimacy, the first chapter went on to identify a 
number of gaps. Each gap was tailored to a particular categorical actor in the fair-trade 
relationship. Exposing three actors in all – the consumer, the non-participating producer, 
and the participating producer – each subsequent chapter was respectively dedicated to 
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examining the welfare effects on a particular actor. Accordingly, inclusive of a 
comprehensive literature review, the contribution of this thesis is four-fold. 
As regards the consumer we equated fair-trade with altruism, and constructed a 
theoretical behavioural framework in which we were able to measure the utility that a 
fair-trade consumer receives in respect of their purchase. From within that framework, 
we displayed how the addition of new information can alter a person’s ‘propensity to 
experience utility from the benefit of others’ and how that in turn affects the consumer’s 
decision to participate in fair-trade. While the generation of new information can be 
either good or bad for fair-trade, it has in either connotation the potential to be win-win 
for the consumer. This is because if they felt their purchases to be heralding a positive 
impact, consumer utilities increase, whereas if they feel their contribution to be 
ineffectual they could withdraw their patronage and save themselves money. The degree 
to which the average consumer differentiates between high quality and low quality 
information is undecided, and that may foster an incentive for fair-trade organisers to 
concentrate their efforts on the proliferation of anecdotal evidence. In the interests of 
‘firmer justice’ however, the policy call has to be for more systematic studies with 
carefully identified counterfactual groups. By virtue of it being voluntary behaviour, 
there is no liberal case to oppose the presence of fair-trade in respect of the consumer. 
Fair-trade either lifts the utility of the consumer or else the consumer does not partake. 
As an extension of the framework it was hypothesised that being able to measure a 
person’s income independent propensity to experience utility from other persons’ gains 
could possibly be used to shed some quantitative light on what a ‘social consensus’ is, 
and the wider role it plays in terms of growth and development.  
Chapter II deployed the tools of a classical welfare approach in analysing transfers 
of income between participating and non-participating producers. We were critical of 
precisely what constitutes ‘oversupply’, and cast doubt upon the ease with which some 
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commentators feel they can ‘with ease’ identify it. As a point of theoretical generosity, 
we took at face value the assertion that by permitting normal market forces to play their 
role, fair-trade does not beget oversupply. The result was a model that appropriated fair-
trade as a change in preference rather than a change in demand, hence we held physical 
supply and demand constant, but permitted incomes to rise – zero-sum in quantity, non 
zero-sum in income. The model is limited in that it only looks at fair-trade as a price 
increase, but it does nonetheless paint a very logical picture, and as such grants the 
policymaker a unique overview of the process. We are able to show an array of 
perceivable welfare shuffles, inclusive in which were the necessary and sufficient, and 
necessary but not sufficient conditions needed in order for fair-trade to be a Pareto 
improvement. Uncovered was the possibility of an adverse effect, one in which, under 
certain conditions, fair-trade damaged the income of the fair-trade farmer, and increased 
the income of the non-participating producer. The transfer was however zero-sum and 
so this, quite interestingly, implies that if one is willing to accept that the non-
participants quite feasibly start from equally disadvantaged circumstances, then the 
patron’s willingness to support fair-trade need not be affected. While there is some 
debate around how one may qualitatively comprehend some key variables, the diagnosis 
of this thesis is that the policymaker is largely forced to take a back seat to the animal 
spirits of actors, and various other market forces both random and non-random.  
Finally, an original dataset of landless South African grape pickers was examined 
for evidence of impact. With a few notable exceptions and points of debate, the overall 
results reflected reasonably well on fair-trade. We observed a number of points of 
neutrality, but at the same time brought forth some local knowledge and evidence which 
suggested that neutrality may be representative of catch-up. Somewhat surprisingly, we 
did not observe that fair-trade made people more likely to remain with their current 
employer, nor did it appear to persuade people that agriculture is an especially 
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preferable destination for their children. One the one hand this could be indicative of 
fair-trade not making people feel any more content, on the other it suggests that fair-
trade does not alter what some would consider to be a ‘natural developmental tide’ in 
respect of labour movement. The strongest and most significant results came in relation 
to subjective improvements in living standards and activities of participation.  
The overall conclusion is that fair-trade appears to do more good than bad, it may 
not be a panacea for problems of disadvantaged commodity producers, but it does 
appear to have the potential to smooth the edges of the lives of the people that it targets. 
Various predispositions will likely dictate that there will always be those one either side 
of the divide; those that consider fair-trade universally good, and those that consider 
fair-trade universally unhelpful. Evaluation is desperately in need of a time dimension, 
but as things stand the arsenal of the advocates is better stocked than the armoury of the 
critics.  
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX 0.1: FAIR-TRADE COMMODITIES FROM AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
Source: FLO Website (2007) 
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APPENDIX 0.2: FAIR-TRADE COMMODITIES FROM ASIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FLO Website (2007) 
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APPENDIX 0.3: FAIR-TRADE COMMODITIES FROM SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FLO Website (2007) 
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APPENDIX 0.4: MARKET SHARE OF COFFEE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 
 
Belgium 1.70% 
Denmark 3.40% 
Finland 0.40% 
France 0.40% 
Germany 1.10% 
Italy 0.30% 
Holland 2.90% 
Sources: Giovannucci (2001, 2003), Zehner, OECD estimates  
 
 
APPENDIX 0.5: ESTIMATED RETAIL VALUE OF FAIR-TRADE CERTIFIED 
PRODUCTS (EUROS) 
 
Country 2006 2007  %Δ 2008 2009 %Δ  
Australia/New Zealand 6,800,000 10,800,000 59% 18,567,280 28,733,986 55%* 
Austria  41,700,000 52,800,000 27% 66,200,000 72,000,000 9% 
Belgium  28,000,000 35,000,000 25% 46,780,141 56,431,496 21% 
Canada  53,800,000 79,600,000 48% 123,797,132 201,978,074 63%* 
Denmark  23,200,000 39,600,000 71% 51,220,106 54,436,609 6% 
Finland  22,500,000 34,600,000 54% 54,445,645 86,865,284 60% 
France  166,000,000 210,000,000 27% 255,570,000 287,742,792 13% 
Germany  110,000,000 141,700,000 29% 212,798,451 267,473,584 26% 
Ireland  11,600,000 23,300,000 101% 94,429,586 118,574,416 26% 
Italy  34,500,000 39,000,000 13% 41,284,198 43,382,860 5% 
Japan  4,100,000 6,200,000 51% 9,567,132 11,283,451 18%* 
Latvia         153,500   
Lithunaia         315,380   
Luxembourg  2,800,000 3,200,000 14% 4,249,301 5,327,122 25% 
Netherlands  41,000,000 47,500,000 16% 60,913,968 86,818,400 43% 
Norway  8,600,000 18,100,000 110% 30,961,160 34,689,522 12%* 
Sweden  16,000,000 42,500,000 166% 72,830,302 82,662,331 13% 
Switzerland  142,300,000 158,100,000 11% 168,766,526 180,160,263 7% 
Spain  1,900,000 3,900,000 105% 5,483,106 8,030,724 46% 
South Africa         458,076   
United Kingdom  409,500,000 704,300,000 72% 880,620,304 897,315,061 2%* 
USA  499,000,000 730,800,000 46% 757,753,382 851,403,590 12%* 
Rest of the world       130,722 18,099,255  
TOTAL   1,623,300,000 2,381,000,000 47% 2,956,368,442 3,394,335,776 14-15% 
 
Norway 1.10% 
Sweden 1.60% 
Switzerland 2.80% 
United Kingdom 1.70% 
United States 0.30% 
Japan 0.40% 
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APPENDIX 0.6: PRODUCT SPICIFIC ESTIMATED UK RETAIL SALES BY 
VALUE FOR 1998–2009 (£MILLION) 
  1998  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006  2007 2008  2009  
Coffee 13.7  15.0  15.5  18.6  23.1  34.3  49.3  65.8  93.0  117.0 137.3  157.0 
Tea  2.0  4.5  5.1  5.9  7.2  9.5  12.9  16.6  25.1  30.0  64.8  68.1 
Cocoa products*  1.0  2.3  3.6  6.0  7.0  10.9  16.5  21.9  29.7  25.5  26.8  44.2 
Honey products*  n/a  n/a  0.9  3.2  4.9  6.1  3.4  3.5  3.4  2.7  5.2  4.6 
Bananas  n/a  n/a  7.8  14.6  17.3  24.3  30.6  47.7  65.6  150.0  184.6  209.2 
Flowers n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4.3 5.7 14.0 24.0  33.4  30.0 
Wine n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.5  3.3 5.3 8.2  10.0  16.4 
Cotton n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a n/a 0.2 4.5 34.8  77.9  50.1 
Other  n/a  n/a  n/a  2.2  3.5  7.2  22.3  30.3  45.7  100.8  172.6  219.4 
TOTAL  16.7  21.8  32.9  50.5  63.0  92.3  140.8 195.0 286.3  493.0**  712.6  799.0*** 
* The figures against these products represent the cocoa part of all products containing cocoa and the 
honey part of all products containing honey. 
** Following review, some of the 2007 figures have been amended but the total remains the same. 
*** Subsequent press releases in March 2011 have stated a final revised figure of £836m, and an 
estimated 2010 figure of £1.17bn 
 
APPENDIX 0.7: TOTAL ESTIMATED UK RETAIL SALES BY VALUE 1998-
2008 (£MILLION) 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 
 
 262
APPENDIX 1.1: ESTIMATED PRICE COMPOSITION OF INSTANT COFFEE, 
1996-2001 (CURRENT US$ THOUSANDS PER TON OF COFFEE BEANS) 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1.2: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME ALONG THE 
COFFEE CHAIN (1971-1995) 
 
 
Taken from Talbot (1997) 
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APPENDIX 1.3: STATISTICS FROM IMHIF AND LEE (2007)  
 
 COAINE 
(FT)   
Mejillones 
(FT) 
Anditrade 
(FT ethos) 
Copacabana 
(Non-FT) 
Year began exporting FT 2004* 2002 - - 
Organic certification 1995 1998 Yes 199 
No. of Members 370 128 1200 320 
Proportion of supply to FT (%) 65 40  - - 
Stage of production purchased 
(1 = early........3 late)+ 
 
Green 
Coffee (3) 
(Pergamo) 
Green 
Coffee (3) 
(Pergamo) 
Berries (1) 
 
Stewed corn 
(2) 
 
Price received for non-organic green 
coffee 
1.39 1.39 1.18 Unknown++  
Price paid to producer ($ per lb) 0.876** 0.975** 0.13125** £0.29** 
Yield per hectare (lbs) 1563 1898 8500 2310 
Revenue per hectare ($) 1369 1851 1275 670 
Annual costs per hectare ($) 592** 620** 450** 400** 
Net annual profit per hectare ($) 777 1231 665 270 
Average Producer’s education (%) 
- No education          
- Primary 
- Secondary 
- Tertiary 
 
52.5 
22.5 
20 
5 
 
75 
17.5 
7.5 
0 
 
65 
22.5 
12.5 
0 
 
41 
22.5 
4.8 
4.8 
Average Children’s education (%) 
- No education          
- Primary 
- Secondary 
- Tertiary 
 
26 
34.8 
34 
5.2 
 
27.7 
33.6 
34.3 
4.4 
 
21.7 
36.2 
42 
0 
 
41 
33.6 
21 
4.5 
Access to potable water (%) 12.5 70 42.5 19 
Electricity in homes - 70 19 14 
Income supplemented by coca (%) 6.5 0 23 36 
Access to credit % 77 100 0*** 0*** 
Revenue from the social premium ($) 
(per head in parentheses) 
8642 
(23.36) 
17284 
(135) 
- - 
Provision of education facilities No No No No 
Investment in occupational training 
and production courses 
Yes Yes Partial In 
the past 
No 
* FLO cert 1994, lost its certification 1998 and was recertified 2004. 
** Note that due to the different levels of processing involved these figures are not directly comparable; 
delivery costs have been subtracted and the FT prices are not inclusive of the social premium. 
*** this figure is questionable, in that the wording of the report is appears a touch uncertain “neither 
Anditrade nor Copacabana seem to facilitate financing for their producers” (p.85) 
+Coffee value chain: 1.Berries, 2. Stewed corn, 3.Green coffee, 4.Rosted coffee. 
++Prices are averages, taking into account the organic premium. While Copacabana is unknown it is 
assumed to be substantially < $1.37/lb 
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APPENDIX 3.1: FARMER A’S INCOME (UNLIMTED SPARE CAPACITY) 
 
AAA YYY Δ±=* ,  ⇒  AAA YYY −=Δ * ⇒ ))(())(())(( AMFTFTFTAAMA QPQPQQPY −+−=Δ  
))(())((* FTFTFT
A
AMA QPQQPY +−=  
))(())((* FTFTFTAMA QPQQPY +−= α  
))(())((* FTMFTAMA QPQQPY εα ++−=  
FTFTMFTMAMA QQPQPQPY εα ++−=*  
 
 
 
APPENDIX 3.2: AGGREGATE INCOME CHANGE (UNLIMITED SPARE 
CAPACITY) 
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APPENDIX 3.3: FULLY EXPANDED QUANTITY EQUATION FOR FARMER 
A (LIMITED SPACE CAPACITY) 
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APPENDIX 3.4: FULLY EXPANDED QUANTITY EQUATION FOR FARMER 
B (LIMITED SPARE CAPACITY) 
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APPENDIX 3.5: FULLY EXPANDED INCOME EQUATION FOR FARMER A 
(LIMITED SPARE CAPACITY) 
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APPENDIX 3.6: FULLY EXPRESSED INCOME EQUATION FOR FARMER B 
(LIMITED SPARE CAPACITY) 
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APPENDIX 3.7: SUMMARISED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 Variable 
description 
Unlimited 
capacity 
Limited capacity General comments and 
degree of openness to 
policy maker  
α  
 
The required 
quantity 
adjustment that 
results from a 
change in 
consumer 
preference 
Zero sum. 
Fails Kaldor-
Hicks. 
A value of 1 
fully protects 
Farmer B from 
negative 
externalities 
Zero sum. 
Fails Kaldor-Hicks. 
A value of 1 helps, 
but does not fully 
protect farmer B 
from negative 
externalities 
Largely exogenous, difficult to 
see how a policymaker would 
influence this variable. 
FTQ
 
Quantity 
demanded of 
fair-trade 
Non zero sum. 
Passes Kaldor-
Hicks. Only 
Pareto improving 
if 1=α  
Non zero sum. 
Passes Kaldor-
Hicks 
Not necessarily 
Pareto improving 
Chapter II explains this 
demand. It can be influenced 
by information and disposable 
income, but proliferation of 
relevant information can be 
costly. 
λA  Farmer A’s 
ability to react 
rationally to the 
quantity 
adjustment that 
fair-trade will 
bring about. 
n/a Zero sum. 
Fails Kaldor-Hicks. 
 
Little to no policymaker 
control. 
ConQ
 
Quantity that 
Farmer A rejects 
in order to 
accommodate a 
fair-trade order.  
n/a Zero sum. 
Fails Kaldor-Hicks. 
 
Limited possibility for 
policymaker influence. As it is 
zero sum, assisting one farmer 
comes at the direct expense of 
the other and generates no 
aggregate value.  
λ  The result of a 
commercial 
battle over a 
previously 
rejected quantity 
of 
conventionally 
priced produce.  
n/a Zero-sum. 
Fails Kaldor-Hicks. 
 
No policymaker control, 
except perhaps indirectly by 
capacity building. 
 
(λ  and ψ  related) 
ψ  
 
captures the 
relative strengths 
that feed the 
result of λ  
commercial 
battle 
n/a Zero-sum. 
Fails Kaldor-Hicks. 
 
No policymaker control, 
except perhaps indirectly by 
capacity building. 
(λ  and ψ  related) 
Ω  Coefficient by 
which the buyer 
can punish the 
fair-trade farmer 
for 
underestimation 
of ConQ  
n/a Zero-sum. 
Fails Kaldor-Hicks. 
 
No policymaker control. 
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APPENDIX 4.10: PAIR-WISE INDEPENDENCE TESTS: MATERIAL 
WELFARE  
 
Variable Chi-sq Spearman 
Correlatio
n 
 
Kendall 
tau-b 
Polychoric 
Correlation 
 
Tetrachoric 
Correlation 
Timing of wages 11.413 
(0.003) 
- 0.0421 
(0.4193) 
- 0.0417 
(0.4189) 
  
Minimum wage 20.9 
(0.000) 
0.2471 
(0.0001) 
0.2382 
(0.0001) 
  
Keep farming if 
wages fell 
11.072 
(0.001) 
   0.3232 
(0.001) 
Ownership of 
durables index 
 -0.2076 
(0.0000) 
-0.1903 
(0.0001) 
-0.3014 
(0.0909) 
 
Saving ability 20.222 
(0.000) 
0.1807 
(0.0005) 
0.1690 
(0.0005) 
0.3142 
(0.0034) 
 
Occasional food 
shortages 
1.0399 
(0.308) 
   0.1345 
(0.3236) 
Subsidised 
accommodation 
7.5542 
(0.006) 
   0.2849 
(0.0107) 
H0 for every test is independence between FT and the stated variable. Correlation coefficients are 
specified from a fair-trade dummy (ft=1) and the opposing variable is a ranked value which conforms to 
a standard in which the higher the number the more positive the outcome. Hence, for all but chi-squared, 
positive numbers imply favouritism towards fair-trade, negative numbers favour the control group. P-
values in parentheses. 
 
 
APPENDIX 4.11: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER CAPITA 
 
0 500 1,000 1,500
Household Income per capita
FT
non-FT
excludes outside values
 
t-test does not reject that means are the same. 
 272
 
APPENDIX 4.12: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE PER 
CAPITA 
 
0 200 400 600
Expenditure per caita
FT
non-FT
excludes outside values
 
t-test does not reject that means are the same. 
 
APPENDIX 4.13: TIMING OF WAGE PAYMENT 
33%
57%
11%
27%
71%
1%
non-FT FT
In advance Upon Delivery
There is generally a delay
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.14: WAGE RELATIVE TO MINIMUM WAGE 
 
4%
46%
7%
43%
1% 11%
10%
78%
non-FT FT
Less than Min Wage Exactly Min Wage
Above Min Wage Don't know/No answer
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
APPENDIX 4.15: WAGE RELATIVE TO MINIMUM WAGE (EXCLUDING 
NON-RESPONDENTS) 
7%
81%
12% 5%
50%
45%
non-FT FT
Less than Min Wage Exactly Min Wage
Above Min Wage
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.16: WHETHER THE WORKER HAS CONSIDERED CHANGING 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
74%
13%
13%
76%
12%
12%
non-FT FT
No Yes, to another rural area
Yes, to a city
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
APPENDIX 4.17 OWNERSHIP OF CONSUMER GOODS INDEX 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
-2 0 2 4 -2 0 2 4
non-FT FT
D
en
si
ty
tv_rad_fridge_mob
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.18:ABILITY TO SAVE 
 
68%
13%
17%
2%
52%
15%
14%
19%
non-FT FT
No Less than 5% per month
Between 5% and 10% per month More than 10%
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
APPENDIX 4.19: HOW SAVINGS ARE MANAGED 
38%
46%
5%
11%
20%
44%
22%
14%
non-FT FT
At home Personal Bank Acc
Bank prog run by co-op/farm Other
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.20: WHETHER WORKERS ALWAYS HAVE ACCESS TO 
SUFFICIENT FOOD 
 
7%
93%
5%
95%
non-FT FT
No Yes
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4.21: RECEIVE SUBSIDISED ACCOMMODATION 
24%
76%
12%
88%
non-FT FT
NO YES
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.22: PAIR-WISE INDEPENDENCE TESTS: IMMATERIAL 
WELFARE 
 
Variable Chi-sq Spearman 
Correlation 
 
Kendall  
tau-b 
Polychoric 
Correlation 
 
Tetrachoric 
Correlation 
Educational 
achievement  
12.5779 
(0.028) 
-0.1320 
(0.0099) 
-0.1204 
(0.0101) 
-0.15218 
(0.07063) 
 
Child mortality 0.3878 
(0.533) 
   0.0674 
(0.6403) 
Hospital child birth 8.1520 
(0.004) 
   -0.4186 
(0.0030) 
Hospital child birth 
– for children <5 
2.6340 
(0.105) 
   -0.3841 
(0.1882) 
Home child birth 5.7752 
(0.016) 
   0.2493 
(0.0178) 
Home child birth for 
children < 5 
0.0010 
 
(0.975) 
   -0.0045 
(1.0000) 
Expected 
improvement in 
living standards of 
children 
1.5828 
(0.453) 
0.0565 
(0.3095) 
0.0542 
(0.3231) 
0.1251 
(0.5416) 
0.1679 
(0.2273) 
Want your child to 
remain in farming 
1.8652 
(0.394) 
 
-0.0255 
(0.6463) 
-0.0243 
(0.6461) 
-0.0391 
(0.186) 
-0.0423 
(0.6959) 
Withdraw children 
from education 
during harvest  
8.9057 
(0.012) 
   -0.5417 
(0.0024) 
Propensity to 
withdraw child from 
school 
8.9057 
(0.012) 
3.7322 
(0.053) 
   0.5417 
(0.0024) 
0.2520 
(0.0667) 
Access to clinics 1.9350 
(0.164) 
   0.1363 
(0.1750) 
Access to hospitals 0.6695 
(0.413) 
   0.0759 
(0.0917) 
Access to visiting 
doctor 
22.2058 
(0.000) 
   0.5191 
(0.0000) 
Living standards 
better than parents’ 
living standards 
1.9308 
(0.381) 
0.0418 
(0.4178) 
0.0411 
(0.4175) 
0.055 
(0.2164) 
 
Improved living 
standards over the 
last 3 to 5 years 
28.2390 
(0.000) 
0.2594 
(0.000) 
0.2554 
(0.000) 
0.3818 
(0.0185) 
 
H0 for every test is independence between FT and the stated variable. Correlation coefficients are 
specified from a fair-trade dummy (ft=1) and the opposing variable is a ranked value which conforms to 
a standard in which the higher the number the more positive the outcome. Hence, for all but chi-squared, 
positive numbers imply favouritism towards fair-trade, negative numbers favour the control group. P-
values in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX 4.23 EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT 
      
10%
23%
17%
44%
6% 11%
37%
18%
27%
5%1%
non-FT FT
No Formal Ed Did not finish Primary
Completed Primary Did not finish Secondary
Completed Secondary 3rd Level
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
APPENDIX 4.24: INSTANCES OF CHILD MORTALITY 
83%
17%
80%
20%
non-FT FT
No children have died Yes children have died
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.25: EXPECTATIONS OF GENERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT 
 
9%
4%
86%
6% 4%
90%
non-FT FT
No Don't know
Yes
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
APPENDIX 4.26 DESIRE FOR CHILDREN TO REMAIN IN FARMING 
41%
12%
47%
41%
17%
42%
non-FT FT
No Indifferent
Yes
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.27: WHETHER CHILDREN ARE WITHDRAWN FROM 
SCHOOL DURING HARVEST TIME 
 
91%
1% 8%
82%
13%
5%
non-FT FT
No Yes
Don't know
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
APPENDIX 4.28: ACCESS TO A VISITING DOCTOR 
94%
6%
73%
27%
non-FT FT
NO YES
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.29 LIVING STANDARD IN COMPARISON TO PARENTS 
68%
29%
4%
72%
22%
5%
non-FT FT
Higher standard Same standard
Lower Standard
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
APPENDIX 4.30: CHANGE IN LIVING STANDARD OVER THE LAST 3 TO 5 
YEARS 
5%
41%
54%
3%
16%
81%
non-FT FT
Worse Same
Improved
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.31 ACTIVE AND PASSIVE JOINT-BODY MEMBERSHIP 
 
96%
4% 1%
99%
non-FT FT
Passive Member Active Member
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4.32: INDEPENDENCE TESTS ON FAIR-TRADE AND DEGREE 
OF PARTICIPATION 
 
Variable Chi-sq Spearman 
Correlation 
 
Kendall 
tau-b 
Polychoric 
Correlation 
 
Participation 
within joint-
body 
83.9153 
(0.000) 
0.4327 
(0.000) 
0.3920 
(0.000) 
0.58982 
(0000) 
H0 for every test is independence between FT and the stated variable. Correlation coefficients are 
specified from a fair-trade dummy (ft=1) and the opposing variable is a ranked 1 to 4, conforming 
to a standard in which 4 is the highest level of participation. Hence positive numbers imply 
favouritism towards fair-trade, negative numbers favour the control group. P-values in parentheses 
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APPENDIX 4.33: WHETHER JOINT-BODY MEMBERSHIP IS 
PERCEIVED TO HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON LIVING 
STANDARDS 
1%
3%
96%
7%
91%
2%
non-FT FT
No Yes
Don't know/No answer
Graphs by Fairtrade
 
 
APPENDIX 4.34 ASSISTANCE WITH HEALTH AND/OR EDUCATION 
26%
70%
4% 5%
44%51%
non-FT FT
No assistance Assist either Education or Health
Assist with both Education & Health
Graphs by Fairtrade
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APPENDIX 4.35: OPINIONS ABOUT WHETHER FAIR-TRADE IS 
‘SPECIFICALLY’ RESPONSIBLE FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN LIVING 
STANDARDS 
6%
91%
3%
No Yes
Don't know/No answer
 
 
APPENDIX 4.36: WHETHER FAIR-TRADE MAKES SUFFICIENT 
PROVISIONS FOR COSTS OF LIVING AND FAMILY DEVELOPMENT  
 
   
16%
76%
8%
No Yes
Don't know/No answer
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APPENDIX 4.37: EXPECTATION OF BEING ABLE TO REPLY ON FAIR-
TRADE TO CONTINUE 
 
5%
88%
7%
No Yes
Don't know/No answer
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4.38: IF FAIR-TRADE DID NOT EXIST WHETHER THE 
WORKER WOULD DIVERT THEIR LABOUR TO DIFFERENT PRODUCTS 
35%
43%
22%
No Yes
Don't know/No answer
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APPENDIX 4.39 HOW PEOPLE FEEL THEIR RECEIVE FAIR-TRADE GAINS 
 
5%
59%
26%
10%
Straight Dividend Community projects
Part dividend, part community project Don't know/No answer
 
 
APPENDIX 4.40 RECORDS OF EXPECTED VALUE REPLACEMENTS 
 
Regressions x.2 and x.3 
Sick days 1 replacements of 0, median and mode 
 
Food and accommodation 7 replacements 
Total sample mean = 0.83 
Counterfactual mean = 0.76 
 
Educational assistance 22 replacements 
Total sample mean = 0.85 
Counterfactual mean = 0.7 
 
Health assistance 22 replacements 
Total sample mean = 0.57 
Counterfactual mean = 0.222 
 
Household income per capita 1 replacement  
Total sample mean = 492 
Counterfactual mean = 509 
 
Household expenditure  per capita 5 replacements  
Total sample mean = 242 
Counterfactual mean = 242 
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Participation index 24 replacements 
Total sample mean = 2.38 
Counterfactual mean = 1.12 
 
 
Regressions 2.2 and 2.3 
 
Sick days 1 replacements of 0, median and mode 
 
Food and accommodation 13 replacements 
Total sample mean = 0.83 
Counterfactual mean = 0.76 
 
Heath and educational assistance 38 replacements 
Total sample mean = 1.306 
Counterfactual mean = 0.78 
 
Past instances of child mortality 13 replacements 
Total sample mean = 0.189 
Counterfactual mean = 0.168 
 
Household income 2 replacements 
Total sample mean = 2176.564 
Counterfactual mean = 2335.604  
 
Household expenditure per capita 9 replacements  
Total sample mean = 263 
Counterfactual mean = 263 
 
Participation index 36 replacements 
Total sample mean = 2.03 
Counterfactual mean = 1.0833 
 
 
Regressions 3.2 and 3.3 
 
Ability to save regularly 1 replacement 
Total sample mean = 0.865 
Counterfactual mean = 0.52 
 
Voting activity 7 replacements  
Total sample mean = 0.707 
Counterfactual mean = 0.653 
 
Food and accommodation 7 replacements 
Total sample mean = 0.83 
Counterfactual mean = 0.76 
 
Food and accommodation 13 replacements 
Total sample mean = 0.83 
Counterfactual mean = 0.76 
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Educational assistance 37 replacements 
Total sample mean = 0.85 
Counterfactual mean = 0.7 
 
Household income per capita 2 replacement  
Total sample mean = 573.77 
Counterfactual mean = 555.21 
 
Household expenditure per capita 9  replacements  
Total sample mean = 263 
Counterfactual mean = 263 
 
Participation index 35 replacements 
Total sample mean = 2.03 
Counterfactual mean = 1.0833 
 
Trust farm 24 replacements 
Total sample mean = 0.7848 
Counterfactual mean = 0.6987 
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APPENDIX 4.41 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN THE MODELS 
 
  
Variable     Description 
Age Continious, respondents age in years. 
Sex Dummy, 0 Female, 1 Male 
Co-Hab Dummy, 0 living alone, 1 co-habiting/married. 
Personal Education Discrete, 0 to 5, increasing value implies increasing level attained. 
Sick days Continuous, cumber of days off work from illness. 
Regular savings Discrete, 1 to 3, increasing value implies. 
Future provision Dummy, 0 no financial provision for the future, 1 some financial 
provision. 
Vote Dummy, 0 does not vote , 1 person has some democratic voting 
activity. 
Food & Accom Dummy, 0 nothing provided, 1 food and/or accommodation provided 
Organisational 
support 
Descrete, 0, no assistance with either health or education, 1 assistance 
with either health or education, 2 assistance with both health and 
education. 
Educational 
support 
Dummy, 0 if no educational support is provided, 1 if educational 
support is provided 
Health 
support 
Dummy, 0 if no educational support is provided, 1 if educational 
support is provided 
Child mortality Dummy, 0 if no instances of child mortality, 1 if instances of CM. 
Income per capita Contentious, value in South African Rand. 
Expenditure per 
capita 
Contentious, value in South African Rand. 
Financial 
Assistance 
Dummy, 0 if the person receives no financial assistance, 1 if they do. 
Participation index Discrete, 0 to 4, increasing value implies increasing participation. 
 
Farm Trust 
Dummy, 0 if the farm generally fails to stand by its promises and 
obligations, 1 if the farm generally fails to stand by its promises and 
obligations.  
 
Cease_Farm 
Dummy, 0 if person has not considered to cease working on the farm 
which presently employs them, 1 if they have considered to cease 
faming on farm that presently employs them. 
Permanent Dummy, 0 seasonal worker, 1 permanent worker. 
Animals Dummy, 0 the person own no farm animals, 1 the person does own. 
Fair-Trade Dummy, 0 no FT, 1 FT. 
 
Child_Farm 
Dummy, 0 if the person does not want their child to remain in farming, 
1 if the person is not opposed to their child remaining involved in 
farming. 
living_stand35 Dummy, 0 if living standard has not improved over the last 3 to 5 
years, 1 of the persons no FT, 1 FT. 
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APPENDIX 4.42: ODDS RATIOS FOR REGRESSION 1 
 
 Regression 1.1 
0dds ratios 
Regression 1.2 
0dds ratios 
(sample means) 
 
Regression 1.3 
Odds ratios 
(counterfactual 
means) 
Dependent 
variable    ? 
Child_farm 
 
Child_farm 
 
Child_farm 
 
Age 0.9521885 
(0.029373)        
0.946247 
(0.0250701)       
0.9437253** 
(0.025062)     
Sex 1.959893 
(1.265137)         
1.60704 
(0.7636291)       
1.551568 
(0.739723)        
Co-Hab 0.868294 
(0.469869)        
0.9389358 
(0.4311137)       
0.916872 
(0.418540)     
Personal Education 0.9860876 
(0.249179)        
1.029878 
(0.211072)        
1.022643 
(0.210311)        
Sick days 0.9994154 
(0.036690)        
1.002773 
(0.031180)        
1.007361 
(0.0307215)       
Regular savings 1.136429 
(0.253649)         
1.279692 
(0.250685)        
1.315975 
(0.260086)        
Food & Accom 0.610394 
(0.366521)        
0.9894914 
(0.5057247)       
0.8905091 
(0.457654)     
Educational 
support 
4.394694 
(4.07028)         
5.613012** 
(3.913921)        
4.406011** 
(3.042427)      
Health 
support 
0.3878126 
(0.225299) 
0.5936098 
(0.2747841)       
0.405644* 
0.1982046     
Child mortality 0.2805321** 
(0.190039)        
(0.492626) 
.2649227       
0.5047363 
0.2704308   
Income per capita 1.00116 
(0.001056)         
1.001184 
(0.0008577)       
1.001013 
0.0008277        
Expenditure per 
capita 
1.000759 
(0.002191)         
1.001053 
(0.001826)        
1.001763 
0.0017169        
Financial 
Assistance 
2.943078** 
(1.5508)           
1.401959 
(0.576525)        
1.354217 
0.5549254        
Participation index 0.9777412 
(0.242409)        
0.9708141 
(0.200329)       
1.094818 
0.2408471        
Cease Farm 0.0883271*** 
(0.05932)     
0.1478837*** 
(0.071908)       
0.1469991*** 
0.07181     
Permanent 2.437922 
(1.96037)         
1.248943 
(0.756647)    
1.322817 
0.8050654        
Animals 3.107124 
(2.174921)         
2.245174 
(1.239645)        
2.359519 
1.327548         
Fair-trade 0.3791136 
 (0.28322)       
0.2773653** 
(0.1375526)       
0.3105314** 
(0.1740949)     
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APPENDIX 3.43 ODDS RATIOS FOR REGRESSION 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Regression 2.1 
0dds ratios 
Regression 2.2 
0dds ratios 
(sample means) 
 
Regression 2.3 
Odds ratios 
(counterfactual 
means) 
Dependent variable   
? 
Cease_farm 
 
Cease_farm 
 
Cease_farm 
 
Age 0.9556768* 
(0.0244667)       
0.946657*** 
(0.0181446)    
0.9469*** 
(0.0182)        
Sex 0.6415065 
(0.383134)        
1.789757 
(0.725492)        
1.780194 
(0.721998)        
Co-Hab 1.822245 
(0.9305285)        
1.742551 
(0.674374)        
1.741892 
(0.672994)        
Personal Education 1.544111* 
(0.3467837)        
1.174677 
(0.205721)        
1.175298 
(0.206077)        
Sick days 1.04364 
(0.0364992)        
1.03588 
(0.024387)        
1.035011 
(0.024304)        
Regular Savings 0.9690882 
(0.1997168)       
0.9888055 
(0.159918)     
0.9915294 
(0.159977)       
Future provision 3.826044 
5.216731         
0.9059954 
(0.57601)        
0.9395454 
(0.598391)       
Food & Accom 1.711203 
1.127523         
1.028691 
(0.472177)        
1.036539 
(0.479260)        
Organisational 
support 
0.6176067 
(0.2882491)       
0.8715029 
(0.2824473)       
0.8048797 
(0.279979)       
Child mortality 0.2755423* 
(0.1990267)       
0.5728189 
(0.290128)       
0.5577421 
(0.283740)       
Income per capita 0.9996901 
(0.000242)        
0.9998815 
(0.000156)    
0.999876 
(0.000155)       
Expenditure per 
capita 
1.003997** 
(0.001604)        
1.001115 
(0.00109)          
1.000963 
(0.001096)        
Financial 
Assistance 
0.4299517** 
(1.256686)        
1.382519 
(0.335329)     
1.40148 
(0.481307)        
Participation index 0.8742044 
(0.2107221)       
1.055719 
(0.184262)      
0.9537957 
(0.178381)       
Permanent 3.09024 
(2.765838)       
1.176199 
(0.6299009)      
1.148676 
(0.324838)       
Animals 0.4299517 
(0.3105601)       
0.6704191 
(0.335329)     
0.6438441 
(0.324838)       
Fair-trade 6.365983** 
 (5.048966)       
1.251075 
(0.534600)        
1.518169 
(0.738587)      
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APPENDIX 4.44 ODDS RATIOS FOR REGRESSION 3 
 
 Regression 3.1 
 
0dds ratios 
Regression 3.2 
0dds ratios 
(sample means) 
 
Regression 3.3 
Counterfactual 
means 
Dependent variable   
? 
living_stand35 living_stand35 living_stand35 
Age 0.94388** 
(0.02411)       
0.96032** 
(0.0177)        
0.96022** 
(0.0177)        
Marriage and 
cohabitation 
2.72758* 
(1.477633)        
2.4308** 
0.94662    
2.44214** 
(0.9520)        
education 0.8876 
(0.2123)        
0.84112 
(0.14911)       
0.83348 
(0.147782)       
Regular Savings 1.44091 
(0.37479)        
1.17416 
(0.21773)        
1.17141 
(0.21732)        
Vote 1.15257 
(0.71352)        
2.2892** 
(0.95302)         
2.22938* 
(0.9318)        
Food & Accom 0.58158 
(0.3805)        
-0.06631 
(0.36211)     
0.76827 
(0.3693)        
Educational 
support 
1.8662 
(1.4678)        
2.1895 
(1.0621)         
2.3766* 
(0.3693)        
Income per capita 0.99859* 
(0.0008)        
0.9995   
(0.0005)    
0.9995 
(0.0005)    
Expenditure per 
capita 
1.004095** 
(0.0020)        
1.0011 
(0.00122)          
1.0011 
(0.0012)        
Financial 
Assistance 
0.478705 
(0.23356)        
0.5188179* 
(0.183836)     
0.5049* 
(0.1798)        
Participation Index 1.08352 
(0.28235)        
0.954074 
(0.17100)     
0.9659 
(0.1724)     
Farm Trust 6.7947*** 
(3.5833)         
4.4485*** 
(1.8467)      
4.6095*** 
(1.91777)        
Permanent 0.77176 
(0.58449)       
1.2847 
(0.58402)      
1.249792 
(0.568198)        
Animals 3.8896* 
(3.1601)        
2.3771 
(1.3456)         
2.42867* 
(1.38199)        
Fair trade 5.2016** 
(3.22544)         
3.6232*** 
(1.468) 
3.32926*** 
(1.35952)        
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APPENDIX 4.45 QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH) 
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